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T e n d e r  O f f e r s  a n d  t h e  S a l e  o f  C o n t r o l :  
A n  A n a l o g u e  t o  D e t e r m i n e  t h e  V a l i d i t y  
o f  T a r g e t  M a n a g e m e n t  D e f e n s i v e  M e a s u r e s  
S t u a r t  R .  C o h n *  
T h e  c o r p o r a t e  w o r l d  h a s  b e e n  s a t i r i z e d  o n  t h e  s t a g e  a n d  p i l l o r i e d  i n  
t h e  t h e a t r e ,  b u t  f o r  s h e e r  d r a m a  l i t t l e  c o m p a r e s  t o  t h e  t r u e - l i f e  s c e n e s  
p l a y e d  a l m o s t  d a i l y  b y  a n  e v e r - c h a n g i n g  c a s t  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  o f f i c e r s ,  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a t t o r n e y s ,  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k e r s ,  a n d  o t h e r s  e n g a g e d  i n  p u r -
s u i n g  o r  d e f e a t i n g  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s .
1  
T h e  c o n f l i c t s  c r e a t e d  b y  s u c h  
o f f e r s  p r o v i d e  a  d i r e c t  a n d  h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a n  
a c q u i r o r  s e e k i n g  s u p p o r t  f r o m  t a r g e t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a n d  a n  e m b a t t l e d  
t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  f e a r i n g  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t .
2  
* P r o f e s s o r  o f  L a w ,  S p e s s a r d  L .  H o l l a n d  L a w  C e n t e r ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  F l o r i d a .  B . A .  
1 9 6 2 ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I l l i n o i s ;  H o n o u r s  D e g r e e  i n  J u r i s p r u d e n c e  1 9 6 4 ,  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y ;  
L L . B .  1 9 6 6 ,  Y a l e  U n i v e r s i t y .  T h e  a u t h o r  e x p r e s s e s  h i s  a p p r e c i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  F r a n k  M .  W o l f f ,  h i s  r e s e a r c h  a s s i s t a n t .  
1 .  R e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  t e r m  " t e n d e r  o f f e r "  d e n o t e  a  p u b l i c l y  a n n o u n c e d  a n d  b r o a d l y  
d i s s e m i n a t e d  o f f e r  a d d r e s s e d  t o  a l l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
t h e  " t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n , "  t o  p u r c h a s e  s h a r e s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n  a t  a  s t a t e d  p r i c e ,  
g e n e r a l l y  a  p r e m i u m  o v e r  m a r k e t ,  s u b j e c t  t o  s t a t e d  t i m e  l i m i t a t i o n s  a n d ,  o f t e n ,  m i n i m u m  
' p e r c e n t a g e  t e n d e r i n g  o f  s h a r e s .  P a y m e n t s  a r e  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  c a s h ,  s e c u r i t i e s ,  o r  a  c o m ·  
b i n a t i o n  t h e r e o f .  T h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  m a d e  d i r e c t l y  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  
a p p r o v a l  o r  a n y  o t h e r  f o r m a l  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
a l t h o u g h  a p p r o v a l  m a y  b e  s o u g h t  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  i n d u c i n g  t h e  t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e s .  T e n d e r  
o f f e r s  m a y  b e  f o r  a n y  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  s h a r e s ,  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  o f f e r s  
b e i n g  f o r  a t  l e a s t  a  s u f f i c i e n t  n u m b e r  o f  s h a r e s  t o  a c q u i r e  w o r k i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  t a r g e t .  
t e r m  " h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s "  r e f e r s  t o  t h o s e  o f f e r s  o p p o s e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  
t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  R e f e r e n c e  t o  " t e n d e r  o f f e r "  i n  t h i s  A r t i c l e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  b u t  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  l i m i t e d  t o  s t a t u t o r y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h a t  t e r m  u n d e r  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  § §  
l ! l ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) ,  1 4 ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  § §  7 8 m ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) ,  7 8 n ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f )  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  s e e  n o t e  
8  i n f r a .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  W e l l m a n  v .  D i c k i n s o n ,  4 7 5  F .  S u p p .  7 8 ! 1 ,  8 1 7 ,  8 2 6 - 2 7 ,  8 2 9 - 3 7  
( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 7 9 )  ( " c l a s s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  p r o t e c t e d , "  " t e n d e r  o f f e r , "  a n d  " e f f o r t  t o  g a i n  
c o n t r o l ' '  d e f i n e d ) .  
2 .  A l t h o u g h  n e g o t i a t e d  m e r g e r s  a n d  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a r e  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  m e a n s  o f  e f f e c t ·  
a  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  c o n t e s t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  c o m p r i s e d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3 0 %  o f  a l l  t e n d e r  
i n  1 9 7 8  a n d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  2 0 %  o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i n  1 9 7 9 ,  t h e r e  b e i n g ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
a n n u a l i z e d  t o t a l  o f  1 6 6  a n d  1 1 2  i n t e r f i r m  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  d u r i n g  s u c h  y e a r s .  A u s t i n ,  
O f f e r  U p d a t e :  1 9 7 8 - 1 9 7 9 ,  1 5  M E R G E R S  &  A C Q . U I S I T I O N S ,  S u m m e r  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  1 3 - 1 4 .  
f i g u r e s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  7 6 %  o f  c o n t e s t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i n  1 9 7 8  w e r e  a t  l e a s t  p a r -
s u c c e s s f u l ,  a n d  7 5 %  w e r e  i n  1 9 7 9 .  / d .  a t  1 8 .  T h e  s u c c e s s  r a t e s  a p p e a r  m i s l e a d i n g ,  
: l l O W e v e r ,  f o r  t h e y  d o  n o t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  i n c h o a t e  e f f o r t s  f r u s t r a t e d  b y  p r e - t e n d e r  o f f e r  
t d e £ e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  a n d  t h u s  n e v e r  b r o u g h t  t o  p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  
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Notorious contests in recent years include Occidental Petroleum-Mead 
Corporation, Anderson Clayton-Gerber Products, Carter Hawley Hale-
Marshall Field, and American Express-McGraw-Hill. 3 Each of these con-
frontations resulted in target management causing the eventual with-
drawal of the tender offer by employing a variety of defensive measures 
known colloquially as "scorched earth" tactics.• Although potential 
acquirors may be wary of entering upon so tumultuous a stage, the "urge 
to merge"5 among major corporations will continue to produce unsoli-
cited, nonnegotiated tender offers at varying scales of size. 6 
The hostile tender offer phenomenon has spawned wholesale defen-
sive measures adopted by target company management. 7 Strategies and 
16-17 infra. Moreover, the figures may not sufficiently include preliminary efforts that 
were publicly announced but, prior to any actual offer, overwhelmed by a torrent of 
defensive reactions. Austin's statistical table, for example, omits the highly contested, 
unsuccessful effort of American Express to proceed with a tender offer for the shares of 
McGraw-Hill. See note 97 infra. 
3. See text accompanying notes 80-81 and notes 59, 97 infra. 
4. While target management may select among the defensive measures described in 
Part I of this Article, it is not uncommon that management employs with immediate and 
full force as many of such measures on a concurrent basis as may be plausibly justified. 
Thus, litigation may be commenced at both federal and state levels, federal regulatory 
agencies may be besieged with pleas for intercession, white knights sought, publicity cam-
paigns undertaken, charter amendments proposed, and other measures initiated for the 
purpose of keeping the potential acquiror off balance, on the defensive, and perhaps, 
eventually enticed or required to withdraw. See notes 59, 97 infra. Employment of 
numerous defensive measures on a concurrent basis is referred to within the investment 
industry as "scorched earth" tactics. 
5. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Urge to 
Merge-Where Has it Come From and Where is it Going?, 35 Bus. LAW. 1417, 1417 
(1980). Mergers among companies having or creating a value in excess of $100 million 
grew from 14 in 1975, 41 in 1977, 80 in 1978 to over 90 in 1979. I d. at 1429. 
6. Often an unsolicited tender offer proceeds with the concurrence of target man-
agement, a concurrence whose enthusiasm may range from genuine to grudging depend-
ing upon management's view of its ability to influence the outcome of the tender offer 
and its future role in the acquired company. Occasionally an initial position of 
antagonism by target management is altered by sweetened packages, including a higher 
offering price and perhaps commitments for continuing employment of the target's prin·, 
cipal officers. Magnavox's opposition to the tender offer by T.M.C. Development Cor· 
poration, a subsidiary of North American Phillips Corporation, was expressed to stock· 
holders in terms of "the inadequacy of the offer of $8 per share in relationship to a book 
value in excess of $11.00." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977). Such' 
opposition was dropped after agreement by North American to employment contracts for 
16 Magnavox officers, despite the fact that the tender offer price was raised only to $9, , 
still well below book value. Id. 
7. The phenomenon has also spawned a new form of insurance, underwritten 
Lloyds of London, providing up to $1,000,000 for costs spent resisting hostile 
offers. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 564, at Y-1 Quly 30, 1980). Estimated costs 
sizeable contests are $300,000-$400,000 for attorneys' fees, $100,000-$200,000 
accountants, $200,000 for public relations, and $300,000-$400,000 for imfes1:m«mt, 
bankers. Id. Reportedly, insurance benefits are not payable unless the tender offer is 
cessfully resisted. Id. The existence of such insurance may create added impetus to 
management's determination to employ defensive measures, for the substantial costs will 
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techniques have been created at 
tion, causing a discernible la1 
management and counsel to de1 
courts to develop legal standard 
and novel area. The result is tha: 
is often mired in amorphous con 
different from the competing 
others affected by tender offer d 
quently voiced under the rubri1 
whose unbridled breadth gives st 
ambiguous are arguments ftam 
such concepts as the "business jt 
and the effect of standards set 
thereunder. 8 An alternative bal 
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dent economic theories and goal 
The predictable result of ·n 
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perspectives such as fiduciary _< 
inadequate as a means to devf 
evaluate specific measures. Such 
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, defending antitakeover tactics a 
the lost opportunity of a premill 
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bent management. The relative ~ 
be borne either by the insurance carri« 
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against target management. 
8. Williams Act, §§ 13(d), (e), (t), 
(e), (f) (1976). The Williams Act amen( 
§§ 13(d), (e) and 14(d), (e), (f). The 
require the filing with the Securities aJ 
an entity, person, or group acquiringr 
or intending to make a tender offer tl 
class of equity securities, the filing 
background of the acquiror, source of 
and any plans for future merger, reoJ 
assets or change in the target's board of 
considerations covering activities of bo 
contained in § 14(e). 
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1 1 d e  O c c i d e n t a l  P e t r o l e u m - M e a d  
·  P r o d u c t s ,  C a r t e r  H a w l e y  H a l e -
i f l c G r a w - H i l l .  
5  
E a c h  o f  t h e s e  c o n - ·  
n e n t  c a u s i n g  t h e  e v e n t u a l  w i t h -
~ a  v a r i e t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  
n "  t a c t i c s .  
4  
A l t h o u g h  p o t e n t i a l  
s o  t u m u l t u o u s  a  s t a g e ,  t h e  " u r g e  
w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  p r o d u c e  u n s o l i -
u y i n g  s c a l e s  o f  s i z e .  
6  
o n  h a s  s p a w n e d  w h o l e s a l e  d e f e n -
n y  m a n a g e m e n t .  
7  
S t r a t e g i e s  a n d  
i c i e n t l y  i n c l u d e  p r e l i m i n a r y  e f f o r t s  t h a t  
1 1 a l  o f f e r ,  o v e r w h e l m e d  b y  a  t o r r e n t  o f  
'~'example, o m i t s  t h e  h i g h l y  c o n t e s t e d ,  
~ w i t h  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  
n o t e s  5 9 ,  9 7  i n f r a .  
t o n g  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
m a g e m e n t  e m p l o y s  w i t h  i m m e d i a t e  a n d  
r r e n t  b a s i s  a s  m a y  b e  p l a u s i b l y  j u s t i f i e d .  
l e r a l  a n d  s t a t e  l e v e l s ,  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  
o n ,  w h i t e  k n i g h t s  s o u g h t ,  p u b l i c i t y  e a r n -
e d ,  a n d  o t h e r  m e a s u r e s  i n i t i a t e d  f o r  t h e  
N l l a n c e ,  o n  t h e  d e f e n s i v e ,  a n d  p e r h a p s ,  
e e  n o t e s  5 9 ,  9 7  i n f r a .  E m p l o y m e n t  o f  
• a s i s  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  w i t h i n  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  
k i n g  a n d  B u s i n e s s  L a w ,  T h e  U r g e  t o  
i S  i t  G o i n g ? ,  3 5  B u s .  L A W .  1 4 1 7 ,  1 4 1 7  
e a t 1 n g  a  v a l u e  i n  e x c e s s  o f  $ 1 0 0  m i l l i o n  
: o v e r  9 0  i n  1 9 7 9 .  l d .  a t  1 4 2 9 .  
d s  w i t h  t h e  c o n c u r r e n c e  o f  t a r g e t  m a n -
: a n g e  f r o m  g e n u i n e  t o  g r u d g i n g  d e p e n d -
R u e n c e  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  ,  
y .  O c c a s i o n a l l y  a n  i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  
s w e e t e n e d  p a c k a g e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a  h i g h e r  
. t i n u i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  p r i n ·  
c ; l e r  o f f e r  b y  T . M . C .  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o r -
i p s  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  w a s  e x p r e s s e d  t o  s t o c k ·  
o f  $ 8  p e r  s h a r e  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  a  b o o k  
: 0 . ,  3 8 0  A . 2 d  9 6 9 ,  9 7 1  ( D e l .  1 9 7 7 ) .  S u c h  
h  A m e r i c a n  t o  e m p l o y m e n t  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  
t e n d e r  o f f e r  p r i c e  w a s  r a i s e d  o n l y  t o  $ 9 ,  
n  f o r m  o f  i n s u r a n c e .  u n d e r w r i t t e n  b y  
I  f o r  c o s t s  s p e n t  r e s i s t i n g  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  
Y - 1  Q u l y  3 0 ,  1 9 8 0 ) .  E s t i m a t e d  c o s t s  f o r  
a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s ,  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 - $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  f o r  
m d  $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 - $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t ,  
1 0 t  p a y a b l e  u n l e s s  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  s u c -
l i U I ' a n c e  m a y  c r e a t e  a d d e d  i m p e t u s  t o  
> e  m e a s u r e s ,  f o r  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o s t s  w i l l  
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t e c h n i q u e s  h a v e  b e e n  c r e a t e d  a t  a  p a c e  f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  l i t i g a  ·  
t i o n ,  c a u s i n g  a  d i s c e r n i b l e  l a g  b e t w e e n  t h e  i n g e n u i t y  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  c o u n s e l  t o  d e v i s e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  
c o u r t s  t o  d e v e l o p  l e g a l  s t a n d a r d s  e f f e c t i v e l y  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h i s  e x p a n d i n g  
a n d  n o v e l  a r e a .  T h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  
i s  o f t e n  m i r e d  i n  a m o r p h o u s  c o n c e p t s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  c o n t e x t s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  c o m p e t i n g  c l a i m s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n v e s t o r s ,  a n d  
o t h e r s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t e n d e r  o f f e r  d i s p u t e s .  A r g u m e n t s  a s  t o  v a l i d i t y  a r e  f r e -
q u e n t l y  v o i c e d  u n d e r  t h e  r u b r i c  o f  " f i d u c i a r y  d u t y , "  t h e  o l d  w a r h o r s e  
w h o s e  u n b r i d l e d  b r e a d t h  g i v e s  s u s t e n a n c e  t o  i n n u m e r a b l e  c l a i m s .  N o  l e s s  
a m b i g u o u s  a r e  a r g u m e n t s  f r a m e d  u p o n  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
s u c h  c o n c e p t s  a s  t h e  " b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e , "  "  c o r p o r a t e  d e m o c r a c y , "  
a n d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s t a n d a r d s  s e t  b y  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  
t h e r e u n d e r .  
8  
A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  b a s i s  f o r  e v a l u a t i o n  r e l i e s  u p o n  e c o n o m i c  
a n a l y s i s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n t e r e s t s .  H e r e  t o o ,  h o w e v e r ,  a n  
a u r a  o f  r e a s o n  f a d e s  i n  t h e  t a n g l e  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  p o s i t i o n s  u t i l i z i n g  i n d e p e n -
d e n t  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r i e s  a n d  g o a l s .  
T h e  p r e d i c t a b l e  r e s u l t  o f  r e l i a n c e  u p o n  e x p a n s i v e ,  i l l - d e f i n e d ,  a n d  
p e r h a p s  i n d e f i n a b l e  c o n c e p t s  i s  a  l a c k  o f  c o h e s i v e  s t a n d a r d s  b y  w h i c h  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  j u d g e d .  B r o a d  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  s u c h  a s  f i d u c i a r y  o r  s t a t u t o r y  c o n c e p t s  h a v e  b e e n  w h o l l y  
i n a d e q u a t e  a s  a  m e a n s  t o  d e v e l o p  m e a n i n g f u l  s t a n d a r d s  b y  w h i c h  t o  
e v a l u a t e  s p e c i f i c  m e a s u r e s .  S u c h  i n a d e q u a c y  i s  s t r i k i n g l y  r e v e a l e d  b y  t h e  
e s p o u s a l  o f  t h e  b r o a d  c o n c e p t s  n o t e d  b y  b o t h  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  
d e f e n d i n g  a n t i t a k e o v e r  t a c t i c s  a n d  d i s g r u n t l e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  r e a c t i n g  t o  
t h e  l o s t  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  a  p r e m i u m  s a l e .  
T h e  p a t t e r n  o f  c a s e  l a w  t o  d a t e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  l a c k  o f  d e f i n i t i v e  
s t a n d a r d s .  I n  t h e  p r o f u s i o n  o f  n e b u l o u s  a n d  c o n f l i c t i n g  s t a n d a r d s ,  c o u r t s  
h a v e  b e e n  r e l u c t a n t  t o  f i n d  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  l i a b i l i t y  o r  t o  e n j o i n  c e r -
t a i n  m e a s u r e s  e x c e p t  i n  e g r e g i o u s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h e r e  d e f e n s i v e  a c t i o n s  
b l a t a n t l y  d e f y  a n y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i o n  o f  i n c u m -
b e n t  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  r e l a t i v e  e a s e  b y  w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  c r e a t e  a  
b e  b o r n e  e i t h e r  b y  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c a r r i e r  o r  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  t h e  
o u t c o m e .  Q u e s t i o n s  m a y  a r i s e  a b o u t  w h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  " s u c c e s s f u l  r e s i s t a n c e , "  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i f  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a r e  f r u s t r a t e d  b u t  s u b s e q u e n t  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n s  r e s u l t  i n  d a m a g e  a w a r d s  
a g a i n s t  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
8 .  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  § §  1 3 ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) ,  1 4 ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  § §  7 8 m ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  7 8 n ( d ) ,  
( e ) ,  ( f )  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  T h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  a m e n d e d  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  E x c h a n g e  A c t  o f  1 9 3 4  b y  a d d i n g  
§ §  1 3 ( d ) ,  ( e )  a n d  1 4 ( d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f ) .  T h e  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h e r e u n d e r  
r e q u i r e  t h e  f i l i n g  w i t h  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( S E C )  o f  d o c u m e n t s  b y  
a n  e n t i t y ,  p e r s o n ,  o r  g r o u p  a c q u i r i n g  m o r e  t h a n  5 %  b e n e f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  c o r p o r a t i o n  
o r  i n t e n d i n g  t o  m a k e  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  t h a t  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  o b t a i n i n g  m o r e  t h a n  5 %  o f  a  
c l a s s  o f  e q u i t y  s e c u r i t i e s ,  t h e  f i l i n g  t o  i n c l u d e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  i d e n t i t y  a n d  
b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  a c q u i r o r ,  s o u r c e  o f  f u n d s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
a n d  a n y  p l a n s  f o r  f u t u r e  m e r g e r ,  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  o r  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l  u s e  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  
a s s e t s  o r  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  / d .  §  7 8 m ( d ) ( 1 ) ,  ( e ) .  G e n e r a l  a n t i f r a u d  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  b o t h  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r o r  a n d  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n  a r e  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  §  1 4 ( e ) .  
1 1 . '  
1 · 1  
d  
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patina of legitimacy for defensive measures results in even further con-
striction of judicial relief. The recent district court decision in Panter v. 
Marshall Field (I Co. 9 is representative of judicial myopia in this area. As 
more fully discussed below, 10 the court's dismissal of the shareholder 
complaint against management's successful blocking of the Carter 
Hawley Hale tender offer was laced with imposing references to fiduciary 
obligations and business judgment concepts. Yet the opinion of the court 
is one of homage without substance, for there is a marked lack of evalua-
tion of the fundamental question whether a business- as opposed to a 
survival- judgment was in fact made, or whether the judgment made 
was based upon adequate consideration of relevant facts. 11 
Panter, unfortunately, is not aberrational. The Second Circuit's 
recent decision in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 12 reflects a similar 
eagerness to- embrace a business judgment standard despite a lower 
·court's explicit findings that target management's actions created 
unusual and deleterious effects upon the corporation and minority 
stockholders. 15 Until standards for control battles are more sharply 
delineated, one cannot expect courts, with occasional exception, to be 
other than inadequate arbiters of competing interests, routinely endorsing 
and thus perpetuating the confusing maze of contradictory rationales. 
Identifying appropriate and feasible standards for evaluating defensive 
measures goes beyond creating a framework for judicial response. Inherent 
in such an exercise is determining a formula for according priorities and 
limitations among the competing rights, obligations, and interests of 
management, shareholders, and the corporate entity}• 
The ambiguities inherent in current perspectives might be substan-
tially reduced if attention is focused on the nature and effect of the 
tender offer, analogizing a successful tender offer to the sale of control by 
a single or otherwise controlling shareholder. The owner of a fractional 
percentage of shares who joins with others in the collective sale of control 
in the tender offer context should be subject to no greater limitations 
upon transferability decisions than is the fifty-one percent owner who 
9. 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1389 (7th Cir. Mar. 
24, 1980). Notwithstanding eventual disposition, the factual context is illustrative and the 
district court's treatment of such issues as fiduciary duty and business judgment is indica· 
tive of the lack of clarity and direction within these standards. 
10. See text accompanying notes 87, 121-24 z"nfra. 
11. See note 124 z"nfra. 
12. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,603 (2d Cir. 1980). 
13. See notes 107, 112 'infra. 
14. The standards and perspectives proposed in this Article may appropriately be 
adopted at the judicial level without imposition of statutory or administrative controls. 
The proposals have accordingly been directed towards a judicial response, although no 
inference is intended that legislative or regulatory intervention consistent with such stan· 
dards should necessarily be avoided. As a matter of preference, it appears that the tender 
offer context contains complexities and variables more appropriately suited for judicial 
evaluation than the mandatory application of potentially inflexible rules. 
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I r e S  r e s u l t s  i n  e v e n  f u r t h e r  c o n ·  
t r i c t  c o u r t  d e c i s i o n  i n  P a n t e r  v .  
' j u d i c i a l  m y o p i a  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  A s  
' s  d i s m i s s a l  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r  
~ful b l o c k i n g  o f  t h e  C a r t e r  
i m p o s i n g  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  f i d u c i a r y  
~· Y e t  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  c o u r t  
h e r e  i s  a  m a r k e d  l a c k  o f  e v a l u a -
e r  a  b u s i n e s s - a s  o p p o s e d  t o  a  
• r  w h e t h e r  t h e  j u d g m e n t  m a d e  
o f  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s .
1 1  
r a t i o n a l .  T h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t ' s  
a r e  ? : o r p .  , u  r e f l e c t s  a  s i m i l a r  
! l e n t  s t a n d a r d  d e s p i t e  a  l o w e r  
n a n a g e m e n t ' s  a c t i o n s  c r e a t e d  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  m i n o r i t y  
t t r o l  b a t t l e s  a r e  m o r e  s h a r p l y  
i t h  o c c a s i o n a l  e x c e p t i o n ,  t o  b e  
n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  r o u t i n e l y  e n d o r s i n g  
t z e  o f  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  r a t i o n a l e s .  
1 d a r d s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  d e f e n s i v e  
~k f o r  j u d i c i a l  r e s p o n s e .  I n h e r e n t  
a l a  f o r  a c c o r d i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  a n d  
1 , .  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  a n d  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
o r a t e  e n t i t y  . 1 4  
· p e r s p e c t i v e s  m i g h t  b e  s u b s t a n -
l l h e  n a t u r e  a n d  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
t e r '  o f f e r  t o  t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  b y  
I c i e r .  T h e  o w n e r  o f  a  f r a c t i o n a l  
5  i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  
l b j e c t  t o  n o  g r e a t e r  l i m i t a t i o n s  
e  f i f t y - o n e  p e r c e n t  o w n e r  w h o  
r d o c k e t e d ,  N o .  8 0 - 1 3 8 9  ( 7 t h  C i r .  M a r .  
1 e  f a c t u a l  c o n t e x t  i s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  a n d  t h e  
r  d u t y  a n d  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  i s  i n d i c a -
s e  s t a n d a r d s .  
l . f r a .  
.  1 9 8 0 ) .  
i n  t h i s  A r t i c l e  m a y  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  b e  
I f  s t a t u t o r y  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l s .  
r a r d s  a  j u d i c i a l  r e s p o n s e ,  a l t h o u g h  n o  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  s u c h  s t a n -
[  p r e f e r e n c e ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  t e n d e r  
m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  s u i t e d  f o r  j u d i c i a l  
e n t i a l l y  i n f l e x i b l e  r u l e s .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 7 9  
m u s t  b e  c o g n i z a n t  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n c e r n s
1 5  
b u t  o v e r  w h o m  m a n a g e m e n t  
g e n e r a l l y  h a s  n o  c o n t r o l .  S t a n d a r d s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
a n d  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  f r o m  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d a n g e r s  o f  a n  i l l - a d v i s e d  
s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  b y  a  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  m a y  b e  e q u a l l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  j u d g e  t h e  w i s d o m  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  b y  t h e  
c o l l e c t i v e  j u d g m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  s t a n -
d a r d s  s u p p o r t s  c e r t a i n  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  d e n i e s  o r  s u g g e s t s  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  o t h e r s ,  a n d  i n  e a c h  i n s t a n c e  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  f o c u s e s  
m u c h  m o r e  d i r e c t l y  a n d  a c c u r a t e l y  o n  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
t e n d e r  o f f e r s  t h a n  d o  t h e  a n a l y s e s  o f  c u r r e n t l y  e m p l o y e d  c o n c e p t s .  
A f t e r  b r i e f l y  o u t l i n i n g  p r i n c i p a l  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s ,  P a r t  I  o f  t h i s  
A r t i c l e  w i l l  e x a m i n e  e a c h  o f  t h e  f i d u c i a r y ,  s t a t u t o r y ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  g e n e r a l l y  a d v a n c e d  i n  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s t r u g g l e s ,  f o c u s i n g  u p o n  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  e m p l o y i n g  s u c h  p e r s p e c t i v e s  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  P a r t  I I  w i l l  p o s i t  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h ,  a n a l o g i z -
i n g  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  o f  t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  a  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  b y  
a  s i n g l e ,  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r .  S p e c i f i c  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b y  t a r g e t  
m a n a g e m e n t  t o  i m p e d e  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  w i l l  b e  a n a l y z e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e .  
P A R T  I  
A .  D e f e n s i v e  M e a s u r e s  b y  T a r g e t  M a n a g e m e n t  
1 .  P r e p a r a t o r y  A c t i o n s  
T h e  n o t o r i e t y  o f  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  u n e a s e  o f  t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t s  h a v e  c r e a t e d  a  w e l t e r  o f  a n t i c i p a t o r y  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  I n d e e d ,  c o r p o r a t e  c o u n s e l  u n i f o r m l y  a d v i s e  t h a t  w h e n  
d i r e c t o r s  a n d  o f f i c e r s  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  a  r e a s o n a b l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a n  
u n w a n t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  e x i s t s ,
1 6  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  n o t  w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  w o l f  
i s  a t  t h e  d o o r Y  T h i s  a d v i c e  h a s  s o u n d  t a c t i c a l  a n d  l e g a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  
D e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e , s  t h a t  a r e  f i r s t  r a i s e d  d u r i n g  a  c o n t r o l ·  b a t t l e  w i l l  o f t e n  
1 5 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  1 7 1 - 8 0  i n f r a .  
1 6 .  F a c t o r s  r e l e v a n t  t o  s u c h  e v a l u a t i o n  i n c l u d e  s i z e  a n d  e x t e n t  o f  b l o c k  h o l d i n g s  o f  
.  s h a r e s ,  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s  o w n e d  o r  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  t h o s e  l i k e l y  t o  s i d e  
w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ,  c o r p o r a t e  l i q u i d i t y ,  a n t i t r u s t  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  m a t t e r s ,  a n d  s i m i l a r  
e c o n o m i c  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  f a c t o r s .  F o r  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  s u c h  f a c t o r s ,  s e e  H a y e s  &  T a u s s i g ,  
T a c t i c s  o f  C a s h  T a k e o v e r  B i d s ,  4 5  H A R V .  B u s .  R E v . ,  M a r . - A p r .  1 9 6 7 ,  a t  1 3 8 ;  T r o u b h ,  
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  T a r g e t  C o m p a n i e s ,  3 2  B u s .  L A W .  1 3 0 1 ,  1 3 0 1 - 0 4  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
1 7 .  F o r m i n g  a  " t e a m "  t o  a s s i s t  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  a d v a n c e  p l a n n i n g  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
S m a l l ,  D e f e n d i n g  T a r g e t  C o m p a n i e s - G e n e r a l  P e r s p e c t i v e s ,  3 2  B u s .  L A W .  1 3 4 9 ,  1 3 5 1 - 5 2  
( 1 9 7 7 ) .  A d v a n c e  p l a n n i n g  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  P a n t e r  v .  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d ,  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  1 1 6 8  
( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  a p p e a l  d o c k e t e d ,  N o .  8 0 - 1 3 8 9  ( 7 t h  C i r .  M a r .  2 4 ,  1 9 8 0 ) ,  i n  w h i c h  M a r -
s h a l l  F i e l d  h i r e d  s p e c i a l  c o u n s e l  i n  1 9 6 9 ,  1 0  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  a n y  t e n d e r  o f f e r  e f f o r t ,  t o  a d v i s e  
i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a n y  t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t ,  w i t h  c o u n s e l  t h e r e a f t e r  a t t e n d i n g  e a c h  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c -
t o r s  m e e t i n g .  I d .  a t  1 1 7 6 - 7 7 .  
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meet with substantially increased shareholder resistance and judicial 
scrutiny. 18 
Questions of validity are most sharply raised with regard to aggressive 
antitakeover measures that attempt to create a porcupine-type defense not 
dependent upon the hope that shareholders will reject the tender offer 
either because of loyalty to, or the persuasive logic of, target manage· 
ment. 19 Nonaggressive measures such as frequent communications to 
shareholders, particular attention to holders of large blocks of targeted 
shares, and respectable dividend policies generate a goodwill between 
shareholders and management that may be of considerable help in com· 
batting takeover efforts. Such measures, however, create far less impedi· 
ment to both target shareholders and acquiring companies than do the 
aggressive measures described below, and are often only an incidental 
part of an expanded package of defensive tools. 
Aggressive defensive measures are designed to impose substantial 
tactical and administrative barriers to the pursuance of a hostile tender 
offer. The following discussion briefly notes the more commonly adopted 
measures, adopted individually or in various combinations. 
Amendments to the articles of incorporation. A pervasive and poten-
tially highly effective antitakeover device is the adoption of charter 
amendments enlarging the defensive powers of target management and 
making the corporation an unattractive takeover candidate. 20 Although 
wide variations exist, the principal types of charter provisions sought by 
18. Proxy statements for charter amendments to be adopted during the pendency of a 
control fight will not only alert shareholders to their potential loss of premium in a 
specific context (should the amendment pass), but will also involve much greater risks of 
nondisclosure or misleading statements regarding the control issues. Compare, for exam-
ple, the extensive disclosures in the April 18, 1979, proxy statement of Outdoor Sports 
Industries, Inc., issued during an ongoing tender offer for the shares of OSI, with the 
brief discussion contained in the December 15, 1978, proxy statement of Alberto-Culver 
Company issued at a time of no pending or anticipated tender offer. Extracts of each of 
the proxy statements are set forth in A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFER: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, 
AND PLANNING 400-75 to 400-111 (1979). 
19. Description of defensive measures in this Article is intended principally as a 
background for discussion of the legal models used to determine justification. Com-
prehensive descriptions of the variety of available defensive measures are set forth in E. 
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973); E. 
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR COR· 
PORATECONTROL 193·206 (1977); A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 113-56; and 1M. LIP· 
TON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 263-325 (1978). The defensive 
measures discussed are applicable to cash tender offers. Where the offer is premised upon 
an exchange of securities, additional measures based upon the quality of the security 
offered, disclosure, and other securities law concerns may be taken. This Article will focus 
principally, however, upon measures common to both cash and exchange offers. 
20. Discussion of a wide variety of defensive charter provisions is found in Buford, 
Amending the Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAW. 1353, 1353-56 (1977); Hochman & 
Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 
537-56 (1979); and Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provi-
sions, 25 Bus. LAw. 1441, 1441-62 (1970). 
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l f e h o l d e r  r e s i s t a n c e  a n d  j u d i c i a l  
1 l y  r a i s e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  a g g r e s s i v e  
: - e a t e  a  p o r c u p i n e - t y p e  d e f e n s e  n o t  
> l d e r s  w i l l  r e j e c t  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
r s u a s i v e  l o g i c  o f ,  t a r g e t  m a n a g e -
a s  f r e q u e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  t o  
> l d e r s  o f  l a r g e  b l o c k s  o f  t a r g e t e d  
i e s  g e n e r a t e  a  g o o d w i l l  b e t w e e n  
y  b e  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  h e l p  i n  c o m -
,  h o w e v e r ,  c r e a t e  f a r  l e s s  i m p e d i -
l c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n i e s  t h a n  d o  t h e  
m d  a r e  o f t e n  o n l y  a n  i n c i d e n t a l  
i v e  t o o l s .  
~·designed t o  i m p o s e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
t h e  p u r s u a n c e  o f  a  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  
t o t e s  t h e  m o r e  c o m m o n l y  a d o p t e d  
i l r i o u s  c o m b i n a t i o n s .  
r p o r a t i o n .  A  p e r v a s i v e  a n d  p a t e n -
v i c e  i s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  c h a r t e r  
o w e r s  o f  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
e  t a k e o v e r  c a n d i d a t e .  
2 0  
A l t h o u g h  
e s  o f  c h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  s o u g h t  b y  
. t s  t o  b e  a d o p t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  a  
t o  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  o f  p r e m i u m  i n  a  
~~t w i l l  a l s o  i n v o l v e  m u c h  g r e a t e r  r i s k s  o f  
a g t ; h e  c o n t r o l  i s s u e s .  C o m p a r e ,  f o r  e x a m -
l 9 7 9 ,  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t  o f  O u t d o o r  S p o r t s  
d e r  o f f e r  f o r  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  O S I ,  w i t h  t h e  
1 9 7 8 ,  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t  o f  A l b e r t o - C u l v e r  
i c i p a t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r . ,  E x t r a c t s  o f  e a c h  o f  
E R ,  T E N D E R  O F F E R :  D E F E N S E S ,  R E S P O N S E S .  
t h i s  A r t i c l e  i s  i n t e n d e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  a s  a  
s  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  C o m -
> l e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  s e t  f o r t h  i n  E .  
C O R P O R A T E  C O N T R O L  2 1 9 - 7 6  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  E .  
~LOPMENTS I N  T E N D E R  O F F . E R S  F O R  C O R ·  
l ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  1 1 3 - 5 6 ;  a n d  1  M .  L I P ·  
~EOUTS 2 6 3 - 3 2 5  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  T h e  d e f e n s i v e  
r  o f f e r s .  W h e r e  t h e  o f f e r  i s  p r e m i s e d  u p o n  
1  . b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
: e m s  m a y  b e  t a k e n .  T h i s  A r t i c l e  w i l l  f o c u s  
t o  b o t h  c a s h  a n d  e x c h a n g e  o f f e r s .  
r e  c h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  i s  f o u n d  i n  B u f o r d ,  
A W .  1 3 5 3 ,  1 3 5 3 - 5 6  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  H o c h m a n  &  
y - L a w  T e c h n i q u e s ,  3 4  B u s .  L A W .  5 3 7 ,  
' 1 S t  T a k e o v e r s - D e f e n s i v e  C h a r t e r  P r o v i -
'  
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t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  s p e c i f y  b r o a d  a r e a s  f o r  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s '  c o n c e r n s ,  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  m i n i m u m  v o t e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m e r g e r s ,  a n d  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  
w h o l e s a l e  c h a n g e s  i n  b o a r d  c o m p o s i t i o n .  
C h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  a u t h o r i z i n g  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  a  
b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  f a c t o r s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  t o  r e s i s t  a  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  
o f f e r  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  l e g i t i m a t e  a n d  t h u s  r e m o v e  a n y  q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d -
i n g  t h e  b r e a d t h  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  c o n c e r n s  t h a t  m a y  j u s t i f y  d e f e n s e  r e a c -
t i o n s .  S h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  M a c D o n a l d ' s  C o r p o r a t i o n  w e r e  t h u s  a s k e d  t o  
a m e n d  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  a r t i c l e s  t o  p e r m i t  d i r e c t o r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  s u c h  f a c -
t o r s  a s  " t h e  s o c i a l ,  l e g a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  e f f e c t  o n  f r a n c h i s e s ,  e m p l o y e e s ,  
s u p p l i e r s ,  c u s t o m e r s  a n d  b u s i n e s s "  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  w h e t h e r  t o  r e s i s t  t e n d e r  
o f f e r s .
2 1  
M a n a g e m e n t  o f  F o r e m o s t - M c K e s s o n ,  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  i n t e n -
t i o n s  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r ,  o b t a i n e d  a p p r o v a l  f r o m  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  a n  a m e n d m e n t  a u t h o r i z i n g  t h e  b o a r d  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
s t o c k  p u r c h a s e s  b y  " a  p e r s o n  o r  p e r s o n s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  b e  u n s u i t a b l e  b y  
g o v e r n m e n t  a u t h o r i t i e s , "  a n d  e m p o w e r i n g  t h e  b o a r d  t o  e x p r e s s  v i e w s  t o  
r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  o n  t h a t  s u b j e c t .
2 2  
A l t h o u g h  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  m a y  
t e c h n i c a l l y  b e  u n n e c e s s a r y  i n  l i g h t  o f  e x p a n d i n g  n o t i o n s  o f  b o a r d  r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t i e s ,  
2 5  
t h e y  r e m o v e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  v a l i d i t y  r e g a r d i n g  i n d i r e c t  c o n c e r n s  
a n d  o f f e r  s u p p o r t  t o  b o a r d  m e m b e r s  w h o  m i g h t  b e  o t h e r w i s e  c a u t i o u s  o f  
b l o c k i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  f a v o r a b l e  p r e m i u m  o f f e r s .  
A  s e c o n d  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  m o r e  i m p e d i n g  a m e n d m e n t  r e q u i r e s  a  
s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t e  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  a p p r o v e  a  m e r g e r  w i t h  a n y  p a r t y  t h a t  
h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  o b t a i n e d  a  s p e c i f i e d  m i n i m u m  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s .  S u p e r -
m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  t y p i c a l l y  r a n g e  f r o m  t w o - t h i r d s  t o  a s  m u c h  a s  n i n e t y  
p e r c e n t ,  a  h i g h e r  f i g u r e  o f t e n  r e f l e c t i n g  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
s h a r e s  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i n s i d e r s .  
2 4  
A s  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a r e  f r e -
q u e n t l y  t h e  f i r s t  o f  a  t w o - s t e p  p r o c e s s  i n v o l v i n g  e v e n t u a l  m e r g e r  o f  t h e  
a c q u i r i n g  a n d  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  i m p e d i m e n t  t o  m e r g e r  
m a y  c o n s i d e r a b l y  r e d u c e  t h e  r i s k  o f  a  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  T o  a v o i d  t h e  
s u p e r m a j o r i t y  i m p e d i m e n t  f r o m  l a t e r  b e i n g  a m e n d e d  d o w n  t o  a  m o r e  
w o r k a b l e  p e r c e n t a g e ,  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  t h e  
f u r t h e r  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e y  c a n n o t  b e  a m e n d e d  o r  r e p e a l e d  e x c e p t  b y  
2 1 .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  A p r .  3 0 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  1 0 ,  c o l .  2 .  
2 2 .  / d . ,  J u l y  2 4 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  2 5 ,  c o l .  2 .  
2 3 .  S e e  n o t e  7 1  i n f r a .  
2 4 .  A  t w o - t h i r d s  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  p r o p o s e d  f o r  M a c D o n a l d s .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  A p r .  3 0 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  
a t  1 0 ,  c o l .  2 .  A  t y p i c a l  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  a d o p t e d  b y  B e l l  I n d u s t r i e s ,  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a n  a f f i r -
m a t i v e  v o t e  o f  a t  l e a s t  7 5 %  o f  B e l l ' s  s h a r e s  t o  a u t h o r i z e  a  m e r g e r ,  c o n s o l i d a t i o n ,  o r  s a l e  o f  
a s s e t s  w i t h  a  " r e l a t e d  e n t i t y , "  d e f i n e d  a s  a  p e r s o n  o r  e n t i t y  o w n i n g  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  
2 0 %  o f  B e l l ' s  v o t i n g  s e c u r i t i e s .  I d . ,  O c t .  1 9 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  6 ,  c o l .  2 .  A n  8 0 - 1 0  c o m b i n a t i o n  i s  
a l s o  c o m m o n ,  r e q u i r i n g  8 0 %  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  f o r  m e r g e r  w i t h  o w n e r s  o f  1 0 %  o r  
m o r e  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  s h a r e s .  S e e  T h r e e  M o r e  C o m p a n i e s  L a y  P l a n s  t o  I m p e d e  H o s t i l e  
T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  A p r .  9 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  1 4 ,  c o l .  2 .  A n  e x a m p l e  o f  a  9 0 %  p r o v i s i o n  i s  
d e s c r i b e d  i n  B u f o r d ,  A m e n d i n g  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  C h a r t e r ,  3 2  B u s .  L A W .  1 3 5 3 ,  1 3 5 4  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
F 1 e i s c h e r  n o t e s  a  v a r i a t i o n  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  v o t e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o n  a  s c a l e  r e l a t i v e  t o  a n  
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an equally high supermajority vote. 25 An additional related provision, to 
assure that friendly or negotiated mergers do not face the difficult hurdle 
of supermajority approval, permits approval of mergers by a simple major-
ity vote if the board of directors has approved the merger prior to the 
acquiring company's attainment of control of the board of directors.26 
The consequent ability of the board to affect voting requirements has 
survived challenge in at least two statesY However, the more fundamen-
tal question of adoption of a supermajority amendment through a simple 
majority vote has not yet been directly addressed. zs 
A third and frequent form of charter amendment provides for a 
classified board of directors, thus delaying the ability of the acquiring 
company to obtain majority control of the board.29 The limitation could 
be an extremely effective impediment where acquisition of control on a 
near-term basis is important to the potential offeror, including situations 
where the offeror intends to utilize assets of the target company to fund 
the costs of acquisition. 
Reincorporation. A majority of states have adopted statutes imposing 
advance notice, filing, and other requirements upon potential acquirors of 
target corporations incorporated, located in, or otherwise having substan-
tial connections with the state. 50 Often referred to as antitakeover statutes, 
25. Such restrictions may be superfluous, however, in some states that establish such 
limitation by statute. Delaware's statute, for example, requires "such greater vote" to 
alter, amend, or repeal a supermajority provision. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(4) 
(Supp. 1978). 
26. Again, variations abound. Some corporations may vest the waiver power in "con-
tinuing directors," that is, directors elected prior to the potential acquiror's acquisition of 
shares. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 21-22 n.65. 
27. Siebert v. Gulton, No. 79-5631 (Del. Ch., filed June 21, 1979), affd wz~hout 
publ. opinion, 414 A.2d 822 (1980); Siebert v. Milton Bradley Co., 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1235, 1241, 405 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Mass. 1980). 
28. See text accompanying notes 181-201 infra. 
29. See Wendy$ Asks Holders to Approve Changes to Thwart Any "Raids," Wall St. 
J., Apr. 14, 1980, at 35, col. 1. To assure that a successful tender offeror cannot remove 
all directors and, through a special meeting, fill all vacancies at one stroke, it would be 
necessary to provide by additional charter amendment that no directors may be removed 
except for cause, or alternatively only by supermajority vote. Other protective measures 
include a restriction against an increase in the size of the board, designated "alternate" 
directors to fill vacancies, and limitations on shareholder meetings. See A. FLEISCHER, 
supra note 18, at 14-18. 
30. As of November 1980, tender offer statutes had been adopted in 35 states: 
ALASKA STAT.§ 45.57.010-.120 (Michie 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 
(1980); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
36-456 to -468m (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT.§§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE 
§§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1980); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121~. § 137.5-1 (1977); 
IND. CODE ANN.§§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE§§ 502.211 to .215 
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); KY. REV. STAT.§§ 292.560 to .630 
(Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 51:1500 to:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801 to 817 (Supp. 1980-1981); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.§ 
11-901 (Michie Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1 to 13 (West Supp. 
1980-1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 451.901 to .917 (West Supp. 1980-1981); MINN. 
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1980). Presumably such a standard coul 
hav~ adverse impact upon employmen 
may be closed or relocated. In 6bited 
Corporation, the New York Attorney 
required a detailed description of what ; 
existing employee benefit plans, and tht 
changes would be made in Carriers' pl 
Takeover Bid by United Technologies J 
United Technologies from Louis l...efkml 
in A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 56~2 
33. Bell Industries, for example, re 
1979, at 6, col. 2. 
34. 443 U.S. 173 (1979), rev'gonjt# 
v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 19' 
history, state statutes having failed on 
Indus., Inc. v. Neiditz, FED. SEC. L. R 
Illinois, Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d ~ 
X Corp., No. 46077 (Mich. Ct. App. Ul 
80-3770 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 1981); and Sot 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,804, at 9C 
in Ohio, AMCA Int'l Corp. v. KroUie, 
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n  a d d i t i o n a l  r e l a t e d  p r o v i s i o n ,  t o  
n  d o  n o t  f a c e  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  h u r d l e  
D V a l  o f  m e r g e r s  b y  a  s i m p l e  m a j o r ·  
p p r o v e d  t h e  m e r g e r  p r i o r  t o  t h e  
: t t r o l  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  a •  
[ )  a f f e c t  v o t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  h a s  
1 1  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  m o r e  f u n d a m e n ·  
r i t y  a m e n d m e n t  t h r o u g h  a  s i m p l e  
a d d r e s s e d .  
2 8  
u t e r  a m e n d m e n t  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a  
y i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  
h e  b o a r d .
2 9  
T h e  l i m i t a t i o n  c o u l d  
v h e r l  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  o n  a  
n t i a l  o f f e r o r ,  i n c l u d i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  
t S  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  t o  f u n d  
e s  h a v e  a d o p t e d  s t a t u t e s  i m p o s i n g  
m e n t s  u p o n  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i r o r s  o f  
d i n ,  o r  o t h e r w i s e  h a v i n g  s u b s t a n -
~erred t o  a s  a n t i  t a k e o v e r  s t a t u t e s ,  
w e v e r ,  i n  s o m e  s t a t e s  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h  s u c h  
~ple, r e q u i r e s  " s u c h  g r e a t e r  v o t e "  t o  
o n .  D E L .  C O D E  A N N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  2 4 2 ( c ) ( 4 )  
t i o n s  m a y  v e s t  t h e  w a i v e r  p o w e r  i n  " c o n -
t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i r o r ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  
! ! - n . 6 5 .  
:h~i f i l e d  J u n e  2 1 ,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  a f f d  w i t h o u t  
M i l t o n  B r a d l e y  C o . ,  8 0  M a s s .  A d v .  S h .  
n . .  
u m g e s  t o  T h w a r t  A n y  " R a i d s , "  W a l l  S t .  
s u c c e s s f u l  t e n d e r  o f f e r o r  c a n n o t  r e m o v e  
a l l  v a c a n c i e s  a t  o n e  s t r o k e ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  
l m e n t  t h a t  n o  d i r e c t o r s  m a y  b e  r e m o v e d  
a a j o r i t y  v o t e .  O t h e r  p r o t e c t i v e  m e a s u r e s  
l i e  o f  t h e  b o a r d ,  d e s i g n a t e d  " a l t e r n a t e "  
a r e h o l d e r  m e e t i n g s .  S e e  A .  F L E I S C H E R ,  
a t u t e s  h a d  b e e n  a d o p t e d  i n  3 5  s t a t e s :  
J U t .  S T A T .  A N N . § §  6 7 - 1 2 6 4  t o  - 1 2 6 4 . 1 4  
1 8  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  C O N N .  G E N .  S T A T .  A N N .  § §  
t o ! N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  2 0 3  ( S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  G A .  C O D E  
n .  § § 4 1 7 E - 1  t o  - 1 5  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  I D A H O  C O D E  
: E V .  S T A T .  c h .  1 2 1  ~, §  1 3 7 . 5 - 1  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  
1 ,  1 9 8 0 ) ;  I O W A  C o D E § §  5 0 2 . 2 1 1  t o  . 2 1 5  
' 1 4 ) ;  K Y .  R E V .  S T A T .  § §  2 9 2 . 5 6 0  t o  . 6 3 0  
t o : 1 5 1 2  ( W e s t  S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  M E .  R E V .  
1 8 1 ) ;  M D .  C O R P .  &  A S S ' N S  C O D E  A N N . §  
0 0 1 .  c h .  1 1 0 C ,  § §  1  t o  1 3  ( W e s t  S u p p .  
t o  . 9 1 7 , ( W e s t  S u p p .  1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 ) ;  M I N N .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 8 3  
t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  g e n e r a l l y  p r o v i d e s  m i n i m u m  t i m e  f r a m e s  f o r  a d v a n c e  n o t i c e  
t o  s t a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  h e a r i n g s  o n  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  o f f e r  i f  o p p o s e d  
b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
5 1  
T h e  n o t i c e  a n d  d e l a y  o c c a s i o n e d  b y  s u c h  p r o v i -
s i o n s  o f f e r  i m p o r t a n t  b r e a t h i n g  s p a c e  f o r  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  p e r m i t t i n g  
t h e m  t o  c o n s i d e r ,  p r e p a r e ,  a n d  l a u n c h  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s  t o  s u b v e r t  t h e  s u r -
p r i s e  o f f e r .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e r e  i s  a l w a y s  t h e  c h a n c e  t h a t  a  s t a t e  a d m i n i s t r a -
t o r  w i l l  f i n d  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  t o  b e  u n f a i r ,  o r  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  a n d  
p o s s i b l y  t i m e - c o n s u m i n g  d i s c l o s u r e .  
3 2  
D e l a y  a l o n e  c a n  b e  d e c i s i v e .  C o n s e -
q u e n t l y ,  s u c h  s t a t u t e s  b e c o m e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  w e a p o n  i n  t h e  a r s e n a l  o f  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  i t  i s  n o t  u n c o m m o n  t o  f i n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s e e k i n g  
s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  s t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e  a d o p t e d  s u c h  
s t a t u t e s .  
3 3  
A  m a j o r  c l o u d  o n  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e  s t a t u t e s  w i l l ,  
h o w e v e r ,  r e m a i n  u n t i l  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  r e s o l v e s  t h e  p r e e m p t i o n  a n d  
i n t e r s t a t e  c o m m e r c e  i s s u e s  a v o i d e d  b y  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n  i n  L e r o y  
v .  G r e a t  W e s t e r n  U n i t e d  C o r p . s .  
S T A T .  A N N . § §  8 0 B . 0 1  t o  . 1 3  ( W e s t  S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  M I S S .  C O D E  A N N . § §  7 5 - 7 2 - 1 0 1  t o  - 1 2 1  
( S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  M o .  A N N .  S T A T .  § §  4 0 9 . 5 0 0  t o  . 5 6 5  ( V e r n o n  1 9 7 9 ) ;  N E B .  R E V .  S T A T .  § §  
2 1 - 2 4 0 1  t o  - 2 4 1 7  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  N E V .  R E V .  S T A T .  § §  7 8 . 3 7 6  t o  . 3 7 7 8  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ;  N . H .  R E V .  S T A T .  
A N N . §  4 2 1 - A : 1  t o  : 1 5  ( S u p p .  1 9 7 9 ) ;  N . J .  R E V .  S T A T . § §  4 9 : 5 - 1  t o  : 5 - 1 9  ( W e s t  S u p p .  
1 9 8 0 ) ;  N . Y .  B u s .  C O R P .  L A W § §  1 6 0 0 - 1 6 1 4  ( M c K i n n e y  1 9 8 0 ) ;  N . C .  G E N .  S T A T . §  7 8  B - 1  
t o  - 1 1  ( M i c h i e  S u p p .  1 9 7 9 ) ;  O H I O  R E V .  C O D E A N N .  §  1 7 0 7 . 0 4 1  ( S u p p .  1 9 7 9 ) ;  P A .  C O N S .  
S T A T .  t i t .  7 0 ,  § §  7 1  t o  8 5  ( P u r d o n  S u p p .  1 9 8 0 - 8 1 ) ;  S . D .  C O D I F I E D  L A W S  A N N . § §  4 7 - 3 2 - 1  
t o  - 4 7  ( S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  T E N N .  C O D E  A N N . § §  4 8 - 2 1 0 1  t o  - 2 1 1 4  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ;  U T A H  C O D E  A N N . § §  
6 1 - 4 - 1  t o  - 1 3  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  V A .  C O D E § §  1 3 . 1 - 5 2 8  t o  - 5 4 0  ( S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  W I S .  S T A T . § §  5 5 2 . 0 1  t o  
. 2 5  ( W e s t  S u p p .  1 9 8 0 ) .  
3 1 .  S e e  n o t e  1 0 9  i n f r a .  
3 2 .  P r i c e  m a y  b e  o n l y  o n e  a s p e c t  o f  f a i r n e s s ,  a s  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  o f t e n  i n c l u d e  
a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  i n f l u e n c e  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ' s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  L o u i s i a n a ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  r e q u i r e s  a  f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i s i t i o n  " w i l l  p r o v i d e  a  p o s i t i v e  b e n e f i t  
t o  t h i s  s t a t e ,  i t s  c i t i z e n s  a n d  i t s  r e s o u r c e s . "  L A .  R E V .  S T A T .  A N N . §  5 1 : 1 5 0 1 G  ( W e s t  S u p p .  
1 9 8 0 ) .  P r e s u m a b l y  s u c h  a  s t a n d a r d  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  a n  i n j u n c t i o n  w h e n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  m a y  
h a v e - - a d v e r s e  i m p a c t  u p o n  e m p l o y m e n t ,  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  o r  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n  w h i c h  p l a n t s  
m a y  b e  c l o s e d  o r  r e l o c a t e d .  I n  U n i t e d  T e c h n o l o g i e s '  t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  s h a r e s  o f  C a r r i e r  
C o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l ,  a c t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  s t a t u t e ,  
r e q u i r e d  a  d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  w h a t  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  m a d e  t o  p r o t e c t  C a r r i e r s '  
e x i s t i n g  e m p l o y e e  b e n e f i t  p l a n s ,  a n d  t h e  c r i t e r i a  U n i t e d  w o u l d  u s e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  
c h a n g e s  w o u l d  b e  m a d e  i n  C a r r i e r s '  p r e s e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  p l a n t  l o c a t i o n s .  I n  R e :  
T a k e o v e r  B i d  b y  U n i t e d  T e c h n o l o g i e s  f o r  C a r r i e r  C o r p .  ( l e t t e r  d a t e d  O c t .  2 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  t o  
U n i t e d  T e c h n o l o g i e s  f r o m  L o u i s  L e f k o w i t z ,  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l ,  S t a t e  o f  N e w  Y o r k ) ,  c i t e d  
i n  A .  F L E I S C H E R ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  5 6 - 2 ,  n . 1 3 9 .  
3 3 .  B e l l  I n d u s t r i e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  r e i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  D e l a w a r e .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  O c t .  1 9 ,  
1 9 7 9 ,  a t  6 ,  c o l .  2 .  
3 4 .  4 4 3  U . S .  1 7 3  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  r e v ' g  o n  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  g r o u n d s ,  G r e a t  W e s t e r n  U n i t e d  C o r p .  
v .  K i d w e l l ,  5 7 7  F . 2 d  1 2 5 6  ( 5 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 8 ) .  T h e  p r e e m p t i o n  i s s u e  h a s  h a d  a  c h e c k e r e d  
h i s t o r y ,  s t a t e  s t a t u t e s  h a v i n g  f a i l e d  o n  p r e e m p t i o n  g r o u n d s  i n  C o n n e c t i c u t ,  H i - S h e a r  
I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  N e i d i t z ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 8 0 5 ,  a t  9 0 , 0 3 8  ( D .  C o n n .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  
I l l i n o i s ,  M i t e  C o r p .  v .  D i x o n ,  6 3 3  F . 2 d  4 8 6 ,  4 9 8  ( 7 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  M i c h i g a n ,  K e l l e y  v .  B e t a  
X  C o r p  . .  N o .  4 6 0 7 7  ( M i c h .  C t .  A p p .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  N e w  J e r s e y ,  K e n n e c o t t  C o r p .  v .  S m i t h ,  C . A .  
8 0 - 3 7 7 0  ( D . N . J .  J a n .  3 0 ,  1 9 8 1 ) ;  a n d  S o u t h  C a r o l i n a ,  H i - S h e a r  I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  C a m p b e l l ,  
F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 8 0 4 ,  a t  9 0 , 0 3 1  ( D . S . C .  1 9 8 0 ) .  S t a t u t e s  h a v e  b e e n  s u s t a i n e d  
i n  O h i o ,  A M C A  l n t ' l  C o r p .  v .  K r o u s e ,  4 8 2  F .  S u p p .  9 2 9  ( S . D .  O h i o  1 9 7 9 ) ;  D e l a w a r e ,  
I 
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Issuance of shares. Where insiders own or control an insufficient 
number of shares to discourage tender offers, effort might be made to 
place a sizeable block of shares in the hands of one or more parties who 
may be expected to side with management in the event of a hostile 
takeover effort. One avenue is the establishment of an Employee Stock 
Ownership Trust (ESOT). Although formation of an ESOT concurrent 
with opposition to a pending tender offer raises substantial questions of 
whether the formation is serving a valid corporate purpose, 35 an ESOT 
established well in advance of any potential offer may be free from 
serious challenge and could result in a sizeable block of shares held by 
trustees with inclinations favorable to management. Similarly, stock 
dividends, 36 and stock bonus, purchase, and dividend reinvestment 
plans, 37 aggrandize the percentage stock ownership of employees and 
current stockholders who, it is anticipated, will constitute a group loyal 
to management in the event of a takeover effort. Substantial numbers of 
shares may also be issued by the target company through acquisitions or 
mergers, thereby increasing the acquiror's cost of acquisition or creating 
blocks of shares likely to support target management. 38 
Repurchase of shares. If management owns or controls a substantial 
percentage of shares, a repurchase program by the target corporation 
may increase that percentage perhaps to the point that it acts as an effec-
Wylain v. TRE Corp .. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,270 
(Del. Ch. 1980); Kentucky, Strode v. Esmark, Inc., FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,538 
(Ky. 1980); and Virginia, Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980). The 
SEC's recent adoption of rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1979), regarding the 
commencement date of tender offers for Williams Act purposes appears to create direct 
conflicts with advance notice provisions of state statutes. Based on this and other per-
ceived conflicts, the SEC has concluded that state statutes "frustrate the operation and 
purposes of the Williams Act." SEC Rei. No. 34-16384, Jan. 7, 1980, FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) 1 82,873. Decisions to date have regarded rule 14d-2 as preempting state provi-
sions. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith (1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 
97,731, at 98,835 (3d Cir. 1980); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., [1979-1980 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,389 (Del. 1980; Eure v. Grand 
Metropolitan Ltd., FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,383 (N.C. 1980. See Langevoort, State 
Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 213, 246-54 (1977). 
35. In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975), the court suggested 
that an ESOT mi~ht be e~j~in_ed perm~nently fro~ voting or otherwise dealing with any 
of the shares acqmred by It If Its establishment dunng a control fight would cause irrep-
arable harm or would be a breach of management's fiduciary duties to minority share-
holders. Id. at 234. Accord, Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. R~P. (CCH) 1 96,433, at 93,557 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("defendants adopted the 
ESOP for the Improper purpose of retaining control by diluting the plaintiff's voting 
strength"). 
36. See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1973). 
37. The dividend reinvestment plan as a preparatory defensive measure is discussed 
in Robinson, Strategy to Prevent a Takeover, 32 Bus. LAW. 1361, 1362 (1977). 
38. Here, too, timing and appearance are critical. Acquisitions not concurrent or 
reasonably close to a struggle for control may have a substantial chance of success 
given the absence of facts inferring questionable motivation and the disinclination of 
courts to interfere with business decisions. 
TENDER OFFERS 
tive block against a hostile tt 
of Marriott Corporation to • 
Marriott shares will result • 
from 24.7 to 36 percent of til 
hostile takeover efforts beca1 
approval of mergers. •o AbseJ 
not require shareholder apF 
proxy disclosures regarding t 
significant shifts in the peret 
Acquisitz"on of regulatetl 
once an unexpected offer is • 
agencies as possible in a c01 
cems. Thus, potential target 
thus be less attractive, to tl1 
regulatory controls. Enlisting 
by McGraw-Hill's efforts ~o 
Among other defensive reaGti 
Communications Commission 
FCC consideration regarding 1 
the continued validity of Me( 
39. Repurchases may be und. 
cause- through a reduction in outst< 
or to buy out the holdings of a diSIIi 
These purposes carry substantial let 
gram reduces the total number of &1 
the overall tender offer cost unless 
market price per share. In most caa 
ticularly in light of· antimanipulati~ 
(proposed) Rule 13e-2, SEC Exch~ 
34-17222 (Oct. 17, 1980). Purchase t 
substantial issues of corporate purpos 
the possibility of precipitating • bidd 
purposes are therefore most ef~eeti-v 
increases in the percentage holdmgs ' 
Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases;, 
LAW. 1545, 1556 (1980). 
40. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1980, a 
tender offer for 10,600,000 of its own 
The combined effect of the tender 1 
would increase insider holdings from 
I d. 
41. Informal pressure for shareli 
exchanges or other institutional forces 
1977), the New York Stock Exchange 1 
though noncontrolling, block of shares 
for shareholder approval. /d. at 561. 1 
legally this was necessary." /d. 
42. See notes 59, 97 infra. 
43. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1979, at 8 
formed a basis of General Host's effor 
American, despite the relatively insigni 
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i e r s  o w n  o r  c o n t r o l  a n  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
l e r  o f f e r s ,  e f f o r t  m i g h t  b e  m a d e  t o  
e  h a n d s  o f  o n e  o r  m o r e  p a r t i e s  w h o  
a g e m e n t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  h o s t i l e  
$ t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  E m p l o y e e  S t o c k  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n  E S O T  c o n c u r r e n t  
o f f e r  r a i s e s  s u b s t a n t i a l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
a l i d  c o r p o r a t e  p u r p o s e ,
3 5  
a n  E S O T  
p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r  m a y  b e  f r e e  f r o m  
1  a  s i z e a b l e  b l o c k  o f  s h a r e s  h e l d  b y  
t o  m a n a g e m e n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  s t o c k  
: h a s e ,  a n d  d i v i d e n d  r e i n v e s t m e n t  
~ock o w n e r s h i p  o f  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  
~ated, w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a  g r o u p  l o y a l  
o v e r  e f f o r t .  S u b s t a n t i a l  n u m b e r s  o f  
: t  c o m p a n y  t h r o u g h  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o r  
l r o r ' s  c o s t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  o r  c r e a t i n g  
r e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
3 8  
m e n t  o w n s  o r  c o n t r o l s  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
m > g r a m  b y  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n  
t o  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  i t  a c t s  a s  a n  e f f e c -
I i n d e r )  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  ,  9 7 , 2 7 0  
, ' I n c . ,  F E D .  S E c .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 5 3 8  
: l s h a w ,  6 1 8  F . 2 d  1 0 2 9  ( 4 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) .  T h e  
F . R .  §  2 4 0 . 1 4 d - 2 ( b )  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
a m s  A c t  p u r p o s e s  a p p e a r s  t o  c r e a t e  d i r e c t  
a t e  s t a t u t e s .  B a s e d  o n  t h i s  a n d  o t h e r  p e r -
l t l l t e  s t a t u t e s  " f r u s t r a t e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  a n d  
5 4 - 1 6 3 8 4 , J a n .  7 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  
i l e d  r u l e  1 4 d - 2  a s  p r e e m p t i n g  s t a t e  p r o v i -
a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  
: O r p .  v .  L i g g e t t  G r o u p ,  I n c . ,  [ 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0  
)  ,  9 7 , 3 8 9  ( D e l .  1 9 8 0 ;  E u r e  v .  G r a n d  
9 7 , 3 8 3  ( N . C .  1 9 8 0 .  S e e  L a n g e v o o r t ,  S t a t e  
a d  P o l i t i c a l  C o m p e t e n c y ,  6 2  C O R N E L L  L .  
- 2 2 5  ( 9 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 5 ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  s u g g e s t e d  
f r o m  v o t i n g  o r  o t h e r w i s e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a n y  
:  d u r i n g  a  c o n t r o l  f i g h t  w o u l d  c a u s e  i r r e p -
m e n t ' s  f i d u c i a r y  d u t i e s  t o  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e -
n e t  I n d u s . ,  I n c . ,  [ 1 9 7 8  T r a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  
N . D .  I l l .  1 9 7 8 )  ( " d e f e n d a n t s  a d o p t e d  t h e  
~ontrol b y  d i l u t i n g  t h e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  v o t i n g  
1 ,  I n c . ,  4 8 8  F . 2 d  2 0 7 ,  2 1 2  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 7 3 ) .  
r e p a r a t o r y  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e  i s  d i s c u s s e d  
1 2  B u s .  L A W .  1 3 6 1 ,  1 3 6 2  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
~ c r i t i c a l .  A c q u i s i t i o n s  n o t  c o n c u r r e n t  o r  
a y  h a v e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c h a n c e  o f  s u c c e s s  
L b l e  m o t i v a t i o n  a n d  t h e  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  o f  
4 8 5  
b l o c k  a g a i n s t  a  h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  
3 9  
A  r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n  b y  t h e  B o a r d  
M a r r i o t t  C o r p o r a t i o n  t o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  r e p u r c h a s e  o f  u p  t o  3 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
' t o t t  s h a r e s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  M a r r i o t t  f a m i l y ' s  c o n t r o l  
2 4 . 7  t o  3 6  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m o n  s t o c k ,  t h u s  e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e c l u d i n g  
t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t s  b e c a u s e  o f  M a r r i o t t ' s  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  t w o - t h i r d s  
l s a n n r o v a l  o f  m e r g e r s .  • o  A b s e n t  s p e c i a l  c h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s ,  r e p u r c h a s e s  d o  
r e q u i r e  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  m a y  n o t  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  
d i s c l o s u r e s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s u c h  p r o g r a m s  u p o n  s l i g h t  b u t  
s h i f t s  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  i n s i d e r s .  n  
A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  r e g u l a t e d  b ' U . S t n e s s e s .  A  c o m m o n  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e  
a n  u n e x p e c t e d  o f f e r  i s  a n n o u n c e d  i s  t o  e n g a g e  a s  m a n y  r e g u l a t o r y  
a g e n c i e s  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a n t i t r u s t  a n d  l i c e n s i n g  c o n -
T h u s ,  p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t s  m a y  c r e a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b u r d e n s ,  a n d  
b e  l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s  f a l l  w i t h i n  
c o n t r o l s .  E n l i s t i n g  t h e  a i d  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
M c G r a w - H i l l ' s  e f f o r t s  t o  a v o i d  a n  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  
! ' . t U I I O n g  o t h e r  d e f e n s i v e  r e a c t i o n s ,  • z  M c G r a w  s t r e n u o u s l y  s o u g h t  F e d e r a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  ( F C C )  s u p p o r t  t o  d e l a y  t h e  o f f e r  p e n d i n g  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  c o n t r o l  u p o n  
c o n t i n u e d  v a l i d i t y  o f  M c G r a w ' s  f o u r  t e l e v i s i o n  l i c e n s e s .  • a  
3 9 .  R e p u r c h a s e s  m a y  b e  u n d e r t a k e n  f o r  o t h e r  d e f e n s i v e  r e a s o n s ,  s u c h  a s  t o  
c a u s e - t h r o u g h  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  o u t s t a n d i n g  s h a r e s - a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  m a r k e t  p r i c e  p e r  s h a r e  
o r  t o  b u y  o u t  t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  a  d i s s i d e n t  g r o u p  l i k e l y  t o  s i d e  w i t h  a  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i r o r .  
T h e s e  p u r p o s e s  c a r r y  s u b s t a n t i a l  l e g a l  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  r i s k s ,  h o w e v e r .  A  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o ·  
_  r e d u c e s  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  s h a r e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c q u i r e  c o n t r o l ,  t h e r e b y  r e d u c i n g  
t h e  o v e r a l l  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o s t  u n l e s s  t h e  t a r g e t  r e p u r c h a s e s  h a v e  m a t e r i a l l y  i n c r e a s e d  
m a r k e t  p r i c e  p e r  s h a r e .  I n  m o s t  c a s e s  a  m a t e r i a l  r i s e  i n  m a r k e t  p r i c e  i s  u n l i k e l y ,  p a r ·  
t i c u l a r l y  i n  l i g h t  o f · a n t i m a n i p u l a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w s .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  
( p r o p o s e d )  R u l e  1 3 e - 2 ,  S E C  E x c h a n g e  A c t  R e l e a s e  N o s .  3 4 - 1 0 5 3 9  ( D e c .  6 ,  1 9 7 3 )  a n d  
! 1 4 - 1 7 2 2 2  ( O c t .  1 7 ,  1 9 8 0 ) .  P u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s  f r o m  a  s e l e c t  g r o u p  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  r a i s e s  
t u b s t a n t i a l  i s s u e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  p u r p o s e  a n d  u n e q u a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  a  b i d d i n g  w a r  f o r  s u c h  s h a r e s .  R e p u r c h a s e s  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  
p u r p o s e s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e l y  u n d e r t a k e n  w h e n  t h e y  m a y  e f f e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  h o l d i n g s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  o t h e r  i n s i d e r s .  S e e  N a t h a n  &  
S o b e l ,  C o r p o r a t e  S t o c k  R e p u r c h a s e s  i n  t h e  C o n t e x t  o f  U n s o l i c i t e d  T a k e o v e r  B i d s ,  3 5  B u s .  
L A w .  1 5 4 5 ,  1 5 5 6  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  
4 0 .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  M a r .  1 4 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  1 6 ,  c o l .  3 .  M a r r i o t t  h a d  p r e v i o u s l y  e n g a g e d  i n  a  
t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  1 0 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  i t s  o w n  s h a r e s ,  f o r  w h i c h  7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  s h a r e s  w e r e  t e n d e r e d .  
T h e  c o m b i n e d  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a n d  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m ,  w h e n  c o m p l e t e d ,  
w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  i n s i d e r  h o l d i n g s  f r o m  2 4 . 7 %  t o  3 6 %  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  c o m m o n  s t o c k .  
I  d .  
4 1 .  I n f o r m a l  p r e s s u r e  f o r  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e f e r e n d u m  m a y  b e  b r o u g h t  t o  b e a r  b y  
e x c h a n g e s  o r  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f o r c e s .  I n  K a p l a n  v .  G o l d s a m t ,  3 8 0  A . 2 d  5 5 6  ( D e l .  C h .  
1 9 7 7 ) ,  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  a d v i s e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e p u r c h a s e  o f  a  s i z e a b l e ,  
t h o u g h  n o n c o n t r o l l i n g ,  b l o c k  o f  s h a r e s  f r o m  a  d i s s i d e n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  s h o u l d  b e  s u b m i t t e d  
f o r  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l .  ! d .  a t  5 6 1 .  T h e  B o a r d  a c q u i e s c e d  a l t h o u g h  i t  " d i d  n o t  f e e l  t h a t  
l e g a l l y  t h i s  w a s  n e c e s s a r y . "  ! d .  
4 2 .  S e e  n o t e s  5 9 · ,  9 7  i n f r a .  
4 3 .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  J a n .  1 7 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  8 ,  c o l .  2 .  S h i p p i n g  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n s  
f o r m e d  a  b a s i s  o f  G e n e r a l  H o s t ' s  e f f o r t s  i n  1 9 7 3  t o  e n j o i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  o f  T r i u m p h  
A m e r i c a n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t s  o f  t h o s e  p o r t i o n s  o f  G e n e r a l  H o s t ' s  
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Reduction i'n liquidity. Corporations may be attractive takeover can· 
didates because of substantial liquid assets that may be used by acquirors to 
fund the acquisitions or expansion of their own operations. It is not uncom· 
mon for such candidates to deliberately reduce their charm through the · 
payment of cash dividends, cash acquisitions of companies or major assets, 
and the premature retirement or redemption of debt and preferred 
securities. •• 
Restri'cti've provisions in loan agreements. Banks and other lending 
institutions may be utilized as allies through provisions in loan 
agreements requiring acceleration of loans in the event of any change in 
control of the borrowing corporation.45 Acceleration may cause a 
substantial drain upon working capital of the target corporation, thus 
giving pause to potential acquirors. Although new loans may be obtained 
following accel~ration, interest rates and other lending provisions may 
not be as favorable as at the date of the original loan. The limited 
usefulness and questionable validity of such loan provisions, however, 
have probably caused banks as well as borrowers generally to avoid their 
adoption. 46 
2. Defensive Measures Concurrent wzth Announced or 
Pending Tender Offers 
The preparatory measures described above may also be initiated 
during the pendency or imminence of a tender offer. Adoption of such 
measures at a later date, however, may raise considerable legal questions 
under "perpetuation of control" theories. Nevertheless, the ambiguity in 
operations. General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 752 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); see note 235 infra. Some regulated industries may offer greater defen· 
sive protection than others. One commentator has noted that "acquiring a small 
insurance company can be very helpful because of the regulatory roadblock which can be 
thrown up, no matter how insignificant a part of the business it may represent." R. JEN· 
NINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 742-43 n.28 (4th ed. 1977). 
44. Within five days of an announced tender offer by Schiavone & Sons, Inc. for the 
shares of Corenco Corp., Corenco directors declared an extra cash dividend payable to 
holders of record the day after the offer's stated expiration date. See Corenco Corp. v. 
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1973). See also City Investing to 
Dispose of 1200 Million of Assets in Wake of Takeover Bid-Offer, Wall St. J., July 25, 
1980, at 4, col. 2. 
45. See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 
115, 132 (1967). Certain loans of the Anaconda Company contained acceleration provi-
sions "whenever more than 10 percent of the Anaconda voting stock was concentrated in ·· 
one person or entity." Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
46. Such loan provisions have been criticized as "a particularly shocking technique" 
that "would also raise the possibility that the management be held liable for tying up the 
company on a long-term basis." Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management 
from Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 839, 841 (1970). Contra, Kamen, Special Problems of Institu-
tional Lenders, 32 Bus. LAW. 1423 (1977), in which it is suggested that cases upholding 
the acceleration of mortgage loans upon sale of the property may have analogous applica-
tion to creditor interests in changes of management. /d. at 1425. 
TENDER OFFERS 
standards for determining the 1 
below, 47 encourages the adop 
midst of a control struqle. 
employed during a tender offe 
Li'tigati'on. Immediate ini1 
injunction against the tender ofl 
reaction in hostile takeover situa 
tions including failure to make f 
of such filings, antitrust violatic 
borrowing restrictions, •• rule I 0 
ingenious counsel for target mar 
the attractive possibilities of til 
may open new avenues of at 
preliminary injunctidn. Delay a 
or the entering of a preliminar 
acquiror is dependent upon·~ p 
of funding sources. 50 
The two most fruitful gr01 
and antitrust concerns. The Wi 
violations, ranging from technic 
standards. 51 However, even if W 
may be short-lived if the injuncti 
disclosure correction. 52 Much m 
term preliminary injunction bu 
scope and complexity of antiti'Ul 
time-consuming discovery that 
too wasteful from the standpoin 
47. See notes 65-160 infra and acec 
48. 15 u.s.c. § 78g (1976). 
49. The commonality of litigation I 
without exception, any announcement 
injunction action filed by the corporab 
the crimes in the Decalogue, but usuallJ 
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 7~ 
50. Additfonal advantages noted b) 
enthusiasm of arbitrageurs before subsl 
space for target management's efforts tel 
the morale of an embattled target man: 
tion Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437' 
51. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milsteit 
schedule !3D); Wellman v. Dickinson,' 
mation of group and commencement ol 
52. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Pape 
of schedule 13D is sufficient relief in : 
harm caused by initial failure); Corencc 
215 (2d Cir. 1973) (permanent injw 
disclosures were corrected). 
53. In issuing a preliminary injuncu 
common shares of Harnischfeger Corp 
'  
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> O S  m a y  b e  a t t r a c t i v e  t a k e o v e r  c a n -
e t s  t h a t  m a y  b e  u s e d  b y  a c q u i r o r s  t o  
e i r  o w n  o p e r a t i o n s .  I t  i s  n o t  u n c o m -
l y  r e d u c e  t h e i r  c h a r m  t h r o u g h  t h e  
i t i o n s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  o r  m a j o r  a s s e t s ,  
d e m p t i o n  o f  d e b t  a n d  p r e f e r r e d  
r e m e n t s .  B a n k s  a n d  o t h e r  l e n d i n g  
i e s  t h r o u g h  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  l o a n  
> a n s  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a n y  c h a n g e  i n  
t n .  
4 5  
A c c e l e r a t i o n  m a y  c a u s e  a  
a l  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h u s  
h o u g h  n e w  l o a n s  m a y  b e  o b t a i n e d  
l l l d  o t h e r  l e n d i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  m a y  
f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  l o a n .  T h e  l i m i t e d  
i  s u c h  l o a n  p r o v i s i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
b o r r o w e r s  g e n e r a l l y  t o  a v o i d  t h e i r  
" e n t  w i t h  A n n o u n c e d  o r  
e r  O f f e r s  
i > e d  a b o v e  m a y  a l s o  b e  i n i t i a t e d  
a  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  A d o p t i o n  o f  s u c h  
r a i s e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  l e g a l  q u e s t i o n s  
: s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  a m b i g u i t y  i n  
u n e r i c a n ,  I n c . ,  3 5 9  F .  S u p p .  7 4 9 ,  7 5 2  
lat~ i n d u s t r i e s  m a y  o f f e r  g r e a t e r  d e f e n -
~r h a s  n o t e d  t h a t  " a c q u i r i n g  a  s m a l l  
> f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  r o a d b l o c k  w h i c h  c a n  b e  
f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  i t  m a y  r e p r e s e n t . "  R .  J E N -
, 2 - 4 ! 1  n . 2 8  ( 4 t h  e d .  1 9 7 7 ) .  
r  o f f e r  b y  S c h i a v o n e  &  S o n s ,  I n c .  f o r  t h e  
l a r e d  a n  e x t r a  c a s h  d i v i d e n d  p a y a b l e  t o  
l  e x p i r a t i o n  d a t e .  S e e  C o r e n c o  C o r p .  v .  
I _  C i r .  1 9 7 3 ) .  S e e  a l s o  C i t y  I n v e s t t ' n g  t o  
l k e o v e r  B i d - O f f e r ,  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  J u l y  2 5 ,  
r J i d s - D e f e n s i v e  T a c t i c s ,  2 3  B u s .  L A W .  
C o m p a n y  c o n t a i n e d  a c c e l e r a t i o n  p r o v i -
t c o n d a  v o t i n g  s t o c k  w a s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  
: 0 1 :  4 1 1  F .  S u p p .  1 2 1 0 ,  1 2 1 4  ( S . D . N . Y .  
l  a s  " a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s h o c k i n g  t e c h n i q u e "  
t a g e m e n t  b e  h e l d  l i a b l e  f o r  t y i n g  u p  t h e  
1  D e v i c e s  U s e d  t o  I n s u l a t e  M a n a g e m e n t  
r a ,  K a m e n ,  S p e c i a l  P r o b l e m s  o f  I n s t i t u -
k h  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  c a s e s  u p h o l d i n g  
e  p r o p e r t y  m a y  h a v e  a n a l o g o u s  a p p l i c a -
: n t .  / d .  a t  1 4 2 5 .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 8 7  
s t a n d a r d s  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s ,  a s  d i s c u s s e d  
b e l o w  , '
7  
e n c o u r a g e s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a g g r e s s i v e  m e a s u r e s  e v e n  i n  t h e  
m i d s t  o f  a  c o n t r o l  s t r u g g l e .  A d d i t i o n a l  d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  o f t e n  
e m p l o y e d  d u r i n g  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  b a t t l e  i n c l u d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
L i t i g a t i o n .  I m m e d i a t e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  s e e k i n g  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  
i n j u n c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  p r o c e e d i n g  h a s  b e e n  a l m o s t  a  k n e e - j e r k  
r e a c t i o n  i n  h o s t i l e  t a k e o v e r  s i t u a t i o n s .  T h e  s u i t  o f t e n  a l l e g e s  a  h o s t  o f  v i o l a -
t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  f a i l u r e  t o  m a k e  f i l i n g s  u n d e r  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  i n a d e q u a c y  
o f  s u c h  f i l i n g s ,  a n t i t r u s t  v i o l a t i o n s ,  o b t a i n i n g  f u n d s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  s t a t u t o r y  
b o r r o w i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s , '
8  
r u l e  I O b - 5  v i o l a t i o n s ,  a n d  w h a t e v e r  o t h e r  c l a i m s  
i n g e n i o u s  c o u n s e l  f o r  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  m i g h t  d e v i s e .  '
9  
L i t i g a t i o n  o f f e r s  
t h e  a t t r a c t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t i m e - c o n s u m i n g  a n d  b r o a d  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  
m a y  o p e n  n e w  a v e n u e s  o f  a t t a c k ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t y  o f  a  
p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i c m .  D e l a y  a l o n e ,  w h e t h e r  c r e a t e d  b y  l i t i g a t i o n  i t s e l f  
o r  t h e  e n t e r i n g  o f  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n ,  m a y  b e  d e c i s i v e  w h e r e  t h e  
a c q u i r o r  i s  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  a  p e n d i n g  l i n e  o f  c r e d i t  o r  o t h e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  f u n d i n g  s o u r c e s .  
5 0  
T h e  t w o  m o s t  f r u i t f u l  g r o u n d s  f o r  l i t i g a t i o n  i n v o l v e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  
a n d  a n t i t r u s t  c o n c e r n s .  T h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  p r o v i d e s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  p o t e n t i a l  
v i o l a t i o n s ,  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t e c h n i c a l  f i l i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  b r o a d  d i s c l o s u r e  
s t a n d a r d s .  
5 1  
H o w e v e r ,  e v e n  i f  W i l l i a m s  A c t  v i o l a t i o n s  a r e  p r o v e n ,  v i c t o r y  
m a y  b e  s h o r t - l i v e d  i f  t h e  i n j u n c t i o n  i s  c o n d i t i o n a l  o n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  f i l i n g  o r  
d i s c l o s u r e  c o r r e c t i o n .  
5 2  
M u c h  m o r e  p r o m i s i n g  i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  l o n g -
t e r m  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n  b a s e d  o n  a  p o t e n t i a l  a n t i t r u s t  v i o l a t i o n .  T h e  
s c o p e  a n d  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  a n t i t r u s t  l i t i g a t i o n  a l s o  i n v i t e s  a  b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  
t i m e - c o n s u m i n g  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  m a y  b e c o m e  e n e r v a t i n g  a n d  e v e n t u a l l y  
t o o  w a s t e f u l  f r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i r o r .  
5 5  
M o r e o v e r ,  
4 7 .  S e e  n o t e s  6 5 - 1 6 0  i n f r a  a n d  a c c o m p a n y i n g  t e x t .  
4 8 .  1 5  u . s . c .  §  7 8 g  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
4 9 .  T h e  c o m m o n a l i t y  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  h a s  c a u s e d  o n e  c o m m e n t a t o r  t o  n o t e  t h a t  " a l m o s t  
w i t h o u t  e x c e p t i o n ,  a n y  a n n o u n c e m e n t  o f  a  t a k e - o v e r  b i d  i s  n o w  i n s t a n t l y  f o l l o w e d  b y  a n  
i n j u n c t i o n  a c t i o n  f i l e d  b y  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  c h a r g i n g  t h e  ' r a i d e r '  w i t h  m o s t  o f  
t h e  c r i m e s  i n  t h e  D e c a l o g u e ,  b u t  u s u a l l y  s t o p p i n g  s h o r t  o f  s t a t u t o r y  r a p e . "  R .  J E N N I N G S  &  
H .  M A R S H ,  S E C U R I T I E S  R E G U L A T I O N  7 4 2  ( 4 t h  e d .  1 9 7 7 ) .  
5 0 .  A d d i t i " o n a l  a d v a n t a g e s  n o t e d  b y  a  l e a d i n g  p r a c t i t i o n e r  i n c l u d e  t h e  c h i l l i n g  o f  t h e  
e n t h u s i a s m  o f  a r b i t r a g e u r s  b e f o r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  a c q u i r e d ,  c r e a t i n g  b r e a t h i n g  
s p a c e  f o r  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  e f f o r t s  t o  f i n d  a  m o r e  s u i t a b l e  m e r g e r  p a r t n e r ,  a n d  r a i s i n g  
t h e  m o r a l e  o f  a n  e m b a t t l e d  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  W a c h t e l l ,  S p e c i a l  T e n d e r  O f f e r  L i t i g a -
t i o n  T a c t i c s ,  3 2  B u s .  L A W .  1 4 3 3 ,  1 4 3 7  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
5 1 .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  G A F  C o r p .  v .  M i l s t e i n ,  4 5 3  F . 2 d  7 0 9 ,  7 1 4  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 7 1 )  ( f a i l u r e  t o  f i l e  
s c h e d u l e  1 3 D ) ;  W e l l m a n  v .  D i c k i n s o n ,  4 7 5  F .  S u p p .  7 8 3 ,  8 2 6 ,  8 3 1  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 7 9 )  ( f o r -
m a t i o n  o f  g r o u p  a n d  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r  w i t h o u t  r e q u i r e d  f i l i n g s ) .  
5 2 .  E . g . ,  R o n d e a u  v .  M o s i n e e  P a p e r  C o r p . ,  4 2 2  U . S .  4 9 ,  5 9  ( 1 9 7 5 )  ( c o r r e c t i v e  f i l i n g  
o f  s c h e d u l e  1 3 D  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  r e l i e f  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  p l a i n t i f f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i r r e p a r a b l e  
h a r m  c a u s e d  b y  i n i t i a l  f a i l u r e ) ;  C o r e n c o  C o r p .  v .  S c h i a v o n e  &  S o n s ,  I n c . ,  4 8 8  F . 2 d  2 0 7 ,  
2 1 5  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 7 3 )  ( p e r m a n e n t  i n j u n c t i o n  d e n i e d  w h e n  d e f e c t s  i n  s c h e d u l e  1 4 D  
d i s c l o s u r e s  w e r e  c o r r e c t e d ) .  
5 ! 1 .  I n  i s s u i n g  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n  h a l t i n g  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  o f  P a c c a r ,  I n c .  f o r  t h e  
c o m m o n  s h a r e s  o f  H a m i s c h f e g e r  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  t r i a l  j u d g e  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  t h e  
:' 
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matters learned through discovery might become a basis for heightened 
governmental concern or intervention. 5• 
State tender offer statutes. Target management may receive 
welcome assistance from local officials charged with enforcement of state 
antitakeover statutes. For example, in the aborted effort by Occidental 
Petroleum to go forward with a tender offer for Mead Corporation, 
Mead gained valuable time and impetus when the Ohio Division of 
Securities made an initial finding that Occidental had made inadequate 
and misleading disclosures. As a result of the finding, Occidental could 
not proceed with its offer until those disclosures had been corrected. 55 
Defensive acquisitions. Timely acquisitions by target corporations 
may bootstrap the target into an offensive litigating posture based upon 
antitrust concerns. 56 The haste by which such acquisitions are made, 
however, as well as the substantial suspicion necessarily raised as to bona 
fides, create considerable risk of adverse judicial reaction. 57 The Panter 
court, however, appeared untroubled by Marshall Field's eleventh hour 
acquisition of stores in the Carter Hawley Hale marketing areas. 58 
Publicity campaigns. Full page ads in national and regional 
injunction "might be fatal to the offer." Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. 
Supp. 1151, 1153 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 
54. See Axinn, Tactics and Strategies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1527, 1531 (1977). 
55. The delays obtained by Mead permitted it to undertake a wide range of defensive 
activities that eventually resulted in Occidental's withdrawal. The Occidential-Mead 
struggle is described in Hostl1e Merger Moves Meet Fierce Opposition from Target Con· 
cerns, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1979, at I, col. 6. See note 59 infra. 
56. Subsequent to the announced exchange offer by Crane to acquire 22.·6% .of the 
common stock of Anaconda, Anaconda acquired a major competitor of Crane and sought. 
a preliminary injunction against the offer, inter alia, upon antitrust grounds. Crane Co. 
v. Anaconda Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court denied the 
request for injunction, relying upon the investment exception provision of § 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as well as a perceived ability to "unravel the 
situation" should that be necessary after a full trial on the merits. 411 F. Supp. at 
1219-20. 
57. Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH), 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Five days following the announced intention of 
Monogram to make a tender offer for the shares of Royal, Royal negotiated and executed 
an agreement for the acquisition of Sar Industries, a small but competing business of 
Monogram's that was plaintiff in a pending antitrust action against Monogram. Id. at 
91,134. The acquisition was totally a defensive maneuver designed solely to create an 
antitrust block. At Monogram's instance the court enjoined the acquisition. Id. at 91,133. 
The court regarded the transaction as a violation of§ 14(e) of the Williams Act, contrary 
to the Act's presumed requirement that the tender offeror "has a right to a fair oppor-
tunity to compete for control of a target company." !d. at 91,136. The court also regarded 
the acquisition as violating fiduciary standards of Delaware law. !d. The Williams Act 
basis for the opinion has been undermined by post-Sante Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977), decisions limiting§ 14(e) to disclosure concerns. See In re Sunshine Mining Co. 
Securities Litigation, 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods., 454 
F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
58. See note 230 infra. 
TENDER OFFERS 
newspapers, press releases, 
analysts, and others within tb 
pose: one, to create a pause, 
shareholders' eagerness to • 
shares, and second, to serve tli 
for an arduous struggl~. Althc 
cash offers, a hard hitting pul 
contrived weakness of the ace 
determined acquiror to co~ 
rebutting such campaigns arc 
Defensive mergers. If all 
to be inadequate against a d 
may seek a more suitable acqu 
cerns as to management tenw 
shifting control. Rescuing acq 
the fray either by competin_g: t 
ject to shareholder approval. 1 
outbid or frustrate the unwat 
knights" have their limits and 
bidding war. 61 
The foregoing discussion ] 
the most aggressive and effect 
59. When Occidental Petroleum 
Mead gathered enormous volumes ol 
from the files of federal regulatory 81 
J., Apr. 3, 1979, at 39, col. 2. M 
$1100,000. Id. The information ob 
numerous regulatory commissions i 
Occidental's activities in the decade.] 
the American Express battle for Me 
challenged by McGraw-Hill's vocifen 
president of American Express who 1M 
ing the same period that American I 
16, 1979, at 5, col. 1. A disclosure: 
Clayton was whether Anderson-Ciaytc 
to its employees in connection with f 
Supp. 1310, 1314-16 (W.D. Mich. 1! 
identification and location of the eiDJ 
During the pendency of the action 
Clayton withdrew its tender offer. Id. 
60. Kern County Land Co. v. Oa 
known for the Court's "pragmatic" aF 
Old Kern's accomplishing a defensive 
acquired a substantial block of share 
61. Defensive efforts by Liggett ( 
Grand Metropolitan Ltd. included e 
Inc. Wall St. J., May 7, 1980, at S, • 
increased its bid, and Standard Brm 
May 15, 1980, at 6, col. 1. 
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t i g h t  b e c o m e  a  b a s i s  f o r  h e i g h t e n e d  
o . u  
r a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  r e c e i v e  
s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  s t a t e  
n  t h e  a b o r t e d  e f f o r t  b y  O c c i d e n t a l  
1 d e r  o f f e r  f o r  M e a d  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  
p e t u s  w h e n  t h e  O h i o  D i v i s i o n  o f  
:  O c c i d e n t a l  h a d  m a d e  i n a d e q u a t e  
t  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g ,  O c c i d e n t a l  c o u l d  
d i s c l o s u r e s  h a d  b e e n  c o r r e c t e d .  
5 5  
c q u i s i t i o n s  b y  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
I S i v e  l i t i g a t i n g  p o s t u r e  b a s e d  u p o n  
l l i c h  s u c h  a c q u i s i t i o n s  a r e  m a d e ,  
k i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y  r a i s e d  a s  t o  b o n a  
s e  j u d i c i a l  r e a c t i o n .  
5 7  
T h e  P a n t e r  
~y M a r s h a l l  F i e l d ' s  e l e v e n t h  h o u r  
• l e y  H a l e  m a r k e t i n g  a r e a s .  
5 8  
a d s  i n  n a t i o n a l  a n d  r e g i o n a l  
i s c h f e g e r  C o r p .  v .  P a c c a r ,  I n c . ,  4 7 4  F .  
J S .  L A W .  1 5 2 7 ,  1 5 3 1  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
' t  t o  u n d e r t a k e  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  d e f e n s i v e  
l ' s  w i t h d r a w a l .  T h e  O c c i d e n t i a l - M e a d  
t i t  F i e r c e  O p p o s i t i o n  f r o m  T a r g e t  C o n -
n o t e  5 9  i n f r a .  
d ' f e r  b y  C r a n e  t o  a c q u i r e  2 2 : 6 %  , o f  t h e  
l  m a j o r  c o m p e t i t o r  o f  C r a n e  a n d  s o u g h t .  
l i o . ,  u p o n  a n t i t r u s t  g r o u n d s .  C r a n e  C o .  
D . N . Y .  1 9 7 5 ) .  T h e  c o u r t  d e n i e d  t h e  
e n t  e x c e p t i o n  p r o v i s i o n  o f  §  7  o f  t h e  
I  a  p e r c e i v e d  a b i l i t y  t o  " u n r a v e l  t h e  
t r i a l  o n  t h e  m e r i t s .  4 1 1  F .  S u p p .  a t  
c .  [ 1 9 7 6 - 7 7  T r a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  F E D .  S E C .  
1  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  a n n o u n c e d  i n t e n t i o n  o f  i  
R o y a l ,  R o y a l  n e g o t i a t e d  a n d  e x e c u t e d  
1 ,  a  s m a l l  b u t  c o m p e t i n g  b u s i n e s s  o f  
l i s t  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  M o n o g r a m .  / d .  
U i e u v e r  d e s i g n e d  s o l e l y  t o  c r e a t e  
l j o i n e d  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n .  / d .  a t  9 1 ,  
§  1 4 ( e )  o H h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  c o n t r a n f l !  
o f f e r o r  " h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  a  f a i r  
~.
1
at 9 1 , 1 3 6 .  T h e  c o u r t  a l s o  r e g a : r . . f . . . l .  
~ware l a w .  / d .  T h e  W i l l i a m s  
t - S a n t e  F e  v .  G r e e n ,  4 3 0  U . S .  
m s .  S e e  I n  r e  S u n s h i n e  M i n i n g  
9 7 9 ) ;  B e r m a n  v .  G e r b e r  P r o d s . ,  
v .  K n i g h t ,  4 3 1  F .  S u p p .  3 0 9 ,  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
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n e w s p a p e r s ,  p r e s s  r e l e a s e s ,  a n d  m a i l i n g s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  b r o k e r s ,  
a n a l y s t s ,  a n d  o t h e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n d u s t r y  s e r v e  a  t w o - f o l d  p u r -
p o s e :  o n e ,  t o  c r e a t e  a  p a u s e ,  h o p e f u l l y  o f  p e r m a n e n t  d u r a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r s '  e a g e r n e s s  t o  e m b r a c e  t h e  p r e m i u m  b e i n g  o f f e r e d  f o r  t h e i r  
s h a r e s ,  a n d  s e c o n d ,  t o  s e r v e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a c q u i r o r  w i t h  n o t i c e  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  
f o r  a n  a r d u o u s  s t r u g g l e .  A l t h o u g h  m o r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  e x c h a n g e  r a t h e r  t h a n  
c a s h  o f f e r s ,  a  h a r d  h i t t i n g  p u b l i c i t y  c a m p a i g n  s e i z e s  u p o n  e v e r y  a c t u a l  o r  
c o n t r i v e d  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  a c q u i r o r ,  o c c a s i o n a l l y  c a u s i n g  e v e n  t h e  m o s t  
d e t e r m i n e d  a c q u i r o r  t o  c o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  a n d  c o s t s  o f  
r e b u t t i n g  s u c h  c a m p a i g n s  a r e  w o r t h  e n d u r i n g .  
5 9  
D e f e n s i v e  m e r g e r s .  I f  a l l  o t h e r  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a p p e a r  o r  p r o v e  
t o  b e  i n a d e q u a t e  a g a i n s t  a  d e t e r m i n e d  a d v e r s a r y ,  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  
m a y  s e e k  a  m o r e  s u i t a b l e  a c q u i r o r ,  p r e s u m a b l y  o n e  t h a t  r a i s e s  f e w e r  c o n -
c e r n s  a s  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  t e n u r e ,  u s e  o f  t a r g e t  a s s e t s ,  a n d  o t h e r  e f f e c t s  o f  
s h i f t i n g  c o n t r o l .  R e s c u i n g  a c q u i r o r s ,  d u b b e d  " w h i t e  k n i g h t s , "  m a y  e n t e r  
t h e  f r a y  e i t h e r  b y  c o m p e t i n g  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  o r  b y  n e g o t i a t e d  m e r g e r s  s u b -
j e c t  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l .  
6 0  
I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  e f f o r t  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  
o u t b i d  o r  f r u s t r a t e  t h e  u n w a n t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r o r ,  a l t h o u g h  e v e n  " w h i t e  
k n i g h t s "  h a v e  t h e i r  l i m i t s  a n d  m a y  n o t  t o l e r a t e  t o o  m a n y  d a r k  d a y s  o f  a  
b i d d i n g  w a r .  
6 1  
T h e  f o r e g o i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  p r e s e n t s  t h o s e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  g e n e r a l l y  
t h e  m o s t  a g g r e s s i v e  a n d  e f f e c t i v e  i n  f o r e s t a l l i n g ,  i m p e d i n g ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  
5 9 .  W h e n  O c c i d e n t a l  P e t r o l e u m  i n i t i a t e d  i t s  t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t s  o f  M e a d  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  
M e a d  g a t h e r e d  e n o r m o u s  v o l u m e s  o f  d o c u m e n t s  r e g a r d i n g  O c c i d e n t a l ' s  g l o b a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
f r o m  t h e  f i l e s  o f  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  O c c i d e n t a l .  W a l l  S t .  
J . ,  A p r .  3 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  3 9 ,  c o l .  2 .  M e a d ' s  p h o t o c o p y i n g  b i l l  a l o n e  w a s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  I d .  T h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  w a s  t h e n  o r g a n i z e d  a n d  d i s s e m i n a t e d  t o  
n u m e r o u s  r e g u l a t o r y  c o m m i s s i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o m p t  o r  f a c i l i t a t e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  
O c c i d e n t a l ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  d e c a d e  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  t a k e o v e r  b i d .  / d .  a t  I ,  c o l .  6 .  D u r i n g  
t h e  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  b a t t l e  f o r  M c G r a w - H i l l ,  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  w a s  
c h a l l e n g e d  b y  M c G r a w - H i l l ' s  v o c i f e r o u s  d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  " c o n s p i r a t o r i a l "  r o l e  o f  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t  o f  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  w h o  s e r v e d  o n  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  M c G r a w - H i l l  d u r -
i n g  t h e  s a m e  p e r i o d  t h a t  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  w a s  p l a n n i n g  i t s  t a k e o v e r  a t t e m p t .  / d . ,  J a n .  
1 6 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  5 ,  c o l .  I .  A  d i s c l o s u r e  i s s u e  r a i s e d  b y  G e r b e r  P r o d u c t s  a g a i n s t  A n d e r s o n -
C l a y t o n  w a s  w h e t h e r  A n d e r s o n - C l a y t o n  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d i s c l o s e  i l l e g a l  p a y m e n t s  
t o  i t s  e m p l o y e e s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  f o r e i g n  s a l e s .  B e r m a n  v .  G e r b e r  P r o d s .  C o . ,  4 5 4  F .  
S u p p .  1 3 1 0 ,  1 3 1 4 - 1 6  ( W . D .  M i c h .  1 9 7 8 ) .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  G e r b e r  s o u g h t  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e m p l o y e e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  i l l e g a l  p a y m e n t s .  / d .  a t  1 3 1 5 .  
D u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  s e e k i n g  a n  o r d e r  f o r  f u l l e r  d i s c l o s u r e ,  A n d e r s o n -
C l a y t o n  w i t h d r e w  i t s  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  / d .  a t  1 3 1 6 .  
6 0 .  K e r n  C o u n t y  L a n d  C o .  v .  O c c i d e n t a l  P e t r o l e u m  C o r p . ,  4 1 1  U . S .  5 8 2  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  b e s t  
k n o w n  f o r  t h e  C o u r t ' s  " p r a g m a t i c "  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f §  1 6 { b ) ,  a r o s e  o u t  o f  
O l d  K e r n ' s  a c c o m p l i s h i n g  a  d e f e n s i v e  m e r g e r  w i t h  T e n n e c o  a f t e r  O c c i d e n t a l  h a d  a l r e a d y  
a c q u i r e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  b l o c k  o f  s h a r e s  t h r o u g h  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  / d .  a t  5 8 7 .  
6 1 .  D e f e n s i v e  e f f o r t s  b y  L i g g e t t  G r o u p  t o  w a r d  o f f  a  p r o p o s e d  c a s h  t e n d e r  o f f e r  b y  
G r a n d  M e t r o p o l i t a n  L t d .  i n c l u d e d  e n t i c i n g  a  c o m p e t i n g  o f f e r  f r o m  S t a n d a r d  B r a n d s ,  
I n c .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  M a y  7 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  3 ,  c o l .  2 .  T h e  e f f o r t  f a i l e d  w h e n  G r a n d  M e t r o p o l i t a n  
i n c r e a s e d  i t s  b i d ,  a n d  S t a n d a r d  B r a n d ' s  " r e s c u e "  a t t e m p t  w a s  p r o m p t l y  w i t h d r a w n .  / d . ,  
M a y  1 5 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  6 ,  c o l .  I .  
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precluding hostile tender offers. Each of the measures, whether taken 
prior to or concurrent with pending hostile offers, is couched in terms 
of safeguarding corporate and shareholder interests. Management's role 
in the initiation and pursuance of defensive measures is defined at times 
by fiduciary concepts, 62 at other times by reference to the statutory 
management powers of directors, 63 and on occasion by resort to 
economic theory. 64 These diverse standards reflect not a harmony of 
goals, hut a confusing panoply of inherently ambiguous, self-
contradictory perspectives. Each of the standards is sufficiently broad to 
generate and embrace arguments by both advocates and adversaries of 
defensive maneuverings. Fiduciary concepts, for example, both fuel the 
ardor of shareholder complaints and offer refuge to beleaguered 
management. Similarly, statutory and economic arguments are raised 
with equal vigor by both sides on the issue of validity of defensive 
measures. What is surprising is not the phenomenon of contrasting use, 
wh!ch is predictable whenever broad principles are sought to be applied 
to xssues of substantial complexity and competing claims, but rather the 
tenacity of such perspectives in light of their inability to provide mean-
ingful guidance. Examination of each ofthe three perspectives may place 
their limitations in sharper relief. 
B. Current Perspec#ves for Evaluation of Target 
Management Response 
1. Fidudary Concepts 
The most alluring theoretical underpinning for examining manage-
ment's defensive techniques is the "fiduciary" concept. As if the statement 
has inherent and authoritative meaning, we are told that directors of 
ta.rget companies "have a high fiduciary duty of honesty and fair dealing 
wxth shareholders . . . and their dealings with the corporation and its 
shareholders are rigorously scrutinized. "65 This standard creates the 
appearance of an acceptable evaluative norm for management actions, 
hut upon application it fades into illusion. Justice Frankfurter's oft-
quoted statement in SEC v. Chenery Corp. testifies to the inherent lack 
of substance in the fiduciary concept. 66 In the tender offer context, the 
lack of substance becomes glaring. To whom, for example, do the 
62. See note 72 infra and accompanying text. 
6!1. See notes 11!1-14 infra and accompanying text. 
64. See text accompanying notes 148-60 infra. 
65. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1!110, 1!119 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
66. Justice Frankfurter stated: 
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to fur-
ther inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a 
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And 
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty? 
318 u.s. 80, 85-86 (1943). 
TENDER OFFERS 
so-called fiduciaries o~ 
shareholder interests diverj 
the target corporation.'! ( 
although noting the in~ 
with respect to investmeJ 
influencing factorl;. 69 1 The issue of allegiaD 
within a specific tender o~ 
company. Where (1 cash teD 
tion of all target shareholcl 
fiduciary requirement of "~ 
that management's efforts· 
price per share possible? s'1 
effects of the acquisition UJ 
by the acquiring compan~ 
desires be weighed by 't_aJ 
employees, customers, and, 
what are the priorities of thtl 
6 7. Examples of the belief the 
tion include the following: "[M]J 
all lawful means persons whose a 
would harm the corporate enterptl 
"Management should be rec~ 
the corporation's business, its de¥4 
social requirements." Steinbrink,~ 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882, 884 (: 
68. Weiss, Tender Offers and 
445, 446-47 (1978). Weiss stated: I 
[I)t must be questioned wh~ 
tent with management's fidu' 
stockholders. In seeking to eJ 
with the tender, managemenl 
adverse impact an injunction I 
tender. 
Id. See also Note, Corporate IJiret:j 
Substantive and Procedural Mo~ 
VAND. L. REV. 575, 598 (1979). 
69. In Bromberg, Tender OJftll 
21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 61!1 (197~ 
the question whether equal standan 
short-term holders of target compan 
and Management Responsibility, 251 
70. Petty v. Penntech Papers, Ir 
71. See, e.g., Herald v. Seawell, 
noted that the economic interests of l 
concerns of management, citing sucll 
quality of accurate news coverage ~ 
conditions. Id. at 1095. The court,. 
prise involved, noting at one point th: 
as the Denver Post is, in effect, a qUill 
Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Socl 
'I 
r o w A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  [ 1 9 8 1 ]  
h  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e s ,  w h e t h e r  t a k e n  
h o s t i l e  o f f e r s ,  i s  c o u c h e d  i n  t e r m s  
o l d e r  i n t e r e s t s .  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  r o l e  
e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  i s  d e f i n e d  a t  t i m e s  
D . e s  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  
a n d  ' o n  o c c a s i o n  b y  r e s o r t  t o  
n d a r d s  r e f l e c t  n o t  a  h a r m o n y  o f  
o f  i n h e r e n t l y  a m b i g u o u s ,  s e l f -
~ s t a n d a r d s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  b r o a d  t o  
i > o t h  a d v o c a t e s  a n d  a d v e r s a r i e s  o f  
t c e p t s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  b o t h  f u e l  t h e  
a d ·  o f f e r  r e f u g e  t o  b e l e a g u e r e d  
l  e c o n o m i c  a r g u m e n t s  a r e  r a i s e d  
b e  i s s u e  o f  v a l i d i t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  
~ p h e n o m e n o n  o f  c o n t r a s t i n g  u s e ,  
r m c i p l e s  a r e  s o u g h t  t o  b e  a p p l i e d  
C o m p e t i n g  c l a i m s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  
r  t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  p r o v i d e  m e a n -
r  t h e  t h r e e  p e r s p e c t i v e s  m a y  p l a c e  
·  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  T a r g e t  
~eiponse 
; o n c e p t s  
r p i n n i n g  f o r  e x a m i n i n g  m a n a g e -
u y "  c o n c e p t .  A s  i f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  
~. w e  a r e  t o l d  t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  o f  
~uty o f  h o n e s t y  a n d  f a i r  d e a l i n g  
g s  w i t h  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  i t s  
•  "
1 5  
T h i s  s t a n d a r d  c r e a t e s  t h e  
n o r m  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t  a c t i o n s ,  
s i o n .  J u s t i c e  F r a n k f u r t e r ' s  o f t -
1 J .  t e s t i f i e s  t o  t h e  i n h e r e n t  l a c k  
I n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t ,  t h e  
>  w h o m ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  d o  t h e  
: t e x t .  
' l  .  -
! p : - 1 3 1 0 ,  1 3 1 9  ( W . D .  M t c h .  1 9 7 8 ) .  
1  analysis~ i t  g i v e s  d i r e c t i o n  t o  f u r -
h a t  o b l i g a t i o n s  d o e s  h e  o w e  a s  a  
d i s c h a r g e  t h e s e  o b l i g a t i o n s ?  A n d  
o m  d u t y ?  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 9 1  
s o - c a l l e d  f i d u c i a r i e s  o w e  p r i m a r y  a l l e g i a n c e  w h e n  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  
s h a r e h o l d e r  i n t e r e s t s  d i v e r g e ?  S o m e  c o u r t s  a n d  c o m m e n t a t o r s  h a v e  s t r e s s e d  
t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n . 6 7  O t h e r s  h a v e  p o i n t e d  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n t e r e s t s ,  
6 8  
a l t h o u g h  n o t i n g  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  l a c k  o f  u n i f o r m i t y  a m o n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n v e s t m e n t  g o a l s ,  l o y a l t y  t o  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  o t h e r  
i n f l u e n c i n g  f a c t o r s .  
6 9  
T h e  i s s u e  o f  a l l e g i a n c e  m a y  b e  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t e d  b y  v a r i a b l e s  
w i t h i n  a  s p e c i f i c  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a n d  b y  u l t i m a t e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  
c o m p a n y .  W h e r e  a  c a s h  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  a n  e v e n t u a l  e l i m i n a -
t i o n  o f  a l l  t a r g e t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t h r o u g h  a  c a s h - f o r - s t o c k  m e r g e r ,  d o e s  t h e  
f i d u c i a r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  " u t m o s t  g o o d  f a i t h  a n d  f a i r  d e a l i n g "
7 0  
d e m a n d  
t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  e f f o r t s  b e  l i m i t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  h i g h e s t  
p r i c e  p e r  s h a r e  p o s s i b l e ?  S u c h  a n  a r g u m e n t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  s i n c e  a n y  a d v e r s e  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  u p o n  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n  w i l l  b e  b o r n e  s o l e l y  
b y  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y  a n d  i t s  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  O r  m a y  s h a r e h o l d e r  
d e s i r e s  b e  w e i g h e d  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o n c e r n s  o f  
e m p l o y e e s ,  c u s t o m e r s ,  a n d  c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  i f  s o  
w h a t  a r e  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t h e s e  c o m p e t i n g  c o n c e r n s ?
7 1  
T h e  c o m p l e x i t i e s  o f  
6  7 .  E x a m p l e s  o f  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  i s  o w e d  p r i m a r i l y  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a -
t i o n  i n c l u d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  " [ M ] a n a g e m e n t  h a s  n o t  o n l y  t h e  r i g h t  b u t  t h e  d u t y  t o  r e s i s t  b y  
a l l  l a w f u l  m e a n s  p e r s o n s  w h o s e  a t t e m p t  t o  w i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  
1  
w o u l d  h a r m  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  e n t e r p r i s e . "  H e i t  v .  B a i r d ,  5 6 7  F . 2 d  1 1 5 7 ,  1 1 6 1  ( 1 s t  C i r .  1 9 7 7 ) .  
" M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  p o s s e s s i n g  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  p o w e r  t o  s h a p e  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  b u s i n e s s ,  i t s  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  i t s  r e t u r n  t o  i n v e s t o r s ,  a n d  i t s  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
s o c i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s . "  S t e i n b r i n k ,  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  T a k e o v e r  A t t e m p t ,  2 8  
C A S E  W .  R E S .  L .  R E V .  8 8 2 ,  8 8 4  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
6 8 .  W e i s s ,  T e n d e r  O f f e r s  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  2 3  N . Y .  L .  S c H .  L .  R E v .  
4 4 5 ,  4 4 6 - 4 7  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  W e i s s  s t a t e d :  
[ I ] t  m u s t  b e  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  . . .  a  r e q u e s t  [ t o  e n j o i n  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r ]  i s  c o n s i s -
t e n t  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  f i d u c i a r y  o b l i g a t i o n  o w e d  t o  a l l  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
s t o c k h o l d e r s .  I n  s e e k i n g  t o  e n j o i n  a n  o f f e r o r  f r o m  c o m m e n c i n g  o r  c o n t i n u i n g  
w i t h  t h e  t e n d e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  b e  g i v i n g  i n s u f f i c i e n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  
a d v e r s e  i m p a c t  a n  i n j u n c t i o n  w i l l  h a v e  o n  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h o s e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  t o  
t e n d e r .  
l d .  S e e  a l s o  N o t e ,  C o r p o r a t e  D i r e c t o r s '  L i a b i l i t y  f o r  R e s i s t i n g  a  T e n d e r  O f f e r :  P r o p o s e d  
S u b s t a n t i v e  a n d  P r o c e d u r a l  M o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  E x i s t i n g  S t a t e  F i d u c i a r y  S t a n d a r d s ,  3 2  
V A N D .  L .  R E V .  5 7 5 ,  5 9 8  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
6 9 .  I n  B r o m b e r g ,  T e n d e r  O f f e r s :  S a f e g u a r d s  a n d  R e s t r a i n t s - A n  I n t e r e s t  A n a l y s i s ,  
2 1  C A S E  W .  R E S .  L .  R E v .  6 1 3  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  t h e  a u t h o r  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a d y  a n s w e r  t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  e q u a l  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  t o  a p p l y  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  b o t h  l o n g - t e r m  a n d  
s h o r t - t e r m  h o l d e r s  o f  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  s e c u r i t i e s .  I  d .  a t  6 2 4 .  S e e  a l s o  W e i s s ,  T e n d e r  O f f e r s  
a n d  M a n a g e m e n t  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  2 3  N . Y .  L .  S C H .  L .  R E V .  4 4 5 , 4 5 2  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
7 0 .  P e t t y  v .  P e n n t e c h  P a p e r s ,  I n c . ,  3 4 7  A . 2 d  1 4 0 ,  1 4 3  ( D e l .  C h .  1 9 7 5 ) .  
7 1 .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  H e r a l d  v .  S e a w e l l ,  4 7 2  F . 2 d  1 0 8 1  ( l O t h  C i r .  1 9 7 2 ) .  T h e  S e a w e l l  c o u r t  
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  D e n v e r  P o s t  w e r e  n o t  t h e  s o l e  
c o n c e r n s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  c i t i n g  s u c h  n o n i n v e s t o r  i n t e r e s t s  a s  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  h i g h  
q u a l i t y  o f  a c c u r a t e  n e w s  c o v e r a g e  a n d  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  f a v o r a b l e  e m p l o y e e  w o r k i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s .  I d .  a t  1 0 9 5 .  T h e  c o u r t  w a s  u n d o u b t e d l y  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  e n t e r -
p r i s e  i n v o l v e d ,  n o t i n g  a t  o n e  p o i n t  t h a t  " a  c o r p o r a t i o n  p u b l i s h i n g  a  g r e a t  n e w s p a p e r  s u c h  
a s  t h e  D e n v e r  P o s t  i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  a  q u a s i - p u b l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n . "  I d .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  N o t e ,  H e r a l d  
C o .  v .  S e a w e l l :  A  N e w  C o r p o r a t e  S o c i a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ? .  1 2 1  U .  P A .  L .  R E V .  1 1 5 7  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .  
~~~~: 
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tender offer battles give rise to a plethora of similar questions, none of 
which is readily answered by reference to a fiduciary concept whose 
breadth makes it inherently incapable of creating priorities among the 
recipients of its beneficent standards. 
Yet the concept survives, even flourishes. Reference to the "fiduciary 
duties" of management is prominent in recent tender offer litigation. 72 Its 
~opularity is the direct outgrowth of its inherent ambiguity, serving as the 
simultaneous rallying cry of both plaintiff shareholders and defendant 
management. 73 Frequency of recitation creates an illusion of substance. 
The utility of a legal standard must be seriously questioned when the stan-
dard is avidly and equally embraced by adversaries. Examination of recent' 
cases illustrates the inadequacy of the fiduciary standard. 
Fiduciary arguments are raised under state law, although frequently 
joined with federal causes of action based on alleged Williams Act viola-
tions. 74 In both Berman v. Gerber Products Co. 75 and Panter v. Marshall 
Field & Co., 76 the most direct cases to date involving shareholder 
challenges under state law to the validity of management's defensive 
measures taken against hostile tender offers, plaintiff shareholders' 
allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duties focused upon litigation 
undertaken against the acquiring companies. The Berman plaintiffs, for 
example, alleged that such litigation "was not motivated by legitimate 
business interests but rather by the self-serving interests of the individual 
board members. "77 
See also Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 882, 909 (1978). 
72. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. III. 1980); 
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., [Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,188, at 
96,529 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, FED. SEC. L. REP. , 97,603 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v. 
Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
73. In Panter, defendant management countered the plaintiff shareholders' claim of 
breach of fiduciary obligation by arguing that their actions were required by their 
fiduciary obligation to the corporation to avoid an antitrust violation. 486 F. Supp. at 
1193-94. 
74. Although it has been argued that the Williams Act incorporates a fiduciary con-
cept, see Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 
CORNELL L. REv. 901, 913 (1979), the argument does not appear consistent with current 
judicial perceptions. The reference in the Williams Act forbidding "fraudulent" acts or 
practices in relation to tender offers, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(e) (1976), has been limited in recent decisions to the context of disclosure violations 
rather than "fair dealing" concepts, analogizing to the Sante Fe limitation on 10b-5. Ber-
man v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman v. 
Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
75. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
76. 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
77. 454 F. Supp. at 1317. See also Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. 
Supp. 713, 714-15 (E.D. Va. 1980), in which a shareholder of Universal Leaf brought a 
deriv~tive actio~ alleging that directors of Universal breached their fiduciary duties by 
opposmg a hostile takeover attempt by Congoleum. The derivative action was upheld 
against the claim that disinterested directors could void the suit, but no decision has as yet 
been reached on the merits. I d. at 717. 
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scrutiny, 78 however, soon glve wa~ 
business judgment, an independe1 
favor .of management action. mi1 
lying questions that are raised b~ 
including such questions as to whCJ 
parameters of fair dealing wheiJ 
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78. 454 F. Supp. at 1319; 486 F. SUJ 
79. See note 66 supra and accompau 
80. The Berman court stated that "[t: 
the principal dispute between Gerber aD~ 
of the disclosure required in connectic 
operation." 454 F. Supp. at 1319. 
81. Id. at 1315. 
82. Id. at 1319 .. 
83. See id. 
84. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., • 
85. Id. at 1194. 
i  I O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  
[ 1 9 8 1 ]  
f > l e t h o r a  o f  s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n s ,  n o n e  o f  
e r e n c e  t o  a  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t  w h o s e  
a b l e  o f  c r e a t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  a m o n g  t h e  
I s .  
f l o u r i s h e s .  R e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  " f i d u c i a r y  
t i n  r e c , e n t  t e n d e r  o f f e r  l i t i g a t i o n .  7 2  I t s  
f i t s  i n h e r e n t  a m b i g u i t y ,  s e r v i n g  a s  t h e  
p l a i n t i f f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a n d  d e f e n d a n t  
. t i o n  c r e a t e s  a n  i l l u s i o n  o f  s u b s t a n c e .  
> e  s e r i o u s l y  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e n  t h e  s t a n - .  
b y  a d v e r s a r i e s .  E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  r e c e n t '  
1 e  f i d u c i a r y  s t a n d a r d .  
u n d e r  s t a t e  l a w ,  a l t h o u g h  f r e q u e n t l y  
b a s e d  o n  a l l e g e d  W i l l i a m s  A c t  v i o l a -
r o d u c t s  C o .  
7 5  
a n d  P a n t e r  v .  M a r s h a l l  
u e 5  t o  d a t e  i n v o l v i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  
v a l i d i t y  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d e f e n s i v e  
1 d e r  o f f e r s ,  p l a i n t i f f  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  
£ : i a r y  d u t i e s  f o c u s e d  u p o n  l i t i g a t i o n  
i i p a n i e s .  T h e  B e r m a n  p l a i n t i f f s ,  f o r  
1  " w a s  n o t  m o t i v a t e d  b y  l e g i t i m a t e  
~If-serving i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
t o  t h e  T a k e o v e r  A t t e m p t ,  2 8  C A S E  W .  R E S .  
4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  l l 6 8 ,  l l 9 4  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  
L ! r J  F E D .  S E c .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  ' 9 7 ,  1 8 8 ,  a t  
R E P .  ' 9 7 , 6 0 3  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  B e r m a n  v .  
: w . o .  M i c h .  1 9 7 8 ) .  
m t e r e d  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  c l a i m  o f  
n a t  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e i r  
, j d  a n  a n t i t r u s t  v i o l a t i o n .  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  
W i l l i a m s  A c t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  a  f i d u c i a r y  c o n -
o f  D e f e n s i v e  T a c t i c s  i n  T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  6 4  
n t  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  c u r r e n t  
I i a m s  A c t  f o r b i d d i n g  " f r a u d u l e n t "  a c t s  o r  
E x c h a n g e  A c t  o f  1 9 3 4 ,  §  1 4 ( e ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  
l i o n s  t o  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c l o s u r e  v i o l a t i o n s  
r  t 0  t h e  S a n t e  F e  l i m i t a t i o n  o n  1 0 b - 5 .  B e r -
0 ,  1 3 1 8  ( W . D .  M i c h .  1 9 7 8 ) ;  A l t m a n  v .  
) .  
v .  U n i v e r s a l  L e a f  T o b a c c o  C o . ,  4 9 5  F .  
s h a r e h o l d e r  o f  U n i v e r s a l  L e a f  b r o u g h t  a  
l e i ' S a l  b r e a c h e d  t h e i r  f i d u c i a r y  d u t i e s  b y  
e u m .  T h e  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n  w a s  u p h e l d  
l d  V ( ) i d  t h e  s u i t ,  b u t  n o  d e c i s i o n  h a s  a s  y e t  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 9 3  
B o t h  t h e  B e r m a n  a n d  P a n t e r  c o u r t s  b e g a n  t h e i r  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y .  L o f t y  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  f a i r  d e a l i n g  a n d  r i g o r o u s  
s c r u t i n y ,  
7 8  
h o w e v e r ,  s o o n  g a v e  w a y  i n  e a c h  c a s e  t o  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  m o d e l  o f  
b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t ,  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a n d a r d  c a r r y i n g  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  i n  
f a v o r  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a c t i o n .  N e i t h e r  c o u r t  a d d r e s s e d  a n y  o f  t h e  u n d e r -
l y i n g  q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  r a i s e d  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  s t a n d a r d ,  
i n c l u d i n g  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  w h o m  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  o w e d ,  t h e  
p a r a m e t e r s  o f  f a i r  d e a l i n g  w h e n  s h a r e h o l d e r  a n d  c o r p o r a t e  i n t e r e s t s  
d i v e r g e ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a c t i o n s  i n a p -
p r o p r i a t e l y  f a v o r  o n e  i n t e r e s t  o v e r  a n o t h e r .  
7 9  
I n s t e a d ,  t h e  B e r m a n  c o u r t  
n a r r o w e d  i t s  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  G e r b e r ' s  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  d i s -
c l o s u r e  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
8 0  
I n a s m u c h  a s  A n d e r s o n  C l a y t o n  w a s  o f f e r i n g  c a s h  f o r  
a n y  a n d  a l l  G e r b e r  s h a r e s  t e n d e r e d ,  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  
c o n s i d e r  w h o  t h e  i n t e n d e d  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d e f e n s i v e  
l i t i g a t i o n  w e r e .  T h e y  w e r e  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  p r e s u m a b l y  
w e l l  i n  e x c e s s  o f  a  m a j o r i t y ,  w h o  w o u l d  h a v e  t e n d e r e d .  A r g u a b l y ,  t h e  
l i t i g a t i o n  p r o t e c t e d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  n o n t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  o n  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  A n d e r s o n  C l a y t o n ' s  m a n a g e m e n t  w a s  a  
m a t e r i a l  f a c t  t o  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  G e r b e r  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  Y e t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  
t h e  a c q u i r o r ' s  m a n a g e m e n t  w a s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  k n o w n - A n d e r s o n  C l a y t o n  
h a d  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  m a t e r i a l s  t h a t  s o m e  o f  i t s  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  o f f i -
c e r s  w e r e  a w a r e  o f  i l l e g a l  f o r e i g n  p a y m e n t s .
8 1  
T h e  i s s u e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w a s  
w h e t h e r  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  n o n t e n d e r i n g  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  o u t w e i g h e d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  d e s i r i n g  t o  t e n d e r .  
T a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  c h o s e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  n o n t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
i n  i n i t i a t i n g  l i t i g a t i o n .  W a s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c h o i c e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
f i d u c i a r y  s t a n d a r d s ?  T h e  B e r m a n  c o u r t  f a i l e d  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
f a i r n e s s  a n d  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  a v o i d i n g  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s  e n t i r e l y  b y  t u r n -
i n g  t o  " [  t  ] h e  s o - c a l l e d  ' b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e '  [ t h a t ]  l e a v e s  r e l a t i v e l y  w i d e  
d i s c r e t i o n  i n  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  a c t  i n  w h a t  i t  c o n s i d e r s  t o  b e  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  "
8 2  
O n l y  l i p  s e r v i c e  w a s  p a i d  t o  t h e  c o u r t ' s  o p e n i n g  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  " h i g h  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y .  "
8 3  
T h e  P a n t e r  c o u r t  f o l l o w e d  a  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n ,  c i t i n g  f i r s t  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  
d u t i e s  o f  " h o n e s t y ,  l o y a l t y ,  g o o d  f a i t h ,  d i l i g e n c e  a n d  f a i r n e s s ,  "
8 4  
t h e n  
s h i f t i n g  t o  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  f a v o r i n g  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a c t i o n s  " i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  f r a u d ,  b a d  f a i t h ,  g r o s s  o v e r r e a c h i n g  o r  a b u s e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n .  "
8 5  
7 8 .  4 5 4  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 3 1 9 ;  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1 9 2 .  
7 9 .  S e e  n o t e  6 6  s u p r a  a n d  a c c o m p a n y i n g  t e x t .  
8 0 .  T h e  B e r m a n  c o u r t  s t a t e d  t h a t  " [ t ] h e  f a c t u a l  h i s t o r y  o f  t h i s  c a s e  . . .  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  d i s p u t e  b e t w e e n  G e r b e r  a n d  A n d e r s o n - C l a y t o n  c e n t e r e d  a r o u n d  t h e  e x t e n t  
o f  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  r e q u i r e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  A n d e r s o n - C l a y t o n ' s  f o r e i g n  p a y m e n t s  
o p e r a t i o n . "  4 5 4  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 3 1 9 .  
8 1 .  I d .  a t  1 3 1 5 .  
8 2 .  / d .  a t  1 3 1 9  . .  
8 3 .  S e e  i d .  
8 4 .  P a n t e r  v .  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  &  C o . ,  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1 9 2 .  
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As in Berman, there was a complete lack of perception of the differing 
and competing shareholder and corporate interests, or of the fact that 
management unilaterally made choices among such interests. Instead, 
the Panter court looked at the narrow question of the antitrust fears of 
Marshall Field management, an examination that was inadequate even 
on its own terms. 86 One may wonder what reflex reaction caused the Ber-
man and Panter courts to assert fiduciary standards. One would also find 
it difficult to give a meaningful content to the fiduciary concept from 
these or other court opinions. 87 
Even in cases where target management's action has been successfully 
challenged, the fiduciary concept has served as no more than a gloss on the 
court's reasoning. In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 88 target 
management sought to dilute the effect of a tender offer by issuance of 
75,000 share~ to a proposed merger partner. 89 The court premised its 
. conclusion against the target board upon a fiduciary standard, citing a 
"breach of this [fiduciary] duty ... for directors to make use of issuance 
of shares to accomplish an improper purpose. "90 The reference to "impro-
per purpose" concerned an issuance of shares in circumstances suggesting a 
motive of self-perpetuation rather than a valid business objective. 91 In 
these circumstances, reference by the court to the fiduciary standard was 
unnecessary because the directors failed to adhere to elementary statutory 
obligations of management, the issuance of shares having been made 
"with precipitous haste with insufficient consideration or opportunity for 
consideration of the interest of the corporation or its stockholders. "9% 
Reference to fiduciary duty in Condec was not only superfluous but 
created unnecessary ambiguity. It has been argued by one commentator, 
for example, that even a precipitous sale of shares to thwart an impending 
takeover, as was done in Condec, is in the best interests of the corporation, 
and thus consistent with a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation. 93 This 
86. See note 124 infra. 
87. An example of the confusion generated by the use of uncertain terminology is 
Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The 
court combined references to "that strict impartiality which is required by their 
[director's] fiduciary duties," id. at 712-13, with business judgment concepts upholding 
management's defensive issuance of shares because "plaintiff has not shown any 
likelihood that it can prove that the transaction amounts to fraud." /d. Whatever the con· 
tent of the fiduciary model, it scarcely could be regarded as resting narrowly upon the 
absence of fraud. 
88. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967). 
89. /d. at 358, 230 A.2d at 772-73. 
90. Id. at 363, 230 A.2d at 775, citing Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 
A.2d 309, 313 (1941). 
91. Id. at 363, 230 A.2d at 776. 
92. /d. at 359, 230 A.2d at 773. 
93. Lipton states: "Once the directors have properly determined that a takeover 
should be rejected they may take any reasonable action to accomplish this purpose, 
including ... the issuance of shares to a big brother .... " Lipton, Takeover Bids in the 
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 123-24 (1979). 
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management -oriented argumen 
enigma- to whom is the fidud; 
Perhaps the most frequent 
concept is the "primary purp 
taken primarily for a legitimate 
narrow purpose of perpetuation 
imagination, however, for target 
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"primary" motivation for opposi 
circumstances may offer relative 
purpose of Marshall Field maru 
based principally on an antitm 
what was the purpose of Me 
substantial concern over the et 
tions?97 Even if perpetuation ~ 
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94. See Note, Herald Co. v. Seawel 
PA. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (1973). Thus, 
occasion, have enjoined defensive m 
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Indus., Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Bind' 
(C.D. Cal. 1976). 
95. See note 57 supra; text accomF 
Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 14!1 (Del 
percentage to remove an existing ~ 
96. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 
97. McGraw-Hill management str 
Week, would suffer a loss of editorial 
takeover. Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1979,' 
"fiduciary" duty owed, and with whi 
primary duty to the integrity of one of i 
would be cashed out by acceptance oft 
interest in the editorial objectivity- of 
. appropriate focus. See id., Feb. 20, ~97 
by certain McGraw-Hill shareholders b 
trageurs who had acquired substantial 
ment. The efforts did not reach fruiti~ 
suits were eventually filed against McC 
American Express offer. /d. Mar. 2, 1! 
group there may have existed a sizeaM 
those still undecided. How is the fiduci 
interests? With regard to the BusinesJ 
management include reasonable effort 
shareholders may go forward? These an 
gle, and it is readily apparent that noti 
and equally amorphous concepts are 1 
through competing interests. 
98. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. 
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t a k e o v e r .  W a l l  S t .  J . ,  J a n .  1 6 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  5 ,  c o l .  1 .  I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  t o  w h o m  i s  t h e  
" f i d u c i a r y "  d u t y  o w e d ,  a n d  w i t h  w h a t  c o n s e q u e n c e s ?  M a n a g e m e n t  c l e a r l y  s e n s e d  a  
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a p p r o p r i a t e  f o c u s .  S e e  i d . ,  F e b .  2 0 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  1 4 ,  c o l .  2 ,  d e s c r i b i n g  a n  e l e v e n t h  h o u r  e f f o r t  
b y  c e r t a i n  M c G r a w - H i l l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  s e e k  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n p u t ,  l e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  b y  a r b i -
t r a g e u r s  w h o  h a d  a c q u i r e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  b l o c k s  a f t e r  A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s '  i n i t i a l  a n n o u n c e -
m e n t .  T h e  e f f o r t s  d i d  n o t  r e a c h  f r u i t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  a t  l e a s t  f i v e  s h a r e h o l d e r  c l a s s  a c t i o n  
s u i t s  w e r e  e v e n t u a l l y  f i l e d  a g a i n s t  M c G r a w - H i l l  b a s e d  o n  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  i m p e d i n g  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s  o f f e r .  I d .  M a r .  2 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  4 ,  c o l .  3 .  Y e t  e v e n  w i t h i n  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r  
g r o u p  t h e r e  m a y  h a v e  e x i s t e d  a  s i z e a b l e  b l o c k  t h a t  a g r e e d  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
t h o s e  s t i l l  u n d e c i d e d .  H o w  i s  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t  t o  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e s e  w i d e l y  v a r y i n g  
i n t e r e s t s ?  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  B u s i n e s s  W e e k  q u e s t i o n ,  d o e s  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e r n  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t  i n c l u d e  r e a s o n a b l e  e f f o r t s  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e  p r o b l e m  s o  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  m a y  g o  f o r w a r d ?  T h e s e  a n d  n u m e r o u s  o t h e r  i s s u e s  s u r f a c e d  f r o m  t h i s  s t r u g -
g l e ,  a n d  i t  i s  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  n o t i o n s  o f  p r i m a r y  m o t i v a t i o n ,  f i d e l i t y ,  f a i r  d e a l i n g ,  
a n d  e q u a l l y  a m o r p h o u s  c o n c e p t s  a r e  t o t a l l y  i n a d e q u a t e  a s  d i s p o s i t i v e  b a s e s  f o r  s i f t i n g  
t h r o u g h  c o m p e t i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  
9 8 .  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  B . F .  G o o d r i c h ,  I n c . ,  3 0 1  F .  S u p p .  7 0 6 ,  7 1 2  ( N . D .  I l l .  






496 66 IOWA LAW REVIEW 475 [1981] 
primary? In this metaphysical realm, concepts are not easily defined. 
Thus one commentator has suggested that "the primary purpose test is 
perhaps somewhere between the 'business judgment' and 'fairness' tests 
of state law, "99 hardly a clarifying delineation. 100 
An alternative standard for giving content to the fiduciary concept 
is reflected in Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 101 the court requiring a "compel-
ling business purpose" to justify the issuance of shares- in Klaus, the 
establishment of an ESOT- as a defense measure during a control bat-
tle.102 Even the "compelling business purpose" standard, while perhaps 
appearing more definitive than other tests, 105 creates broad areas of sub-
jectivity and lack of guidance. As described by the Klaus court, the test 
"suggests a balancing of the good to the corporation against the dispro-
portionate advantage to the majority shareholders and incumbent 
management."104 Notions of "balancing," "good to the corporation," 
and "advantage ... to incumbent management" offer scant evidence of 
clarity. 
The lack of substance in the fiduciary perspective is further illus-
trated by the efforts of both the Berman and Panter courts to infuse the 
concept with content through the so-called "business judgment rule."105 
The fiduciary ideology is grounded on notions of loyalty, fair dealing, 
and avoidance of conflict. This is far removed from the judicially-created 
99. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 86-87. 
100. The "primary purpose" test has been further criticized with regard to the ambi-
guity of the term "primary" (is the primary motive that which is stronger than all other 
motives combined, or simply the strongest of any individual motive?) and the uncertainty 
of determining motives when board members act collectively, each member perhaps 
responding to a different influencing factor. See Gelfond & Sebastion, Reevaluating the 
Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REV. 403, 437-43 
(1980). 
101. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975). 
102. Id. at 233-34. It is not coincidental that Klaus is a Ninth Circuit decision, for the 
court's standard was taken from the language of the California Supreme Court in Jones v. 
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 
(1969), dealing with the obligations of controlling shareholders. 
103. In Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, 
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1978), the author argued 
for universal adoption of the "compelling business purpose" test as "more consistent with 
the inevitable conflict of interest faced by management in a contested control situation. 
Adoption of this test would subject many defensive tactics to claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty, a radical departure from much of existing law." Id. at 44. It is difficult to accept 
the author's implication that clarity is obtained by the confluence of "compelling business 
purpose," burden of proof, and the fiduciary duty context, for defensive measures are fre-
quently defended on plausible business and fiduciary grounds. The content of these 
ambiguous standards is what creates the problems of application, and perceptions may 
vary among courts just as they vary among management and shareholders. It would 
therefore be preferable to consider standards that _avoid such inherently ambiguous ter-
minology. 
104. 528 F.2d at 234. 
105. See text accompanying notes 78-87 supra. 
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fiduciary duty whenever they agJ 
shareholders110 to the position t1J 
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issued shares from voting in light of itS 
ment was primarily motivated by its dei 
668, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Second 
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to overcome the presumption that dine 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 97,603, at 98;il0 
Co. v. Internorth, Inc., No. 80-7865 (l! 
sive measures was reversed based up(m 
proof to plaintiffs rather than target cc 
108. In Brundney, Fiduciary Ideolos 
MICH. L. REv. 259 (1966), the author F 
repurchase of shares by corporations d1 
erroneously slipped into business judj 
within the fiduciary context of a duty 4 
109. The Williams Act permits but 
statement recommending or opposing 
(1976). Limited authority is given to 
statutes permitting management to in1 
R.EV. CODE ANN. § 1707 .04l(B)(l)(b) ( 
110. A Bn'ef Against Managements j 
1979, at 159. 
Ill. Steinbrink, Management's Resj 
L. REv. 882, 894 (1978). 
r O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  [ 1 9 8 1 ]  
t ,  c o n c e p t s  a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  d e f i n e d .  
I  t h a t  " t h e  p r i m a r y  p u r p o s e  t e s t  i s  
i n e s s  j u d g m e n t '  a n d  ' f a i r n e s s '  t e s t s  
· l i n e a t i o n .
1 0 0  
1 g  c~mtent t o  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t  
,
1 0 1  
t h e  c o u r t  r e q u i r i n g  a  " c o m p e l -
i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s - i n  K l a u s ,  t h e  
n s e  m e a s u r e  d u r i n g  a  c o n t r o l  b a t -
p u r p o s e "  s t a n d a r d ,  w h i l e  p e r h a p s  
: e s t s ,  
1 0 1  
c r e a t e s  b r o a d  a r e a s  o f  s u b -
: r i b e d  b y  t h e  K l a u s  c o u r t ,  t h e  t e s t  
n e ·  c o r p o r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  d i s p r o -
. t y  S h a r e h o l d e r s  a n d  i n c u m b e n t  
i n g , "  " g o o d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n , "  
~agement" o f f e r  s c a n t  e v i d e n c e  o f  
t c i a r y  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  f u r t h e r  i l l u s -
f n  a n d  P a n t e r  c o u r t s  t o  i n f u s e  t h e  




P . n o t i o n s  o f  l o y a l t y ,  f a i r  d e a l i n g ,  
1 1 1 o v e d  f r o m  t h e  j u d i c i a l l y - c r e a t e d  
t h e r  c r i t i c i z e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a m b i -
i v e  t h a t  w h i c h  i s  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  a l l  o t h e r  
m d i v i d u a l  m o t i v e ? )  a n d  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
l e t  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  e a c h  m e m b e r  p e r h a p s  
G e l f o n d  &  S e b a s t i o n ,  R e e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  
~_Offer, 6 0  B . U .  L .  R E V .  4 0 3 ,  4 3 7 - 4 3  
: t a u s  i s  a  N i n t h  C i r c u i t  d e c i s i o n ,  f o r  t h e  
1 e  C a l i f o r n i a  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n  J o n e s  v .  
i » . 2 d  4 6 4 ,  4 7 1 ,  8 1  C a l .  R p t r .  5 9 2 ,  5 9 9  
:  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
r y ,  t h e  M a r k e t  f o r  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l ,  
K .  L .  R E V .  1  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  t h e  a u t h o r  a r g u e d  
p u r p o s e "  t e s t  a s  " m o r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
m e n t  i n  a  c o n t e s t e d  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n .  
t a c t i c s  t o  c l a i m s  o f  b r e a c h  o f  f i d u c i a r y  
a w . "  / d .  a t  4 4 .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c c e p t  
t h e  c o n f l u e n c e  o f  " c o m p e l l i n g  b u s i n e s s  
: o n t e x t ,  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  f r e -
c i a r y  g r o u n d s .  T h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e s e  
.  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  a n d  p e r c e p t i o n s  m a y  
a g e m e n t  a n d  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  I t  w o u l d  
~void s u c h  i n h e r e n t l y  a m b i g u o u s  t e r -
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
4 9 7  
p r e s u m p t i o n  f a v o r i n g  t h e  b u s i n e s s  d e c i s i o n s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  s o  l o n g  a s  
s u c h  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  m a d e  " i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  f r a u d ,  b a d  f a i t h ,  g r o s s  o v e r -
r e a c h i n g  o r  a b u s e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n . "
1 0 6  
T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  
c r e a t e  d i f f e r i n g  b u r d e n s  o f  p r o o f  a n d ,  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  w h i c h  s t a n d a r d  i s  
s e l e c t e d ,  t h e  b u r d e n  c r e a t e d  m a y  b e  d i s p o s i t i v e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s .
1 0 7  
Y e t ,  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t  l a c k s  i n h e r e n t  g u i d e l i n e s ,  
c o u r t s  a r e  p r o n e  t o  a  c o n f u s i o n  o f  t e r m s  a n d  a n  i m p l i c i t ,  p e r h a p s  e v e n  
u n k n o w i n g ,  r e j e c t i o n  o f  f i d u c i a r y  i d e o l o g y .
1 0 8  
D e f i n i t i o n a l  c o n t e n t  t o  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t s  i s  i m p e d e d  i n  p a r t  b e c a u s e  
a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t a r g e t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  
c a p a c i t i e s .  T h e r e  i s  n o  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  r o l e  f o r  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  
a n a l o g o u s  t o  m e r g e r  o r  s a l e  o f  a s s e t  t r a n s a c t i o n s .
1 0 9  
T h u s  c o u r t s  a n d  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  a r e  l e f t  g r o p i n g  f o r  s u b s t a n c e .  N o t i o n s  o f  g o o d  f a i t h ,  
h o n e s t y ,  l o y a l t y ,  a n d  o t h e r  v i r t u e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  m o d e l  a r e  
n o t  r e a d i l y  t r a n s l a t a b l e  i n t o  d e c i s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  i n  t h e  c o m p l e x i t i e s  o f  
h o s t i l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s t r u g g l e s .  T h e  r e s u l t  p r e d i c t a b l y  h a s  b e e n  p o l a r i z a -
t i o n  o f  o p i n i o n ,  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  b r e a c h  t h e i r  
f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  w h e n e v e r  t h e y  a g g r e s s i v e l y  i m p e d e  a n  o f f e r  f r o m  r e a c h i n g  
s h a r e h o l d e r s n o  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  " t h e  e v e r - p r e s e n t  f i d u c i a r y  o b l i g a t i o n  
o f  m a n a g e m e n t  . . .  [ j u s t i f i e s ]  t a k i n g  s u c h  r e a s o n a b l e  a c t i o n  a s  t h e y  d e e m  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  f r u s t r a t e  o r  d e l a y  a n  u n s o l i c i t e d  t a k e o v e r  a t t e m p t .  " m  
1 0 6 .  P a n t e r  v .  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  &  C o . ,  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1 9 4 .  
1 0 7 .  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  a n d  e f f e c t  u p o n  r e s u l t s  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  r e c e n t  S e c o n d  C i r -
c u i t  d e c i s i o n  i n  T r e a d w a y  C o s .  v .  C a r e  C o r p . ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  ,  9 7 , 6 0 3  ( 2 d  
C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  r e v e r s i n g  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  i n j u n c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  v o t i n g  o f  s h a r e s  i s s u e d  b y  
T r e a d w a y  d u r i n g  t h e  m i d s t  o f  a  c o n t r o l  b a t t l e  w i t h  C a r e .  / d .  a t  9 8 , 2 1 3 .  T h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  
f o c u s e d  u p o n  T r e a d w a y  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a n d  e n j o i n e d  t h e  
i s s u e d  s h a r e s  f r o m  v o t i n g  i n  l i g h t  o f  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  " T r e a d w a y ' s  i n c u m b e n t  m a n a g e -
m e n t  w a s  p r i m a r i l y  m o t i v a t e d  b y  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  s t a v e  o f f  a  C a r e  t a k e o v e r  b i d . "  4 9 0  F .  S u p p .  
6 6 8 ,  6 8 7  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 8 0 ) .  T h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  l o w e r  c o u r t  " d i d  n o t  a p p l y  
t h e  s t a n d a r d  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  a n a l y s i s "  a n d  r e v e r s e d ,  b a s e d  u p o n  a  f a i l u r e  o f  p l a i n t i f f  
t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  " h a v e  a c t e d  p r o p e r l y  a n d  i n  g o o d  f a i t h . "  F E D .  
S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 6 0 3 ,  a t  9 8 , 2 1 0 - 1 1 ;  s e e  n o t e  1 1 2  i n f r a .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  C r o u s e - H i n d s  
C o .  v .  I n t e r n o r t h ,  I n c . ,  N o .  8 0 - 7 8 6 5  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  a n  i n j u n c t i o n  a g a i n s t  c e r t a i n  d e f e n -
s i v e  m e a s u r e s  w a s  r e v e r s e d  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t ' s  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  
p r o o f  t o  p l a i n t i f f s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  d i r e c t o r s .  
1 0 8 .  I n  B r u n d n e y ,  F i d u c i a r y  I d e o l o g y  i ' n  T r a n s a c t i o n s  A f f e c t i n g  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l ,  6 5  
M I C H .  L .  R E v .  2 5 9  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  t h e  a u t h o r  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  D e l a w a r e  c o u r t s ,  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
r e p u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s  b y  c o r p o r a t i o n s  d u r i n g  c o n t r o l  f i g h t s  h a v e ,  i n  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  o p i n i o n ,  
e r r o n e o u s l y  s l i p p e d  i n t o  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  s t a n d a r d s  r a t h e r  t h a n  v i e w i n g  t h e  i s s u e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n t e x t  o f  a  d u t y  o f  l o y a l t y .  / d .  a t  2 7 3 - 7 7 .  
1 0 9 .  T h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  p e r m i t s  b u t  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  i s s u e  a  
s t a t e m e n t  r e c o m m e n d i n g  o r  o p p o s i n g  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  §  1 4 ( d ) ( 4 ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  §  7 8 n ( d )  
( 1 9 7 6 ) .  L i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y  i s  g i v e n  t o  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  s o m e  s t a t e  a n t i t a k e o v e r  
s t a t u t e s  p e r m i t t i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  i n v o k e  s t a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e v i e w .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  O H I O  
R E v .  C O D E  A N N . §  1 7 0 7 . 0 4 1 ( B ) ( 1 ) ( b )  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 1 0 .  A  B n " e f  A g a i n s t  M a n a g e m e n t s  t h a t  F i g h t  O f f  T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  F O R T U N E ,  M a r .  1 2 ,  
1 9 7 9 ,  a t  1 5 9 .  
1 1 1 .  S t e i n b r i n k ,  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  T a k e o v e r  A t t e m p t ,  2 8  C A S E  W .  R E S .  
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Competing arguments often are based on wholly discrete perceptions of 
the proper object of management's "fiduciary" concerns. Perceptions 
vary as well among courts, resulting in decisions that lend neither 
guidance nor substance to already ambiguous standards. 112 
2. Statutory Provisions 
A distinct perspective for evaluation of defensive measures centers 
upon statutory provisions that hopefully avoid the ambiguities of 
common-law and equity doctrines by defining the specific roles of man-
agement and shareholders. This perspective, however, embraces several 
independent statutory bases. Thus, in common with the problems raised 
by fiduciary concepts, varying statutory provisions support arguments of 
both challengers and defenders of defensive measures. Moreover, resort 
to a statutory perspective is futher clouded by the imprecision of broad 
statutory language, as well as by a lack of clear delineation to determine 
which of several potentially conflicting statutory provisions have priority 
in application. 
A starting point for some courts and commentators is the provision 
found universally in statutory codes granting to directors broad discre-
tionary authority to manage the conduct and affairs of the corporation. m 
112. The problems in application of ambiguous standards are reflected in Treadway 
Cos. v. Care Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 97,603 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the 
perceptions of management motivation differed sharply between the district court and 
court of appeals. The district court, noting the haste bY'which a substantial block of 
shares was issued to a third party, the unusual terms of the transaction mandating the 
eventual redemption of such shares, and management's obvious efforts to avoid a 
shareholder vote on the issuance, concluded that "Treadway's incumbent management 
was primarily motivated by its desire to stave off a Care takeover bid." 490 F. Supp. at 
687. The Second Circuit, however, reversing the lower court's issuance of an injunction, 
found "the critical fact, in our view, is that the Treadway board ... in approving the 
stock sale ... were moving Treadway toward a business combination with Fair Lanes." 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,603, at 98,212. The Second Circuit's opinion suffers from 
several weaknesses compared to the extensive discussion of issues in the lower court. The 
appellate court failed to address the unusual terms of the issuance, such as mandatory 
redemption, and dismissed in a cursory and inadequate footnote the problem of dilution 
of minority shares that abrogated a statutorily created veto right. /d. at 98,211-12 n.48. 
Moreover, if the court of appeals was prepared to accept the issuance as a first step 
toward a business combination, a matter of substantial shareholder concern and statutory 
rights, the court was unaccountably silent regarding the district court's finding that 
"Treadway has consistently structured its proposed transactions so as to avoid shareholder 
scrutiny." 490 F. Supp. at 686. If business combination was a major purpose, then why is 
not shareholder scrutiny appropriate? The court would have been better served had it 
kept in mind its earlier admonishment in Butler Aviation lnt'l v. Comprehensive 
Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970), that "[w]hile courts should rigorously 
enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing prescribed by federal securities legislation, 
they must guard against the risk that, at the instance of incumbent management, they 
may be frustrating informed shareholders from doing what the latter want." /d. at 845. 
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1978); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT§ 35 
(1975). In Treadway, challenging Treadway's defensive issuance of shares in an effort to 
dilute Care's holdings and prevent an eventual Care takeover, the court noted that "the 
TENDER OFFERS 
Within that grant of authority, i1 
tant judgment for directors than 
term interests of the corporation. 
permit directors to make decisio 
tions but preclude them from tak 
they perceive that corporate 
takeover. 114 The natural exten 
"business judgment rule" to tak 
rule applies to other operation 
earlier, m the result of applying 
to the presumed business expel 
come only by gross overreaching 
v. B. F. Goodrich Co. ,ll6 a deriv 
ment's hastily arranged issuanc~ 
dismissed because "managemeJll 
which, in its best judgm¢nt, .2 
stockholders. "ll7 Similarly the...di 
presumption of sound busin~ 
disturb if any rational business ji 
tors'] decisions."HB 
The business judgment rUl 
fiduciary model, but it suffers frtil 
purposes. Rarely will a target~ 
knowledgeable counsel,m be UI1 
starting point in our analysis is the bu"a 
delegation of managerial authority to t! 
97,603, at 98,210. 
114. Lipton comments: 
A takeover bid is no different than 
As long as matters such as capital 
and bankruptcy are for the reli.IOB 
is no reason to put acceptance or 
basis. ' 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's 
115. See text accompanying notes 7: 
116. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 19 
117. /d. at 712. Cary, commenting' 
concluded that "if that philosophy pret 
field for an incumbent management." 4 
ment from Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 859, 
118. 486 F. Supp. at 1194. 
119. The role of corporate counsel i: 
questions of potential conflict that an 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 
SIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13 stress that a Ia 
its directors, officers, and shareholder~ 
t!hat target management is motivated 1 
cerns, to what extent may counsel acti 
measures? The Code and Model Rule 
cumstances .. But there may be a marm 
l O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  [ 1 9 8 1 ]  
: d  o n  w h o l l y  d i s c r e t e  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  
" f i d u c i a r y "  c o n c e r n s .  P e r c e p t i o n s  
1 1 g  i n  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  l e n d  n e i t h e r  
n b i g u o u s  s t a n d a r d s .  
1 1
2  
'  P r o v i s i o n s  
t t i o n  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  c e n t e r s  
l e f u l l y  a v o i d  t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s  o f  
d e f i n i n g  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r o l e s  o f  m a n -
l e e t i v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  e m b r a c e s  s e v e r a l  
c o m m o n  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m s  r a i s e d  
r y  p r o v i s i o n s  s u p p o r t  a r g u m e n t s  o f  
e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  M o r e o v e r ,  r e s o r t  
u d e d  b y  t h e  i m p r e c i s i o n  o f  b r o a d  
t '  o f  c l e a r  d e l i n e a t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
r  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  h a v e  p r i o r i t y  
l ! l d  c o m m e n t a t o r s  i s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
r a n t i n g  t o  d i r e c t o r s  b r o a d  d i s c r e -
: t  a n d  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
1  
u  
1 0 u s  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  T r e a d w a y  
)  ,  9 7 , 6 0 3  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  
d  s h a r p l y  b e t w e e n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  a n d  
u~ h a s t e  b y , w h i c h  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  b l o c k  o f  
I  t e n n s  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  m a n d a t i n g  t h e  
m a g e m e n t ' s  o b v i o u s  e f f o r t s  t o  a v o i d  a  
I l l } .  " T r e a d w a y ' s  i n c u m b e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
f f a  C a r e  t a k e o v e r  b i d . "  4 9 0  F .  S u p p .  a t  
e  l o w e r  c o u r t ' s  i s s u a n c e  o f  a n  i n j u n c t i o n ,  
~ T r e a d w a y  b o a r d  .  .  .  i n  a p p r o v i n g  t h e  
.  b u s i n e s s  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  F a i r  L a n e s . "  
' h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t ' s  o p i n i o n  s u f f e r s  f r o m  
I C u s s i o n  o f  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  l o w e r  c o u r t .  T h e  
r m s  o f  t h e  i s s u a n c e ,  s u c h  a s  m a n d a t o r y  
l e q u a t e  f o o t n o t e  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  d i l u t i o n  
J l ! a t e d  v e t o  r i g h t .  / d .  a t  9 8 , 2 1 1 · 1 2  n . 4 8 .  
d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  i s s u a n c e  a s  a  f i r s t  s t e p  
a n t i a l  s h a r e h o l d e r  c o n c e r n  a n d  s t a t u t o r y  
a r d i n g  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g  t h a t  
r l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  s o  a s  t o  a v o i d  s h a r e h o l d e r  
n a t i o n  w a s  a  m a j o r  p u r p o s e ,  t h e n  w h y  i s  
t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  b e t t e r  s e r v e d  h a d  i t  
1 t l e r  A v i a t i o n  I n t ' l  v .  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  
t h a t  " [  w  ] h i l e  c o u r t s  s h o u l d  r i g o r o u s l y  
! S C r i b e d  b y  f e d e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
t a n c e  o f  i n c u m b e n t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  t h e y  
l o i n g  w h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  w a n t . "  / d .  a t  8 4 5 .  
I > D E L  B U S I N E S S  C O R P O R A T I O N  A C T §  3 5  
f e n s i v e  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s  i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  
: a r e  t a k e o v e r ,  t h e  c o u r t  n o t e d  t h a t  " t h e  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
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W i t h i n  t h a t  g r a n t  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  n o  m o r e  i m p o r -
t a n t  j u d g m e n t  f o r  d i r e c t o r s  t h a n  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f u t u r e  v i a b i l i t y  a n d  l o n g -
t e r m  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  T h u s ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  i t  m a k e s  l i t t l e  s e n s e  t o  
p e r m i t  d i r e c t o r s  t o  m a k e  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  d a y - t o - d a y  b u s i n e s s  o p e r a -
t i o n s  b u t  p r e c l u d e  t h e m  f r o m  t a k i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n  i n  i n s t a n c e s  w h e r e  
t h e y  p e r c e i v e  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  w e l f a r e  i s  t h r e a t e n e d  b y  a  p o t e n t i a l  
t a k e o v e r  . u •  T h e  n a t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  s u c h  r e a s o n i n g  i s  t o  a p p l y  t h e  
" b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e "  t o  t a k e o v e r  d e f e n s e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  m a n n e r  t h e  
r u l e  a p p l i e s  t o  o t h e r  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t .  A s  n o t e d  
e a r l i e r ,  
1 1 5  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a p p l y i n g  t h e  r u l e  m a y  b e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  p r e s u m e d  b u s i n e s s  e x p e r t i s e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a  d e f e r e n c e  o v e r -
c o m e  o n l y  b y  g r o s s  o v e r r e a c h i n g  o r  f r a u d .  I n  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .  
v .  B . F .  G o o d r i c h  C o . ,  
1 1 6  
a  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n  b a s e d  u p o n  t a r g e t  m a n a g e -
m e n t ' s  h a s t i l y  a r r a n g e d  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s  t o  a  f r i e n d l y  t h i r d  p a r t y  w a s  
d i s m i s s e d  b e c a u s e  " m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  o p p o s e  o f f e r s  
w h i c h ,  i n  i t s  b e s t  j u d g m e n t ,  a r e  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  c o m p a n y  o r  i t s  
s t o c k h o l d e r s .  "
1 1 7  
S i m i l a r l y  t h e  d i r e c t e d  v e r d i c t  i n  P a n t e r  w a s  b a s e d  o n  " a  
p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  s o u n d  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  .  .  .  ,  w h i c h  c o u r t s  w i l l  n o t  
d i s t u r b  i f  a n y  r a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  p u r p o s e  c a n  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e i r  [  d i r e c -
t o r s ' ]  d e c i s i o n s .  "
1 1 8  
T h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e  m a y  o f f e r  g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y  t h a n  t h e  
f i d u c i a r y  m o d e l ,  b u t  i t  s u f f e r s  f r o m  e q u a l l y  s e v e r e  l i m i t a t i o n s  f o r  e v a l u a t i v e  
p u r p o s e s .  R a r e l y  w i l l  a  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n e  a d v i s e d  b y  
k n o w l e d g e a b l e  c o u n s e l ,
1 1 9  
b e  u n a b l e  t o  d e v i s e  a  p l a u s i b l e  b u s i n e s s  p u r -
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  i n  o u r  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e , "  c i t i n g  N e w  J e r s e y ' s  s t a t u t o r y  
d e l e g a t i o n  o f  m a n a g e r i a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  
9 7 , 6 0 3 ,  a t  9 8 , 2 1 0 .  
1 1 4 .  L i p t o n  c o m m e n t s :  
A  t a k e o v e r  b i d  i s  n o  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  a n y  o t h e r  f u n d a m e n t a l  b u s i n e s s  d e c i s i o n  . . . .  
A s  l o n g  a s  m a t t e r s  s u c h  a s  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  d i s c o n t i n u a n c e s  o f  b u s i n e s s e s  
a n d  b a n k r u p t c y  a r e  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n a b l e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  d i r e c t o r s ,  t h e r e  
i s  n o  r e a s o n  t o  p u t  a c c e p t a n c e  o r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a  t a k e o v e r  b i d  o n  a n y  d i f f e r e n t  
b a s i s .  
L i p t o n ,  T a k e o v e r  B i d s  i n  t h e  T a r g e t ' s  B o a r d r o o m ,  3 5  B u s .  L A W .  1 0 1 ,  1 2 0  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 1 5 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  7 8 - 7 9  s u p r a .  
1 1 6 .  3 0 1  F .  S u p p .  7 0 6  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 6 9 ) .  
1 1 7 .  / d .  a t  7 1 2 .  C a r y ,  c o m m e n t i n g  u p o n  t h e  c o u r t ' s  a t t i t u d e  i n  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s t r i e s ,  
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  " i f  t h a t  p h i l o s o p h y  p r e v a i l s  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  a  c o u r t ,  i t  i s  v e r y  m u c h  a n  o p e n  
f i e l d  f o r  a n  i n c u m b e n t  m a n a g e m e n t . "  C a r y ,  C o r p o r a t e  D e v i c e s  U s e d  t o  I n s u l a t e  M a n a g e -
m e n t  f r o m  A t t a c k ,  2 5  B u s .  L A W .  8 3 9 ,  8 4 1  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  
1 1 8 .  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1 9 4 .  
1 1 9 .  T h e  r o l e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o u n s e l  i n  a d v i s i n g  a n d  a s s i s t i n g  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  r a i s e s  
q u e s t i o n s  o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  a r e  n o t  r e a d i l y  r e s o l v a b l e .  B o t h  t h e  A B A  C O D E  O F  
P R O F E S S I O N A L  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  E C  5 · 1 8  ( 1 9 7 8 )  a n d  t h e  p r o p o s e d  M O D E L  R U L E S  O F  P R O F E S ·  
S I O N A L  C O N D U C T  §  1 . 1 3  s t r e s s  t h a t  a  l a w y e r  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  
i t s  d i r e c t o r s ,  o f f i c e r s ,  a n d  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  W h e n  c o u n s e l  p e r c e i v e s  o r  r e a s o n a b l y  s u s p e c t s  
t h a t  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  m o t i v a t e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  b y  p e r s o n a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o r p o r a t e  c o n ·  
c e r n s ,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  m a y  c o u n s e l  a c t i v e l y  a d v i s e  a n d  c o o r d i n a t e  e f f o r t s  a s  t o  d e f e n s i v e  
m e a s u r e s ?  T h e  C o d e  a n d  M o d e l  R u l e s  i m p l y  t h a t  c o u n s e l  s h o u l d  n o t  a c t  i n  s u c h  c i r ·  
c u m s t a n c e s  . .  B u t  t h e r e  m a y  b e  a  m a r k e d  g a p  b e t w e e n  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  p r a c t i c e ,  f o r  i t  w o u l d  
, 
500 66 IOWA LAW REVIEW 475 (1981] 
pose for its conduct. 1Z° For example, the Panter court accepted the 
legitimacy of defensive acquisitions even though none of the acquisitions 
was pursued prior to the initiation of takeover efforts. m The court also 
readily accepted management's decision to undertake defensive 
litigation. m Judicial deference to a presumed business judgment is starkly 
exhibited by the court's acceptance of the argument that a "business judg-
ment'' was made by Marshall Field directors when they concluded that the 
proposed Carter Hawley Hale offer justified antitrust litigation.m The 
directors' conduct in this regard exhibited a determined unwillingness to 
consider financial and other corporate benefits of the proposed merger 
and a marked eagerness to embrace antitrust concerns to support their 
opposition.l%4 If the facts in Panter support a "business judgment" as to 
be unreasonable to expect counsel to undertake an independent investigation of manage-
ment motivations. Nor would it be reasonable to demand that counsel independently 
evaluate whether the tender offer is advantageous for its corporate client. Reliance will 
necessarily bt: placed upon management expertise. Is reliance reasonable in a hostile 
tender offer context? The issue is deserving of careful study and evaluation. See Cary, 
Professional Responsibility in the Practice of Corporation Law: The Murky Divide 
Between Right and Wrong, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 27, 29-30 (N. 
Galston ed. 1977). It is appropriate to note that adoption of standards proposed by the 
sale of control analogue would ameliorate a substantial aspect of the problem by reducing 
the area of unilateral management activity. 
120. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 926 ("Besieged with business reasons 
justifying the use of a maneuver, a court applying the business purpose test frequently 
finds itself compelled to legitimize the corporate conduct."). See also U.S. Smelting v. 
Clevite Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968), in which the court 
noted the serious time pressures on target management and approved the hasty decision 
as consistent with valid business judgment in light of the "exigencies of the situation." /d. 
at 99,047. 
121. 486 F. Supp. at 1194; see note 230 infra. 
122. 486 F. Supp. at 1194. 
123. /d. 
124. Although both Carter Hawley and Marshall Field operated stores throughout the 
country, antitrust concerns involved only the Chicago area, focusing upon one store 
operated by Caner Hawley in Northbrook Court, potential competition with regard to 
two future sites, and existing competition in the retail sales of books. /d. at 1180. 
Management's judgment was based upon an opinion of counsel from the company's law 
firm in response to a request from Angelo Arena, Marshall Field's president. Id. 
Although over three months passed between the date of the opinion and Carter Hawley's 
eventual withdrawal, no further consideration was made of the antitrust issues despite the 
facts that: (a) the issues were fairly narrow in scope and therefore potentially resolvable; 
(b) Carter Hawley advised Marshall Field of its willingness to sell the Northbrook store, 
the primary source of concern, id. at 1180; (c) Marshall Field management should haVe 
been aware, and at least one director was so advised by Carter Hawley, that the FTC had 
approved prior department store mergers, including one involving the leading company 
in the industry, Deposition of Edward McCormick Blair, Sept. 29, 1978; and (d) Marshall 
Field management was aware that Caner Hawley's attorneys had opined "that there is no 
antitrust deterrent" to the potential merger. 486 F. Supp. at 1188. The potential merger, 
apart from antitrust concerns, held substantial promise for Marshall Field and its 
shareholders. It appears that at least Arena believed that advantages were present. 
Deposition of Angelo Arena, Oct. 2, 1978 ("There is some benefit to be accrued by pooling 
of managements and pooling of special professional people in a bigger organization . . .. 
TENDER OFFERS 
the antitrust concerns, it is ( 
by directors to any probler 
"business judgment." The 
Panter court creates for dd 
the much-criticized Cheffs v. 
repurchase of shares. 
Apart from validating u 
judgment rule" creates a p1 
pora.te governance situation 
shareholder control. Thus, i 
impede, and are therefore c 
right to determine the man 
The division of ownership an 
constricted the sphere of sh; 
and alter management118 bei 
( 
vestiges of shareholder · au1 
statutory authority in manjtSl 
create an ongoing authori~ 
management. A tender off«: 
shareholder to acquire suffici4 
available for a midstre;un .. 
perspective, constraints upon 
tioned, for there is no compell 
authority to directors over ~ 
shareholders. 130 :;l 
And I don't doubt that those points 1 
said as being reasonable .... "). In 
additional efforts to determine the · 
existing problems could be readily ~ 
in any direction was made. Depositio1 
that he gave no consideration to Cart4 
be sold, being satisfied to rest tOijally 4 
it is difficult to perceive or accept at 
lack of any effort to apply business ' 
justified by, the long-standing comi 
commitment "expressed so many timl 
as policy." 486 F. Supp. at 1177. 
125. 41 Del. 494, 199 A.2d 548 ~ 
Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 
126. Yoran, Advance Defensive 1 
531, 532 (1973). ' 
127. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
128. See id. § 141(k) (Supp. 1978). 
129. See FLA. STAT. § 607.084(S) 
(1975). Limiting or denying the abilil 
tiona! defensive measure that may be 
were recently adopted by the Americ 
shareholders. Wall St.]., July 28, 19: 
130. In Maldonado v. Flynn, 415 
applicability of the business judgment 
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,  t h e  P a n t e r  c o u r t  a c c e p t e d  t h e  
n  t h o u g h  n o n e  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n s  
t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t s .  m  T h e  c o u r t  a l s o  
d s i o n  t o  u n d e r t a k e  d e f e n s i v e  
w n e d  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  i s  s t a r k l y  
t e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  a  " b u s i n e s s  j u d g -
: t o r s  w h e n  t h e y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  
s t i f l e d  a n t i t r u s t  l i t i g a t i o n . m  T h e  
t e d  a  d e t e r m i n e d  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  m e r g e r  
11t~trust c o n c e r n s  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  
» p o t ; t  a  " b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t "  a s  t o  
a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  m a n a g e -
t o  d e m a n d  t h a t  c o u n s e l  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
I U s  - f o r  i t s  c o r p o r a t e  c l i e n t .  R e l i a n c e  w i l l  
r t i s e .  I s  r e l i a n c e  r e a s o n a b l e  i n  a  h o s t i l e  
c a r e f u l  s t u d y  a n d  e v a l u a t i o n .  S e e  C a r y ,  
C o r p o r a t i o n  L a w :  T h e  M u r k y  D i v i d e  
O . N S I B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  L A W Y E R  2 7 ,  2 9 - 3 0  ( N .  
r - a d o p t i o n  o f  s t a n d a r d s  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  
t a n t i a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  b y  r e d u c i n g  
a t  9 2 6  ( " B e s i e g e d  w i t h  b u s i n e s s  r e a s o n s  
~g t~e b u s i n e s s  p u r p o s e  t e s t  f r e q u e n t l y  
: e  c o n d u c t . " ) .  S e e  a l s o  U . S .  S m e l t i n g  v .  
1 1  ( N . D .  O h i o  1 9 6 8 ) ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o u r t  
g e m e n t  a n d  a p p r o v e d  t h e  h a s t y  d e c i s i o n  
1 . t  o f t h e  " e x i g e n c i e s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n . "  I  d .  
l  
z .  
U l l  F i e l d  o p e r a t e d  s t o r e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
C h i c a g o  a r e a ,  f o c u s i n g  u p o n  o n e  s t o r e  
r t ,  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  r e t a i l  s a l e s  o f  b o o k s .  I d .  a t  1 1 8 0 .  
n i o n  o f  c o u n s e l  f r o m  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  l a w  
t \ r e n a ,  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d ' s  p r e s i d e n t .  l d .  
d a t e  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  a n d  C a r t e r  H a w l e y ' s  
I S  m a d e  o f  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  i s s u e s  d e s p i t e  t h e  
» p e  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  r e s o l v a b l e ;  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s e l l  t h e  N o r t h b r o o k  s t o r e ,  
r f a r s h a l l  F i e l d  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  h a v e  
s e d  b y  C a r t e r  H a w l e y ,  t h a t  t h e  F T C  h a d  
l i n g  o n e  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  l e a d i n g  c o m p a n y  
I .  B l a i r ,  S e p t .  2 9 ,  1 9 7 8 ;  a n d  ( d )  M a r s h a l l  
r ' s  a t t o r n e y s  h a d  o p i n e d  " t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  
F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1 8 8 .  T h e  p o t e n t i a l  m e r g e r ,  
d  p r o m i s e  f o r  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  a n d  
» e l i e v e d  t h a t  a d v a n t a g e s  w e r e  :r-~--··~ 
~is s o m e  b e n e f i t  t o  b e  a c c r u e d  b y  
1 1 a l  p e o p l e  i n  a  b i g g e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  .  .  •  
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t h e  a n t i t r u s t  c o n c e r n s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m a g i n e  w h a t  m i n i m u m  a t t e n t i o n  
b y  d i r e c t o r s  t o  a n y  p r o b l e m  w i l l  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  j u d i c i a l l y  p r o t e c t e d  
" b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t . "  T h e  d e f e r e n c e  a c c o r d e d  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  t h e  
P a n t e r  c o u r t  c r e a t e s  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  l i t i g a t i o n  a n  a u r a  o f  l e g i t i m a c y  t h a t  
t h e  m u c h - c r i t i c i z e d  C h e f f s  v .  M a t h e s
1 2 5  
d e c i s i o n  c r e a t e s  f o r  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  
r e p u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s .  
A p a r t  f r o m  v a l i d a t i n g  u n w a r r a n t e d  j u d i c i a l  d e f e r e n c e ,  t h e  " b u s i n e s s  
j u d g m e n t  r u l e "  c r e a t e s  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t  a c t i o n  i n  c o r -
p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  s i t u a t i o n s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a n d  s t a t u t o r i l y  e n t r u s t e d  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r  c o n t r o l .  T h u s ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  
i m p e d e ,  a n d  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  c o n t r a r y  t o ,  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  f u n d a m e n t a l  
r i g h t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e i r  c o r p o r a t i o n .
1 2 6  
T h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  m o d e r n  c o r p o r a t i o n s  h a s  




a n d  a l t e r  m a n a g e m e n t l % 8  b e i n g  p e r h a p s  t h e  l a s t  a n d  m o s t  f u n d a m e n t a l  
v e s t i g e s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r  a u t h o r i t y .  T h e s e  r i g h t s ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  




c r e a t e  a n  o n g o i n g  a u t h o r i t y  i n  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  c o r p o r a t e  
m a n a g e m e n t .  A  t e n d e r  o f f e r  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  a  s i n g l e  
s h a r e h o l d e r  t o  a c q u i r e  s u f f i c i e n t  s h a r e s  t o  i n v o k e  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a  m i d s t r e a m  c h a n g e  i n  m a n a g e m e n t .  V i e w e d  i n  t h i s  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  c o n s t r a i n t s  u p o n  s h a r e h o l d e r  a c t i o n  m u s t  b e  s e r i o u s l y  q u e s -
t i o n e d ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  n o  c o m p e l l i n g  b a s i s  f o r  p r e f e r r i n g  a  g r a n t  o f  s t a t u t o r y  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i r e c t o r s  o v e r  a  d i s t i n c t  g r a n t  o f  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
1 5 0  
A n d  I  d o n ' t  d o u b t  t h a t  t h o s e  p o i n t s  w e r e  v a l i d ,  s o  I  a c c e p t e d  t h e  b u l k  o f  w h a t  P h i l  H a w l e y  
s a i d  a s  b e i n g  r e a s o n a b l e  . . . .  " ) .  I n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i t  w o u l d  b e  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  
a d d i t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  d e p t h  a n d  s c o p e  o f  a n t i t r u s t  c o n c e r n s  a n d  w h e t h e r  
e x i s t i n g  p r o b l e m s  c o u l d  b e  r e a d i l y  r e s o l v e d  t h r o u g h  d i v e s t i t u r e  o r  o t h e r  m e a n s .  N o  e f f o r t  
i n  a n y  d i r e c t i o n  w a s  m a d e .  D e p o s i t i o n  o f  E d w a r d  M c C o r m i c k  B l a i r ,  S e p t .  2 8 ,  1 9 7 8  ( s t a t i n g  
t h a t  h e  g a v e  n o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  C a r t e r  H a w l e y ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  i t s  N o r t h b r o o k  s t o r e  c o u l d  
b e  s o l d ,  b e i n g  s a t i s f i e d  t o  r e s t  t o t a l l y  o n  c o u n s e l ' s  o r i g i n a l  o p i n i o n ) .  I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p e r c e i v e  o r  a c c e p t  a s  v a l i d  t h e  " b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t "  t h a t  w a s  m a d e .  T h e  
l a c k  o f  a n y  e f f o r t  t o  a p p l y  b u s i n e s s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  i n  l i g h t  o f ,  b u t  n o t  
j u s t i f i e d  b y ,  t h e  l o n g · s t a n d i n g  c o m m i t m e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  r e m a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  a  
c o m m i t m e n t  " e x p r e s s e d  s o  m a n y  t i m e s  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t w o  d i r e c t o r s  . . .  r e c a l l  i t  b e i n g  s t a t e d  
a s  p o l i c y . "  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  1 1  7 7 .  
1 2 5 .  4 1  D e l .  4 9 4 ,  1 9 9  A . 2 d  5 4 8  ( 1 9 6 4 ) ;  s e e  I s r a e l s ,  C o r p o r a t e  P u r c h a s e  o f  i t s  O w n  
S h a r e s - A r e  T h e r e  N e w  O v e r t o n e s ? ,  5 0  C O R N E L L  L . Q .  6 2 0 ,  6 2 4  ( 1 9 6 5 ) .  
1 2 6 .  Y o r a n ,  A d v a n c e  D e f e n s i v e  T a c t i c s  A g a i n s t  T a k e o v e r  B i d s ,  2 1  A M . ] .  C O M P .  L .  
5 3 1 ,  5 3 2  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .  
1 2 7 .  S e e  D E L .  C O D E  A N N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  2 1 1  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  
1 2 8 .  S e e  i d .  §  1 4 1 ( k )  ( S u p p .  1 9 7 8 ) .  
1 2 9 .  S e e  F L A .  S T A T .  §  6 0 7  . 0 8 4 ( 3 )  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  M O D E L  B U S I N E S S  C O R P O R A T I O N  A C T  §  2 8  
( 1 9 7 5 ) .  L i m i t i n g  o r  d e n y i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  c a l l  s p e c i a l  m e e t i n g s  i s  a n  a d d i -
t i o n a l  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e  t h a t  m a y  b e  t a k e n  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  B y - l a w  a m e n d m e n t s  
w e r e  r e c e n t l y  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n v e s t m e n t  C o m p a n y  e l i m i n a t i n g  s u c h  r i g h t  o f  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  W a l l  S t . ] . ,  J u l y  2 8 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  4 ,  c o l .  4 .  
1 3 0 .  I n  M a l d o n a d o  v .  F l y n n ,  4 1 3  A . 2 d  1 2 5 1  ( D e l .  C h .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  d e n i e d  t h e  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  d i r e c t o r s  c o m p e l l i n g  t h e  d i s m i s s a l  
,,I 
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The foregoing conflict of statutory authority is clouded by yet another 
statutory provision cited for target management intervention, namely 
those provisions requiring director consent to statutory merger. 131 Applica-
tion of the provision is premised on the fact that a successful tender offer for 
a controlling interest is essentially equivalent to a merger, particularly 
when the offer is the first step in an eventual two-step merger process. 132 
The merger analogy is not for the purpose of requiring a formal director 
vote, but rather to justify director consideration of the merits of the pro-
posed tender offer and to thereafter take actions consistent with their 
conclusions. This argument has shades of the de facto merger concept, 155 
seeking application of statutory provisions when the effect, but not the pro-
cedure, of the transaction is arguably governed by statutory policy. The 
merger analogy for tender offers seeks to justify director response, while the 
de facto merger doctrine is designed to permit shareholder involvement. 
of a derivative action. The business judgment rule was regarded as a "limitation of 
liability" and "not an independent grant of authority to the directors to dismiss derivative 
suits." /d. at 1262. Accord, Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 351-54 (S.D. Tex. 
1980); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
Contra, Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The 
Maldonado court was influenced by the ability of "an impartial tribunal, and not a com-
mittee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers," to decide the merits of the particular claims. 
413 A.2d at 1263. Relevance of these decisions to the tender offer context is not immedi-
ately apparent, but the opinions represent a possible crack in the business judgment rule in 
instances where conflicting claims of shareholders and management may be readily resolved 
through the judicial process. Unilateral defensive measures by target management may 
thwart a tender offer without shareholder input, despite the fact that a tender offer, like a 
derivative action, is a matter directed to the decisionmaking by individual shareholders. 
Regarding the tender offer as analogous to a collective sale of control, the judgment of 
tendering shareholders should not be subordinated to a presumption that management's 
"business judgment" should prevail. To do so without the leavening process of adjudica-
tion would create a burdensome restraint on the alienability of minority shares not pre-
sent in transfers by dominant shareholders. It will be interesting to observe whether the 
reasoning in the Maldonado and Maher opinions is expanded to contexts other than 
derivative actions. 
131. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974). 
132. Frequently the tender offer seeks only to acquire working control to achieve an 
eventual merger between the acquiring company and target. Thus, it is argued that 
tender offers should not subvert a major role of management in merger transactions, i.e., 
bargaining for consideration, a role that results in a more favorable retum to shareholders 
than would ensue if acquirors were able to deal with the shareholders on an individual 
basis. See Harzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist 
Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC. 152, 153 (1979). This argument gives economic justifica· 
tion to the involvement of directors under a merger equivalency theory. Lipton, supra 
note 93, at 116. 
133. Transactions not formulated pursuant to statutory merger provisions, yet creating 
substantially or identically equivalent results as such mergers, have in some instances been 
treated by courts as "de facto mergers" in order to apply statutory merger provisions as to 
shareholder votes and appraisal procedures. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 
1285-86, 136 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1965); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 433-35, 
143 A.2d 25, 29-30 (1958). Contra, Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 
330-32, 182 A.2d 22, 25-26 (1963), affd, 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963). 
Yet each of the arguments is deriv~ 
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absolute veto power over that 
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appropriate under a merger. 
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little guidance where the tti11 
shares, or when the acquiring co1 
ultimate merger. 
Business judgment, corporate 
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argued that the principal purpose 
to create a balancing between the': 
shareholders of the target com.J:>ail 
situation of having to make unn 
134. A board veto may not be overric 
exists, of course, that a shareholder rev. 
135. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 
infra. 
136. See notes 1, 8 supra. 
137. Support for the argument that t1 
tion is drawn from the remarks of Senal 
This measure is not aimed at ol 
instances, a change in managem 
holder[ s] . . . and ... it may be nee: 
I have taken extreme care with tl 
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case. 
113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967). 
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r y  a u t h o r i t y  i s  c l o u d e d  b y  y e t  a n o t h e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  n a m e l y  
a s e n t  t o  s t a t u t o r y  m e r g e r  .
1 5 1  
A p p l i c a -
~fact t h a t  a  s u c c e s s f u l  t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  
q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  m e r g e r ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
~entual t w o - s t e p  m e r g e r  p r o c e s s .  u z  
i r p o s e  o f  r e q u i r i n g  a  f o r m a l  d i r e c t o r  
n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  p r o -
r  t a k e  a c t i o n s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e i r  
e s  o f  t h e  d e  f a c t o  m e r g e r  c o n c e p t ,  u s  
i o n s  w h e n  t h e  e f f e c t ,  b u t  n o t  t h e  p r o -
y  g q v e r n e d  b y  s t a t u t o r y  p o l i c y .  T h e  
t o  j~tify d i r e c t o r  r e s p o n s e ,  w h i l e  t h e  
t o  p e r m i t  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n v o l v e m e n t .  
1 e n i :  r u l e  w a s  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  " l i m i t a t i o n  o f  
u t h o r i t y  t o  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  t o  d i s m i s s  d e r i v a t i v e  
' C o r p . ,  4 9 0  F .  S u p p .  3 4 8 ,  3 5 1 · 5 4  ( S . D .  T e x .  
1 . ,  4 9 5  F .  S u p p .  7 1 3 ,  7 1 7  ( E . D .  V a .  1 9 8 0 ) .  
~pp. 6 8 2 ,  6 8 8  ( E . D .  M i c h .  1 9 8 0 ) .  T h e  
t y  o f  " a n  i m p a r t i a l  t r i b u n a l ,  a n d  n o t  a  c o m -
,  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c l a i m s .  
a s  t o  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t  i s  n o t  i m m e d i -
o s s i b l e  c r a c k  i n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e  i n  
l e n  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  b e  r e a d i l y  r e s o l v e d  
m s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  
u t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  l i k e  a  
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
l i .  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  
u t @ t e d  t o  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
D  w i t h o u t  t h e  l e a v e n i n g  p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u d i c a -
L  t h e  a l i e n a b i l i t y  o f  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e s  n o t  p r e -
I t  w i l l  b e  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  o b s e r v e  w h e t h e r  t h e  
> i n i o n s  i s  e x p a n d e d  t o  c o n t e x t s  o t h e r  t h a n  
! 5 l ( b )  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  
l y  t o  a c q u i r e  w o r k i n g  c o n t r o l  t o  a c h i e v e  a n  
n p a n y  a n d  t a r g e t .  T h u s ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  
o f  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  m e r g e r  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  i . e . ,  
I t s  i n  a  m o r e  f a v o r a b l e  r e t u r n  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o n  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
' : O f ' p t r r a t e  D i r e c t o r s  H a v e  a  R i g h t  t o  R e s i s t  
7 9 ) .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  g i v e s  e c o n o m i c  j u s t i f i c a -
l  m e r g e r  e q u i v a l e n c y  t h e o r y .  L i p t o n ,  s u p r a  
L t  t o  s t a t u t o r y  m e r g e r  p r o v i s i o n s ,  y e t  c r e a t i n g  
a s  s u c h  m e r g e r s ,  h a v e  i n  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s  b e e n  
l e r  t o  a p p l y  s t a t u t o r y  m e r g e r  p r o v i s i o n s  a s  t o  
R a t h  v .  R a t h  P a c k i n g  C o . ,  2 5 7  I o w a  1 2 7 7 ,  
1  v .  G l e n  A l d e n  C o r p . ,  3 9 3  P a .  4 2 7 ,  4 3 3 - 3 5 ,  
, v .  A r c o  E l e c t r o n i c s ,  I n c . ,  4 0  D e l .  C h .  3 2 6 ,  
D e l .  C h .  7 4 ,  1 8 8  A . 2 d  1 2 3  ( 1 9 6 3 ) .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 0 3  
Y e t  e a c h  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  i s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  f u n c t i o n a l  e q u i v a l e n c e  a n d  f r o m  
a n a l o g y  t o  e x p l i c i t  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s .  
T h e  m e r g e r  a n a l o g y  h a s  s u p e r f i c i a l  a p p e a l ,  b u t  f l o u n d e r s  a s  a  s t a n -
d a r d  b y  w h i c h  t o  e v a l u a t e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  T h e  a n a l o g y  o f f e r s  n o  
g u i d e s  o r  c r i t e r i a  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  m i g h t  b e  a p p r o -
p r i a t e .  A  b o a r d  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o p o s e d  t e r m s  o f  a  s t a t u t o r y  m e r g e r  
h a s  a b s o l u t e  v e t o  p o w e r  o v e r  t h a t  t r a n s a c t i o n .
1
u  E v e n  u n d e r  a  m e r g e r  
a n a l o g y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  r o l e  f o r  a  f o r m a l  b o a r d  v e t o  o f  t h e  
t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  a  t r a n s a c t i o n  n o t  r e q u i r i n g  c o r p o r a t e  a c t i o n  f o r  i t s  c o n s u m -
m a t i o n .  S h o r t  o f  a  v e t o  p o w e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w h a t  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  
b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  u n d e r  a  m e r g e r  a n a l o g y ?  S i n c e  m e r g e r s  a r e  e f f e c t e d  
t h r o u g h  s h a r e h o l d e r  a c t i o n  f o l l o w i n g  p r o x y  s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  i s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
r o l e  l i m i t e d  t o  a  p r o x y - t y p e  d i s c l o s u r e ?  T h e  l a t t e r  r o l e  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s -
t e n t  w i t h  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  a n d  i n d e e d  i t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  A c t  
h a s  l i m i t e d  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a l o n e .  
1 3 5  
T h u s ,  a g a i n  t h e r e  
a r e  c o m p e t i n g ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t u t o r y  a r g u m e n t s  r a i s e d  i n  s u p p o r t  o f ,  o r  i n  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o ,  m a n a g e m e n t  i n v o l v e m e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  m e r g e r  a n a l o g y  
o f f e r s  l i t t l e  g u i d a n c e  w h e r e  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  f o r  l e s s  t h a n  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  
s h a r e s ,  o r  w h e n  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y  h a s  n o  a n n o u n c e d  i n t e n t i o n  o f  
u l t i m a t e  m e r g e r .  
B u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t ,  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e ,  a n d  m e r g e r  a n a l o g i e s  a r e  
a r g u m e n t s  b a s e d  u p o n  s t a t e  c o r p o r a t e  c o d e s .  A t  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l ,  a n d  
,  r o u n d i n g  o u t  t h e  d i v e r s e  s t a t u t o r y  e l e m e n t s ,  i s  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t .  
1 5 6  
T h e  
l a c k  o f  r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  t o  s p e c i f i c  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  h a s  
f u e l e d  a r g u m e n t s  o n  b o t h  s i d e s  o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s t r u g g l e s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  A c t  u p o n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  s u c h  m e a s u r e s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i t  i s  
a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  A c t ,  c i t i n g  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y ,  
1 5 7  
i s  
t o  c r e a t e  a  b a l a n c i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  a n d  t h e  a c q u i r o r  s o  t h a t  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  a r e  n o t  m e t  w i t h  t h e  p r e - W i l l i a m s  A c t  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  h a v i n g  t o  m a k e  i m m e d i a t e  d e c i s i o n s  b a s e d  u p o n  r e l a t i v e l y  
1 3 4 .  A  b o a r d  v e t o  m a y  n o t  b e  o v e r r i d d e n  b y  s h a r e h o l d e r  v o t e .  T h e  r e m o t e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
e x i s t s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  a  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e v o l t  w i l l  r e m o v e  a n d  r e p l a c e  t h e  b o a r d .  
1 3 5 .  L y n c h  &  S t e i n b e r g ,  s u p r a  n o t e  7 4 ,  a t  9 3 3 · 3 8 ;  s e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e  1 3 9  
S e e  n o t e s  1 ,  8  s u p r a .  
S u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  l i m i t s  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  d i s c r e ·  
t i o n  i s  d r a w n  f r o m  t h e  r e m a r k s  o f  S e n a t o r  H a r r i s o n  W i l l i a m s ,  s p o n s o r  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n :  
T h i s  m e a s u r e  i s  n o t  a i m e d  a t  o b s t r u c t i n g  l e g i t i m a t e  t a k e o v e r  b i d s .  I n  s o m e  
i n s t a n c e s ,  a  c h a n g e  i n  m a n a g e m e n t  w i l l  p r o v e  a  w e l c o m e  b o o n  f o r  s h a r e ·  
h o l d e r [ s ]  . . .  a n d  . . .  i t  m a y  b e  n e c e s s a r y  i f t h e  c o m p a n y  i s  t o  s u r v i v e .  
I  h a v e  t a k e n  e x t r e m e  c a r e  w i t h  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  b a l a n c e  t h e  s c a l e s  e q u a l l y  t o  
p r o t e c t  . . .  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  . . . .  E v e r y  e f f o r t  h a s  
b e e n  m a d e  t o  a v o i d  t i p p i n g  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  b u r d e n  i n  f a v o r  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t  o r  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  o f f e r o r .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  b i l l  i s  t o  r e q u i r e  f u l l  
a n d  f a i r  d i s c l o s u r e  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  s t o c k h o l d e r s  w h i l e  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  p r o ·  
v i d i n g  t h e  o f f e r o r ,  a n d  m a n g e m e n t  e q u a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  f a i r l y  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  
c a s e .  
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little information. 138 The balancing is achieved through disclosure 
mechanisms and minimum time frames, one purpose of the minimum 
time frames being to permit target management, should they so desire, 
to provide shareholders with additional information, recoi?mendati~ns, 
and arguments respecting the merits of the offer. From this perspective, 
the permissible activity of target management is fairly limited, and is 
designed primarily to provide information to shareholders so that they 
may make an intelligent decision about whether to tender their shares. 
Any other management action that interferes with the shareholder deci-
sionmaking process creates a disturbance in the balance of the Williams 
Act and, it is argued, is impermissible conduct under that Act. 139 
Equally plausible, however, is the argument that the disclosure 
mechanisms and various time frames provided for in the Act are not incon-
sistent with, but rather support, aggressive defensive measures by target 
management designed to impede the takeover effort. From this perspec-
tive, the Williams Act provides restraints upon the acquiring company to a 
much greater degree than might be imposed upon target management. 
Seen primarily as a protective measure against acquiring companies, the 
Williams Act is thus viewed as neutral to the taking of defensive 
measures. The neutrality of the Act is silent support for defensive tactics, 
as Congress arguably chose to regulate only disclosure aspects and not 
other defensive activities of target management. 
These alternative arguments mask a more serious weakness within the 
Williams Act context: the Act's provisions are not triggered unless and until 
there is a tender offer or a public announcement of an intended offer. 140 
Where scorched earth tactics prevent a proposed offer from reaching frui-
tion- as is generally their intent- there may be substantial doubt whether 
the threshold jurisdictional elements of the Williams Act have been 
satisfied. Shareholders of McGraw-Hill, Gerber Products, and Marshall 
Field were all met with narrow judicial approaches that denied Williams 
Act claims. 141 
138. Note, Target Management and Tender Offers: Proposals for Structuring the 
FiduciaryRelationshzp, 15 HARV.J. LEGIS. 761,768 (1978). 
139. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 973. 
140. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. lll4, ll25-26 (D. Mass. 
1978). 
141. Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 
3332 (Nov. 3, 1980) (No. 79-2054); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 
1190 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.O. Mich. 
1978). It may be questioned whether these decisions, which effectively deny Williams Act . 
application where defensive measures have successfully impeded a tender offer, do not take 
too narrow a view of the remedial purposes of the Act. In Panter, for example, where the 
court held that the Act did not apply because Carter Hawley's proposed tender offer had 
not commenced or been announced in a sufficiently unconditional manner, 485 F. Supp. 
at 1190-91, the effect upon the market of Carter Hawley's announced intentions was 
substantially similar to what the market reaction would have been if the offer had been · 
unconditionally commenced. A flurry of trading activity increased the price of Marshall 
Field stock over 30%, and investor decisions were being made by numerous shareholders· 
·TENDER OFFERS 
The jurisdictional problem .. _· 
possibility that a private cause ~i 
Williams Act. Shareholders concel' 
basis to challenge defensive measu 
on broader aspects of fraud or 
Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris-! 
opinion to denying standing to te 
target corporations, 144 but recen~ ~ 
causes of action in other sec~t 
whether an implied right for pnv 
aggrieved shareholders will in fac 
. As the foregoing discussion b 
· tains elements that both justify ant 
by target management. While not 
of fiduciary concepts, the statu~o~ 
emphases placed upon altemauvc 
and arbitrageurs in light of the pendidg 
strain logic under these circumstances tCJ 
sions of the Williams Act should not be i 
Act in this regard are in marked co~trilll 
other cases seeking to define the nouon ~ 
475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 191 
142. See Royal Indus., Inc. v. MonOJ 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 95,863, at 
supra. 
143. 430 u.s. 1 (1977). ~ 
144. ld. at 47. 
145. Transamerica Mort. Advisors, 
private right of action for ~amages un& 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redmgton, 442 t 
under§ 17(a) of the Securities Exc~ 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). 
146. See generally Phillips & Nichob 
Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agen~y Rent-1 
private right of action was specdicilly d 
other securities contexts. I d. at 101. Ac 
REP. (CCH), 97,613 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980); Kirsch _CCJ 
(CCH), 97,580, at 98,071 (W.~. Mtch 
147. A suggestion that combmes sta1 
business judgment presumption to c 
presumably higher, "fairness" standal 
board. Gelfond & Sebastion, Reevalvat 
Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REv. 403, 
premise that "outside" directors are 1 
insiders, a premise that may well be qUI 
Restructuring the Corporate Board of. 
L. REV. 581, 590 (1978). Moreover, use 
battles is problematic. The authors notl 
tion of their article that "this standar 
both the realities of corporate control c 
" O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  
r  i s  a c h i e v e d  t h r o u g h  d i s c l o s u r e  
1 1 e s ,  o n e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  m i n i m u m  · ·  
. a n a g e m e n t ,  s h o u l d  t h e y  s o  d e s i r e ,  
a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  
, f  t h e  o f f e r .  F r o m  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
l l a g e m e n t  i s  f a i r l y  l i m i t e d ,  a n d  i s  
a t i o n  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  s o  t h a t  t h e y  
u t  w h e t h e r  t o  t e n d e r  t h e i r  s h a r e s .  
t e r f e r e s  w i t h  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r  d e c i - . .  
1 1 c e  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  
e  c o n d u c t  u n d e r  t h a t  A c t .  
1 5 9  
h e  p r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  
- o v i d e d  f o r  i n  t h e  A c t  a r e  n o t  i n c o n -
s s i v e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b y  _  
a k e o v e r  e f f o r t .  F r o m  t h i s  p e r s p e c - '  
t s  u p o n  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y  t o  a  
n p o s e d  u p o n  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
· a g a i n s t  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n i e s ,  t h e  
. U a l  t o  t h e  t a k i n g  o f  d e f e n s i v e  
; i l e n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s ,  
e  o n l y  d i s c l o s u r e  a s p e c t s  a n d  n o t  
1 1 a g e m e n t .  
a m 6 r e  s e r i o u s  w e a k n e s s  w i t h i n  t h e  
l l S  a r e  n o t  t r i g g e r e d  u n l e s s  a n d  u n t i l  
u n c e m e n t  o f  a n  i n t e n d e d  o f f e r .  
1 4
'  
p r o p o s e d  o f f e r  f r o m  r e a c h i n g  f r u i -
~ay b e  s u b s t a n t i a l  d o u b t  w h e t h e r  
o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  h a v e  b e e n  
L  Ge~ber P r o d u c t s ,  a n d  M a r s h a l l  
a p p r o a c h e s  t h a t  d e n i e d  W i l l i a m s  
"  O f f e r s :  P r o p o s a l s  f o r  S t r u c t u n n g  t h e  
•  7 6 8  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
7 3 .  
. - 4 6 6  F .  S u p p .  1 1 1 4 ,  1 1 2 5 - 2 6  ( D .  M a s s .  
! d  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  c e r t .  d e n i e d ,  4 9  U . S . L . W .  
b r s h a l l  F i e l d  &  C o . ,  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  1 1 6 8 ,  
: : 0 . ,  4 5 4  F .  S u p p .  1 3 1 0 ,  1 3 1 8  ( W . O .  M i c h .  
i o n s ,  w h i c h  e f f e c t i v e l y  d e n y  W i l l i a m s  A c t  
I I S f u l l y  i m p e d e d  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  d o  n o t  t a k e  
1 e  A c t .  I n  P a n t e r ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h e r e  t h e  
a r t e r  H a w l e y ' s  p r o p o s e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  h a d  
n t l y  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  m a n n e r ,  4 8 5  F .  S u p p .  
r t e v H a w l e y ' s  a n n o u n c e d  i n t e n t i o n s  w a s  
n  ~ould h a v e  b e e n  i f  t h e  o f f e r  h a d  b e e n  
~ a c _ t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  p r i c e  o f  M a r s h a l l  
r e  b e i n g  m a d e  b y  n u m e r o u s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 0 5  
T h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  p r o b l e m ,  h o w e v e r ,  p a l e s  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  p r i v a t e  c a u s e  o f  a c t i o n  h a s  n o t  b e e n  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  
W i l l i a m s  A c t .  S h a r e h o l d e r s  c o n c e i v a b l y  w i l l  b e  w i t h o u t  a n y  W i l l i a m s  A c t  
b a s i s  t o  c h a l l e n g e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s ,  e i t h e r  o n  g r o u n d s  o f  d i s c l o s u r e  o r  
o n  b r o a d e r  a s p e c t s  o f  f r a u d  o r  d e n i a l  o f  " f a i r  o p p o r t u n i t y . "
1 4 2  
T h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n  P i p e r  v .  C h r i s - C r a f t  I n d u s t n : e s
1 4 3  
c a r e f u l l y  l i m i t e d  i t s  
o p i n i o n  t o  d e n y i n g  s t a n d i n g  t o  t e n d e r  o f f e r o r s  s u i n g  f o r  d a m a g e s  f r o m  
t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
1 4 4  
b u t  r e c e n t  d e n i a l s  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  i m p l i e d  p r i v a t e  
c a u s e s  o f  a c t i o n  i n  o t h e r  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w  c o n t e x t s
1 4 5  
r a i s e  d o u b t  a b o u t  
w h e t h e r  a n  i m p l i e d  r i g h t  f o r  p r i v a t e  a c t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  b y  
a g g r i e v e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w i l l  i n  f a c t  b e  u p h e l d .  
1 4 6  
A s  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  p e r s p e c t i v e  c o n -
t a i n s  e l e m e n t s  t h a t  b o t h  j u s t i f y  a n d  c h a l l e n g e  u n i l a t e r a l  d e f e n s i v e  a c t i o n s  
b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  W h i l e  n o t  s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  t h e  i n h e r e n t  a m b i g u i t i e s  
o f  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t s ,  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  a p p r o a c h  f a i l s  b e c a u s e  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  
e m p h a s e s  p l a c e d  u p o n  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s .  w  H e r e  t o o ,  t h e  
a n d  a r b i t r a g e u r s  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  p e n d i n g  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s t r u g g l e .  I d .  a t  1 1 8 2 - 8 4 .  I t  s e e m s  t o  
s t r a i n  l o g i c  u n d e r  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  a n d  a n t i f r a u d  p r o v i -
s i o n s  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a p p l i c a b l e .  T h e  n a r r o w  r e a d i n g s  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  
A c t  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  a r e  i n  m a r k e d  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  m o r e  e x p a n s i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  f o u n d  i n  
o t h e r  c a s e s  s e e k i n g  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  W e l l m a n  v .  D i c k i n s o n ,  
4 7 5  F .  S u p p .  7 8 3 ,  8 2 3 - 2 4  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 4 2 .  S e e  R o y a l  I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  M o n o g r a m  I n d u s . ,  I n c . ,  [ 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 7  T r a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  
F E n .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  ,  9 5 , 8 6 3 ,  a t  9 1 , 1 3 6  ( C . D .  C a l .  1 9 7 6 ) ,  d i s c u s s e d  a t  n o t e  5 7  
s u p r a .  
1 4 3 .  4 3 0  u . s .  1  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
1 4 4 .  I d .  a t 4 7 .  
1 4 5 .  T r a n s a m e r i c a  M o r t .  A d v i s o r s ,  I n c .  v .  L e w i s ,  4 4 4  U . S .  1 1 ,  1 9 - 2 4  ( 1 9 7 9 )  ( n o  
p r i v a t e  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  f o r  d a m a g e s  u n d e r §  2 0 6  o f  t h e  I n v e s t m e n t  A d v i s o r s  A c t  o f  1 9 4 0 ) ;  
T o u c h e  R o s s  &  C o .  v .  R e d i n g t o n ,  4 4 2  U . S .  5 6 0 ,  5 6 9 - 7 1  ( 1 9 7 9 )  ( n o  p r i v a t e  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  
u n d e r §  1 7 ( a )  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  E x c h a n g e  A c t  o f  1 9 3 4 ) .  S e e  a l s o  C a n n o n  v .  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
C h i c a g o ,  4 4 1  U . S .  6 7 7 ,  6 8 8  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 4 6 .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  P h i l l i p s  &  N i c h o l s o n ,  C h r i s - C r a f t ,  1 0  R E v .  S E C .  R E G .  8 9 1  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  I n  
G a t e w a y  I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  A g e n c y  R e n t - A - C a r ,  I n c . ,  4 9 5  F .  S u p p .  9 2  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  a  
p r i v a t e  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  w a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e n i e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  p r e c e d e n t  i n  
o t h e r  s e c u r i t i e s  c o n t e x t s .  I d .  a t  1 0 1 .  A c c o r d ,  S t a - R i t e ,  I n c .  v .  N o r t e k ,  I n c . ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  
R E P .  ( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 6 1 3  ( E . D .  W i s .  1 9 8 0 ) .  C o n t r a ,  D a n  R i v e r ,  I n c .  v .  U n i t e x  L t d . ,  6 2 4  F . 2 d  
1 2 1 6 ,  1 2 2 4  ( 4 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  K i r s c h  C o .  v .  B l i s s  &  L a u g h l i n  I n d u s . ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  
( C C H ) ,  9 7 , 5 8 0 ,  a t  9 8 , 0 7 1  ( W . O .  M i c h .  1 9 8 0 ) .  
1 4 7 .  A  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  c o m b i n e s  s t a t u t o r y  a n d  f i d u c i a r y  p e r s p e c t i v e s  w o u l d  a p p l y  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  p r e s u m p t i o n  t o  d e c i s i o n s  m a d e  b y  " o u t s i d e "  d i r e c t o r s ,  a n d  a  
p r e s u m a b l y  h i g h e r ,  " f a i r n e s s "  s t a n d a r d  t o  d e c i s i o n s  m a d e  b y  a n  i n s i d e r - d o m i n a t e d  
b o a r d .  G e l f o n d  &  S e b a s t i a n ,  R e e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  D u t i e s  o f  T a r g e t  M a n a g e m e n t  1 n  a  H o s t i l e  
T e n d e r  O f f e r ,  6 0  B . U .  L .  R E v .  4 0 3 ,  4 4 7  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  T h e  d u a l  a p p r o a c h  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
p r e m i s e  t h a t  " o u t s i d e "  d i r e c t o r s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  r e a c h  a n  o b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  t h a n  
i n s i d e r s ,  a  p r e m i s e  t h a t  m a y  w e l l  b e  q u e s t i o n a b l e  e v e n  i n  a  c o n t r o l  c o n t e x t .  S e e  S o l o m o n ,  
R e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s :  F o n d  H o p e - F a i n t  P r o m i s e . P ,  7 6  M I C H .  
L .  R E v .  5 8 1 ,  5 9 0  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  M o r e o v e r ,  u s e  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  s t a n d a r d  i n  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
b a t t l e s  i s  p r o b l e m a t i c .  T h e  a u t h o r s  n o t e d  a s  m u c h  w h e n  t h e y  c o n c l u d e d  i n  a n  e a r l i e r  p o r -
t i o n  o f  t h e i r  a r t i c l e  t h a t  " t h i s  s t a n d a r d  o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  [ b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  r u l e ]  i g n o r e s  
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difficulty of developing a standard for evaluating defensive measures lies 
not in the illegitimacy of any particular argument, but rather in the 
diversity that exists within the framework of the evaluative effort. 
3. Economic Interests 
If fiduciary concepts and statutory constructs are unable to provide 
firm guidance to evaluate defensive measures, perhaps economic theory 
can fill the void. The economic approach views the several actors in a 
tender offer battle from the perspective of economic interests that each 
of those actors is seeking or is charged with protecting. 
Arguments favoring active target management intervention stress that 
corporate directors are much more qualified than shareholders to make 
judgments affecting the corporation's long-term economic viability. Direc-
tors are regarded as possessing greater ability and objectivity to consider 
the long-range concerns raised by a tender offer, including the interests of 
employees, suppliers, and other groups that may be materially affected. 
Shareholders, on the other hand, are seen as having a narrower interest, 
namely, their particular investment in the target's stock. This limited 
perspective inevitably compels shareholders, it is argued, to favor 
immediate, favorable, short-term returns, and to disregard long-term 
consequences to the corporation, nontendering shareholders, and other 
interests. 148 This argument is buttressed by the frequent presence of arbi-
trageurs and other speculators, who often compose a significant percent· 
age of shareholders during a tender offer fight and whose interests are 
undeniably short-term. m Some commentators, so taken by the perceived 
dichotomy between management's high road and shareholders' low road, 
regard it as a matter of "national policy" that directors be allowed to inter-
of corporate law." Gelfond & Sebastian, supra, at 434. Finally, the suggested approach 
assumes ready application to specific defensive measures. Inherent ambiguities within 
business judgment and fairness standards, however, provipe little guidance to judge the 
validity of actual measures. 
148. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. R.Fs. 
L. REv. 882, 891 (1978). Regarding the shareholder's interest in a corporation as a 
monetary one limited solely to the value of his stock leads to the argument that the social 
and broad economic repercussions of a shift in control is too important a decision to leave 
to shareholders motivated solely by personal concerns. Lipton, supra note 93, at 113-16. 
Although shareholders interested primarily in long-term, low-risk growth may constitute 
a block favoring defensive measures, it may reasonably be presumed that in most hostile 
tender offer situations the pro-management block represents an insubstantial minority. 
Indeed a major factor in considering the prospects of a tender offer is the dispersal of· 
shares of the target company and management's lack of control of sizeable blocks. E. 
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 6 (1973). 
149. The role of arbitrageurs in tender offers is discussed in O'Boyle, Changing Tactics 
in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863, 865 (1970), and Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW .. 
1315, 1315 (1977). Because arbitrageurs may constitute a pressure group upon manage· 
ment to accept or at least not impede the tender offer from going forward, it is important 
from a tactical standpoint that target management act with sufficient speed and force to 
discourage substantial arbitrage activity. 
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interests of the shareholders anci 
its constituencies in addition to 
Lipton, supra note 93, at ll5. 
151. Liman, Has the Tender Men 
706-07 (1978). 
152. A more fundamental posi~ 
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analyzed as early as 1932 by A. BEl 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 220-32 (1932). lJ 
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67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489 (1958), an; 
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153. Long, Director Fiduciaria: 
AcQ.UISITIONS, Winter 1980, at 5. 
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Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REc. 15l 
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~aluating d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  l i e s  
l a r  a r g u m e n t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  i n  t h e  
t r k  o f  t h e  e v a l u a t i v e  e f f o r t .  
lnt~rests 
c o n s t r u c t s  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  
a s u r e s ,  p e r h a p s  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  
l c h  v i e w s  t h e  s e v e r a l  a c t o r s  i n  a  
:  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  e a c h  
w i t h  p r o t e c t i n g .  
m a g e m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  s t r e s s  t h a t  ·  
l i f i e l d  t h a n  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  m a k e  
. g - t e r m  e c o n o m i c  v i a b i l i t y .  D i r e c -
) ; » i l i t y  a n d  o b j e c t i v i t y  t o  c o n s i d e r  
~r 6 f f e r ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
t h a t  m a y  b e  m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c t e d .  
~ a s  h a v i n g  a  n a r r o w e r  i n t e r e s t ,  
t h e  t a r g e t ' s  s t o c k .  T h i s  l i m i t e d  
& l d e r s ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  t o  f a v o r  
n s ,  a n d  t o  d i s r e g a r d  l o n g - t e r m  
1 d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a n d  o t h e r  
~y t h e  f r e q u e n t  p r e s e n c e  o f  a r b i -
D .  c o m p o s e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p e r c e n t -
e r  f i g h t .  a n d  w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
t a t o r s ,  s o  t a k e n  b y  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  
' O a d  a n d  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  l o w  r o a d ,  
h~ d i r e c t o r s  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  i n t e r -
1~ 4 3 4 .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s u g g e s t e d  a p p r o a c h  
m e a s u r e s .  I n h e r e n t  a m b i g u i t i e s  w i t h i n  
e r ,  p r o v i p . e  l i t t l e  g u i d a n c e  t o  j u d g e  t h e  
4 1  T a k e o v e r  A t t e m p t ,  2 8  C A S E  W .  R E s .  
t o l d e r ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  c o r p o r a t i o n  a s  a  
d t  l e a d s  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  
t t r o l  i s  t o o  i m p o r t a n t  a  d e c i s i o n  t o  l e a v e  
e m s .  L i p t o n ,  s u p r a  n o t e  9 3 ,  a t  1 1 3 - 1 6 .  
g - t e r m ,  l o w - r i s k  g r o w t h  m a y  c o n s t i t u t e  
1 1 a b l y  b e  p r e s u m e d  t h a t  i n  m o s t  h o s t i l e  
( r e p r e s e n t s  a n  i n s u b s t a n t i a l  m i n o r i t y .  
: t s  o f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  t h e  d i s p e r s a l  o f  
l a c k  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  s i z e a b l e  b l o c k s .  E .  
I R P O R A T E  C O N T R O L  6  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .  
i l i s c u s s e d  i n  O ' B o y l e ,  C h a n g i n g  T a c t i c s  
a n d  R u b i n ,  A r b i t r a g e ,  3 2  B u s .  L A W .  
ltit~e a  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p  u p o n  m a n a g e -
' f e t  f r o m  g o i n g  f o r w a r d ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  
t  a c t  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  s p e e d  a n d  f o r c e  t o  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 0 7  
v e n e  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  p r o c e s s .
1 5 0  
I n d e e d ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a  r e l a t i v e l y  u n b r i d l e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
m o v e m e n t  a r e  m a t t e r s  o f  s u c h  m o m e n t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  n o r  
m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  m a j o r  e c o n o m i c  d e c i s i o n s ,  b u t  t h a t  
C o n g r e s s  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a  m o r e  p o i n t e d  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  l i m i t i n g  t e n d e r  
o f f e r  e f f o r t s .
1 5 1  
S u c h  p e r s p e c t i v e s  a r e  o f  c o u r s e  c o m p l e t e l y  a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  
a n y  n o t i o n  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s h a r e h o l d e r  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  p r o -
c e s s . t 5 2  
A  r e l a t e d  e c o n o m i c  a r g u m e n t  f a v o r i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  t h a t  m a n a g e -
m e n t  i s  m o s t  c a p a b l e  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y  i s  
o f f e r i n g  s u f f i c i e n t  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  t a r g e t  s h a r e s .  A l t h o u g h  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  m a y  
b e  a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  p r e m i u m s  o v e r  m a r k e t  p r i c e ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  
" i n h e r e n t  v a l u e s "  o f  t h e  s h a r e s - p r e s u m a b l y  n o t  r e f l e c t e d  o n  t h e  
m a r k e t - m a y  b e  h i g h e r  y e t .  
1 5 3  
D e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  t h u s  j u s t i f i e d  a s  a  
m e a n s  o f  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e ,  a s s u m i n g  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
~ompromise o n  s h a r e  v a l u e  b y  a c q u i r i n g  a n d  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t s .
1 5
•  
1 5 0 .  O n e  c o m m e n t a t o r  s t a t e d :  
R a t h e r  t h a n  f o r c i n g  d i r e c t o r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  o n l y  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t s  o f  c e r t a i n  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a n d  t h e  c o m p a n y  a s  a  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e  w i t h  a l l  o f  
i t s  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
L i p t o n ,  s u p r a  n o t e  9 3 ,  a t  1 1 5 .  
1 5 1 .  L i m a n ,  H a s  t h e  T e n d e r  M o v e m e n t  G o n e  T o o  F a r ? ,  2 3  N . Y .  L  S c H .  L  R E V .  6 8 7 ,  
7 0 6 - 0 7  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
1 5 2 .  A  m o r e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p o s i t i o n  e n d o r s i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  p r i o r i t y  m a y  b e  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  b r o a d  d i s p a r i t y  b e t w e e n  " o w n e r s h i p "  a n d  " c o n t r o l "  o f  a  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h o r o u g h l y  
a n a l y z e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  1 9 3 2  b y  A .  B E R L E  &  G .  M E A N S ,  T H E  M O D E R N  C O R P O R A T I O N  A N D  
P R I V A T E  P R O P E R T Y  2 2 0 - 3 2  ( 1 9 3 2 ) .  I f  i n  f a c t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  m a y  b e  b e s t  v i e w e d  " a s  a n  i n t r i -
c a t e ,  c e n t r a l i z e d ,  e c o n o m i c - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  r u n  b y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m a n a g e r s  w h o  
h i r e  c a p i t a l  f r o m  t h e  i n v e s t o r , "  M a n n i n g ,  B o o k  R e v i e w ,  T H E  A M E R I C A N  S T O C K H O L D E R ,  
6 7  Y A L E  L J  1 4 7 7 ,  1 4 8 9  ( 1 9 5 8 ) ,  a n y  s h a r e h o l d e r - i n v e s t o r  r o l e  i n  c o n t r o l  o r  o t h e r  l o n g -
t e r m  e c o n o m i c  d e c i s i o n s  w o u l d  b e  a n o m a l o u s .  T h e  i n v e s t o r  r o l e  w o u l d  b e  n o  d i f f e r e n t  
t h a n  t h a t  o f l e n d e r s  o r  l o n g - t e r m  c r e d i t o r s ,  n e i t h e r  o f  w h i c h  g r o u p s  a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  e n t i t l e d  
t o  c a u s e  a  c h a n g e  i n  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  b e  s t r o n g e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a d  
t h e  d i s p a r i t y  o f  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  c o n t r o l  r e s u l t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  5 0  y e a r s  i n  a n y  s t a t u t o r y  
m o v e m e n t  t o  r e s t r i c t  s h a r e h o l d e r  s u f f r a g e  o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  r e m o v e  d i r e c t o r s .  I n  f a c t  t h e  
r e c e n t  t r e n d  h a s  b e e n  o p p o s i t e ,  w i t n e s s  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  S E C  e m p h a s i s  u p o n  n o t i o n s  o f  " c o r -
p o r a t e  d e m o c r a c y "  a n d  ~tate s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  p e r m i t t i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e m o v a l  o f  
d i r e c t o r s  w i t h o u t  c a u s e .  T h e  a t t i t u d e  i n h e r e n t  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  r o l e  f o r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
i s  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r  a b i l i t y  t o  r e m o v e  m a n a g e m e n t ,  h o w e v e r  l i m i t e d  o r  i n f r e q u e n t l y  e x e r -
c i s e d ,  r e m a i n s  a  p o s i t i v e  c h e c k  u p o n  m a n a g e m e n t  e x c e s s e s  a n d  a b u s e  o f  p o w e r .  M a n n i n g ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  h a v i n g  r e c o g n i z e d  t h e  i n v e s t o r  r o l e  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  " p o w e r -
f u l  a r g u m e n t s  c a n  b e  a d v a n c e d  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  ' r a i d '  a s  a  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  
r e a l l o c a t i n g  f r o z e n  a s s e t s . "  I d .  a t  1 4 8 8 - 8 9 .  N o  " r a i d "  c o u l d  b e  e f f e c t i v e l y  a c c o m p l i s h e d  
w i t h o u t  s h a r e h o l d e r  c o o p e r a t i o n .  
1 5 3 .  L o n g ,  D i r e c t o r  F i d u c i a n ' e s :  P r o t e c t i n g  S h a r e h o l d e r  I n t e r e s t ,  1 4  M E R G E R S  &  
A C Q U I S I T I O N S ,  W i n t e r  1 9 8 0 ,  a t  5 .  
1 5 4 .  H a r z e l ,  S c h m i d t  &  D a v i s ,  W h y  C o r p o r a t e  · D i r e c t o r s  H a v e  a  R i g h t  t o  R e s i s t  
T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  6 1  C H I .  B .  R E c .  1 5 2 ,  1 5 4  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ;  s e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  2 4 2 - 4 5  
i n f r a  ( r e g a r d i n g  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a s s e r t e d l y  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  r e a s o n  o f  p r i c e  
i n a d e q u a c y ) .  
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Accordingly it has been argued that the proper test for judging defensive 
actions is "whether the defensive action is reasonably calculated to benefit 
shareholders in a market sense, that is, higher values for their securities." 155 
This argument suffers from an inability to distinguish good faith efforts 
to determine "inherent value" from the employment of a price inade-
quacy concern as a smokescreen for management's feared loss of control. 
Determining the bona fides of management's position is made con-
siderably more difficult by the subjective nature of "inherent value." 
Opinions of investment counsel often vary widely, particularly in the soft 
areas of long-term forecasting, effects of synergism, and long-range 
economic conditions. 156 
A contrasting argument would suggest that it is ironic for manage-
ment to be posing as the protector of shareholder returns, for the pre-
sumably undervalued market price may be a reflection of the market's 
collective judgment of the inefficiency of current management. 157 
Acquiring companies are prepared to pay substantial premiums for 
target shares presumably because they foresee an ability to create a more 
productive use of assets than exists under target management. Hostile 
tender offers thus serve a useful economic purpose in upgrading, or at 
least serving as a prod to improve, management performance. 158 For this 
reason it has been suggested that management's veto role-even in 
statutory mergers-is inimical to assuring that "corporations are control-
led by those who can use that control most productively." 159 Defensive 
measures are thus regarded as contrary to economic efficiency because 
155. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 613, 655 (1970). See also Note, Corporate Directors' Liability for 
Resisting a Tender Offer: Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modifications of Existing 
State Fiduciary Standards, 32 VAND. L. REv. 575, 603 (1979). 
156. During the course of the American Express tender offer effort, McGraw·Hiii 
chairman Harold McGraw was reported to state: "Who says we have an obligation to sell 
this company: I never saw times better for (McGraw-Hill)." Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1979, at 
31, col. 3. If such better times were so evident, it may be questioned why the market price 
of McGraw-Hill was not higher and why the market price following the withdrawal by 
American Express dropped back to close to its preoffer position. Unless we are to give lit· 
tie if any credence to the efficient capital market hypothesis, it may be questioned 
whether Chairman McGraw was basing his comment on information not adequately 
disclosed to the public investors. 
157. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 12.5 (1972); Fischel, Efficient 
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978). 
158. The economic value of the tender offer phenomenon was noted by the court in 
Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I, 8 (S.D. Ind. 1978) ("A tender offer plays an 
important role in the health of the national economy in that it serves as a device which 
helps to maintain accountability of corporate management to its shareholders."). Similarly 
the Senate Report on the Williams Act noted that "takeover bids should not be discouraged 
because they serve a useful purpose of providing a check on entrenched but inefficient 
management." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). 
159. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAYLSIS OF LAW§ 12.5, at 183 (1972). 
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they hinder the ability of sha~hc 
and preclude obtaining the grei 
Although each of the ~ 
elements of legitimacy, there 1l 
economic perspective over anot 
Despite the economists' delight i 
of evidence in the tender ofl 
economic theory. 160 Dispositive 
economic perspective could sea 
speculative nature of judgmentS 
takeover, and the vicissitudes of 
ing a successful defense to a tei 
A. Sale~ 
The inability of courts an\i · 
evaluate defensive measures is d 
fiduciary concepts, the diversit) 
able and the conflicting perspeo 
due 'to the use of defensive,mea 
ment alien to traditional modes 
concepts as fiduciary duty and 
tender offers involving mult 
disparate shareholders, and ~ 
costly array of counsel, investn: 
are a relatively recent phenon 
distinct lexicon, including deli@ 
hugs," "sleeping beauties,'' .: 
knights," but from ~n evaluau 
complexity of defensive measui 
process. 
, 
Rather than attempt to 
160. Lipton suggests that managem 
even when the tender offer is defeated, 
post-tender offer market price was ne: 
ton, supra note 93, at 107. Lipton c 
rejected and defeated by target m 
shareholders of more than 50 ~reel 
defeated tender offer had succeeded." 
from the substantial lapse of time-se 
and current illustrative prices, as well 
refute, that shareholders who reinv~ 
(had the offers been successful) woulc 
current market price of target compa 
I O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  [ 1 9 8 1 ]  
t  t h e  p r o p e r  t e s t  f o r  j u d g i n g  d e f e n s i v e  
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1 5 5  
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L l  m a r k e t  h y p o t h e s i s ,  i t  m a y  b e  q u e s t i o n e d _ t  
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t h e y  h i n d e r  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  r e m o v e  i n e f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
a n d  p r e c l u d e  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  g r e a t e s t  r e t u r n  o n  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n v e s t m e n t .  
A l t h o u g h  e a c h  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  o r i e n t e d  a r g u m e n t s  c o n t a i n  
e l e m e n t s  o f  l e g i t i m a c y ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  a p p a r e n t  b a s i s  f o r  e m b r a c i n g  o n e  
e c o n o m i c  p e r s p e c t i v e  o v e r  a n o t h e r  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  
D e s p i t e  t h e  e c o n o m i s t s '  d e l i g h t  i n  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  p a u c i t y  
o f  e v i d e n c e  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t  t o  s u p p o r t  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  
e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y .  
1 6 0  
D i s p o s i t i v e  d a t a  a s  t o  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a n y  o n e  
e c o n o m i c  p e r s p e c t i v e  c o u l d  s c a r e l y  b e  e x p e c t e d  g i v e n  t h e  u n a v o i d a b l y  
s p e c u l a t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  j u d g m e n t s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
t a k e o v e r ,  a n d  t h e  v i c i s s i t u d e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o l l o w -
i n g  a  s u c c e s s f u l  d e f e n s e  t o  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  .  
P A R T  I I  
A .  S a l e  o f  C o n t r o l  A n a l o g u e  
T h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  c o u r t s  a n d  c o m m e n t a t o r s  t o  c o n c u r  o n  a  s t a n d a r d  t o  
e v a l u a t e  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  i s  d u e  i n  p a r t  t o  t h e  i n h e r e n t  a m b i g u i t i e s  o f  
f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t s ,  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  a r g u a b l y  a p p l i c -
a b l e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e s  w i t h i n  e c o n o m i c  a r g u m e n t s .  I t  i s  a l s o  
d u e  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  i n  a n  a g g r e s s i v e ,  e x p l o s i v e  e n v i r o n -
m e n t  a l i e n  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  m o d e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t  o u t  o f  w h i c h  s u c h  
c o n c e p t s  a s  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  a n d  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  h a v e  e v o l v e d .  H o s t i l e  
t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i n v o l v i n g  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t h o u s a n d s  o f  
d i s p a r a t e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a n d  s c o r c h e d  e a r t h  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  e m p l o y i n g  a  
c o s t l y  a r r a y  o f  c o u n s e l ,  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k e r s ,  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  a n d  p u b l i c i s t s  
a r e  a  r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  p h e n o m e n o n .  T h e  p h e n o m e n o n  h a s  c r e a t e d  a  
' d i s t i n c t  l e x i c o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  d e l i g h t f u l l y  d e s c r i p t i v e  p h r a s e s  s u c h  a s  " b e a r  
"  " s l e e p i n g  b e a u t i e s , "  " S a t u r d a y  n i g h t  s p e c i a l s , "  a n d  " w h i t e  
auu~m:;," b u t  f r o m  a n  e v a l u a t i v e  s t a n d p o i n t  t h e  i n g e n u i t y ,  s p e e d ,  a n d  
i C O m p l e x i t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  h a v e  o u t r u n  t h e  s l o w e r - p a c e d  j u d i c i a l  
t h a n  a t t e m p t  t o  s q u e e z e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a n d  d e f e n s i v e  
1 6 0 .  L i p t o n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  a c t i o n s  o f t e n  d o  n o t  i m p a i r  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e t u r n  
· e v e n  w h e n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  d e f e a t e d ,  a n d  o f f e r s  a  t a b l e  o f  s e v e r a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  
o o s t · t e n d e r  o f f e r  m a r k e t  p r i c e  w a s  n e a r  o r  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  d e f e a t e d  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e .  L i p ·  
s u p r a  n o t e  9 3 ,  a t  1 0 7 .  L i p t o n  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  o f  t h e  3 6  u n s o l i c i t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  
a n d  d e f e a t e d  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  b e t w e e n  1 9 7 6  a n d  J u n e  1 9 7 9 ,  " t h e  
f t h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  m o r e  t h a n  5 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t a r g e t s  a r e  b e t t e r  o f f  t o d a y  t h a n  i f  t h e  
l : c l e f e a t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  h a d  s u c c e e d e d . "  I  d .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  s u c h  e v a l u a t i o n  a r i s e s  b o t h  
t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  l a p s e  o f  t i m e - s e v e r a l  y e a r s  i n  m o s t  c a s e s - b e t w e e n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
c u r r e n t  i l l u s t r a t i v e  p r i c e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a n  i m p l i e d  a s s u m p t i o n ,  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n f i r m  o r  
t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w h o  r e i n v e s t e d  t h e i r  p r o c e e d s  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  
t h e  o f f e r s  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l )  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  a n  a c c u m u l a t e d  r e t u r n  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  
m a r k e t  p r i c e  o f  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  s h a r e s .  
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measures into traditional modes created in differing contexts, it may be 
more appropriate to examine the validity of defensive measures within 
the framework of the underlying transaction. Such analysis takes as its 
starting point the nature and purpose of the tender offer. Fundamen-
tally, a tender offer is equivalent to a private transaction in which a 
potential purchaser offers terms and conditions governing the purchase 
for acceptance or rejection by the potential seller. What transforms the 
private, relatively unregulated one-on-one transaction161 into a tender 
offer subject to Williams Act provisions and to a host of adverse target 
management reactions is the extension of the offer to all shareholders with 
the consequent potentiality of a shift in control in the target company .162 
Shifts in control occur, of course, in private transactions. Such 
private transactions between a single or small group of control shareholders 
and a third party usually meet with no management opposition, manage-
. ment generaliy being synonymous with control shareholders. It is appro-
priate, indeed it may even be logically mandated, to question why a single, 
controlling shareholder may sell his shares in a relatively unburdened trans-
action, while fractionalized, minority shareholders cannot do so collec-
tively without overcoming substantial and costly impediments created by 
an unhappy target management. 
Corporate control may be transferred in several manners. A statutory 
merger involves director approval because the merger may substantially 
alter the capital structure and identity of the merged corporation. A sale of 
a controlling block of shares, however, creates no change in corporate 
structure, identity, or legal relationships. Thus, no state corporate code 
provides for director approval as a condition precedent to a shareholder's 
sale of controlling interest. If the transfer of shares by a single, dominant 
shareholder is an individual judgment to pass corporate control to the pur-
chaser, the transfer of shares through a tender offer is a collective judgment 
161. Certain judicial and statutory standards apply to all sales of securities by insiders 
or others possessing material information and under a duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading, e.g., rule 10b-5. Common-law restraints have developed on the sale of shares by 
controlling shareholders, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), and Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 272, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 781, 793-94 (1969), and other judicially created standards have developed with 
respect to potentially fraudulent conduct, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 
498-501, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-14 (1969). Despite the imposing list of potential pitfalls, 
the overwhelming bulk of daily transactions occur between traders for whom such restric-
tions have no applicability. 
162. It was the spector of unregulated shifts in control, rather than broad-based offers 
to shareholders at large, that appears to have been the primary purpose of the Williams 
Act. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 873 (1974). The court stated that 
/d. 
a corporation does not become a tender offeror simply by proposing a paper 
exchange of securities. There must be contemplated some change in control. If 
actual control does not shift, it is difficult to see why the shareholder needs the 
protection of Section 14(e). 
TENDER OFFERS 
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~in d i f f e r i n g  c o n t e x t s ,  i t  m a y  b e  
~dity o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  w i t h i n  
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1 e  o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  F u n d a m e n -
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t e n t i a l  s e l l e r .  W h a t  t r a n s f o r m s  t h e  
l - o n e  t r a n s a c t i o n  
1 6 1  
i n t o  a  t e n d e r  
o s  a n d  t o  a  h o s t  o f  a d v e r s e  t a r g e t  
o f  t h e  o f f e r  t o  a l l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w i t h  
1  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y . 1 & Z  
1 e ,  i n  p r i v a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  S u c h  
m a l l  g r o u p  o f  c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
m a n a g e m e n t  o p p o s i t i o n ,  m a n a g e -
~ontrol s h a r e h o l d e r s .  I t  i s  a p p r o -
. a n d a t e d ,  t o  q u e s t i o n  w h y  a  s i n g l e ,  
~in a  r e l a t i v e l y  u n b u r d e n e d  t r a n s -
l h a r e h o l d e r s  c a n n o t  d o  s o  c o l l e c -
~d c o s t l y  i m p e d i m e n t s  c r e a t e d  b y  
e d  i n  s e v e r a l  m a n n e r s .  A  s t a t u t o r y  
u s e  t h e  m e r g e r  m a y  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
· t h e  I p e r g e d  c o r p o r a t i o n .  A  s a l e  o f  
·  creat~ n o  c h a n g e  i n  c o r p o r a t e  
1 1 1 .  T h u s ,  n o  s t a t e  c o r p o r a t e  c o d e  
l t i o n  p r e c e d e n t  t o  a  s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  
i r  . .  p f  s h a r e s  b y  a  s i n g l e ,  d o m i n a n t  
p b s  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  p u r -
n d e r  o f f e r  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  j u d g m e n t  
a p p l y  t o  a l l  s a l e s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  b y  i n s i d e r s  
n d e r  a  d u t y  t o  d i s c l o s e  o r  a b s t a i n  f r o m  
h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  o n  t h e  s a l e  o f  s h a r e s  b y  
1 a n ,  2 1 9  F . 2 d  1 7 3 ,  1 7 8  ( 2 d  C i r . ) ,  c e r t .  
e r t ,  2 7 1  C a l .  A p p .  2 d  2 5 2 ,  2 7 2 ,  7 6  C a l .  
: r e a t e d  s t a n d a r d s  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  w i t h  
l : i a m o n d  v .  O r e a m u n o ,  2 4  N .  Y . 2 d  4 9 4 ,  
~ t h e  i m p o s i n g  l i s t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  p i t f a l l s ,  
b e t w e e n  t r a d e r s  f o r  w h o m  s u c h  r e s t r i c ·  
o o n t r o l ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b r o a d - b a s e d  o f f e r s  
n  t h e  p r i m a r y  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  
d  5 7 9 ,  5 9 9  ( 5 t h  C i r . ) ,  c e r t .  d e n i e d ,  4 1 9  
~Nimply b y  p r o p o s i n g  a  p a p e r  
1 p l a t e d  s o m e  c h a n g e  i n  c o n t r o l .  I f  
l e e
1  
w h y  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r  n e e d s  t h e  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
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b y  t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  t h e  s a m e  e f f e c t .  T h e  m o t i v a t i o n  b e h i n d  e a c h  
o f  s u c h  t r a n s f e r s  m a y  b e  i d e n t i c a l .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  m a k e s  l i t t l e  s e n s e  t o  a t t a c k  
t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a s  b e i n g  b a s e d  u p o n  s e l f i s h ,  
m o n e t a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a l o n e ,  w h e n  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  a  c o n t r o l l i n g  
s h a r e h o l d e r  m a y  b e  e q u a l l y  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  s u c h  c h a l l e n g e  b u t  i s  b e y o n d  
r e p r o a c h  e x c e p t  i n  l i m i t e d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
1 6 5  
M o r e o v e r ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t e n d e r  o f f e r s  p e r m i t  r e m o v a l  o f  i n e f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  o f  t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i s  i n  e f f e c t  a  v o t e  o f  n o  c o n f i d e n c e  a n d  p r o -
v i d e s  a  f a r  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  m e a n s  o f  c h a n g i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a n  t h e  p r o x y  
s y s t e m . l & 4  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a s  e f f e c t i n g  a  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b e  j u d g e d  b y  s t a n d a r d s  r e l e v a n t  t o  s a l e  
o f  c o n t r o l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  T h e  d u a l  i d e n t i t y  o f  p u r p o s e  a n d  e f f e c t  b e t w e e n  
i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e  t r a n s f e r s  c a u s e s  i n q u i r y  i n t o  w h a t  l i m i t a t i o n s  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  
t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o  s p e c i f i c  d e f e n -
s i v e  t a c t i c s  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a c e  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a t  a n  u n r e a s o n -
a b l e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  r i g h t s  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ?  I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  s h o u l d  b e  
r e s t r i c t e d  o n l y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  v a l i d l y  i m p o s e d  r e s t r a i n t s  u p o n  i t s  i n d i v i d -
u a l  c o u n t e r p a r t ,  a  c o n c l u s i o n  s t e m m i n g  f r o m  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n a l  n a t u r e  
o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  c o n s i s t e n t  s t a n d a r d s  t o  b o t h  i n d i -
v i d u a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e  t r a n s f e r s  o f  c o n t r o l  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h i s  A r t i c l e  a s  
t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e .  T h e  p r e m i s e  o f  a n a l o g o u s  t r e a t m e n t  i s  t h a t  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  l i m i t a t i o n s  i m p o s e d  u p o n  p r i v a t e  t r a n s f e r s  o f  
c o n t r o l  a n d  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  t h e y  d o  n o t  r e a s o n a b l y  i m p a i r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  
m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  m a k e  a  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  a s  a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  s a l e  m a y  b e  t r a n s a c t e d .
1 6 5  
1 6 3 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  1 7 1 - 8 0  i n f r a .  K a p l a n  s t a t e s :  
[ I ) n  v e r y  f e w  i n s t a n c e s  i s  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  a c t  p r i m a r i l y  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  c o r -
p o r a t i o n  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  o w n  i n t e r e s t  i m p o s e d .  F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  i t  i s  s e l d o m  i f  e v e r  h e l d  t h a t  . . .  h e  s h a l l  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  s e l l i n g  h i s  
c o n t r o l  s h a r e s  ( o t h e r  t h a n  t o  a  l o o t e r  o r  a t  a  p r e m i u m  w h i c h  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  d i v e r -
s i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a d v a n t a g e ) .  
K a p l a n ,  F i d u c i a r y  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  3 1  B u s .  L A W .  
8 8 3 ,  8 8 8  ( 1 9 7 6 )  ( f o o t n o t e s  o m i t t e d ) .  
1 6 4 .  B r u d n e y  a n d  C h i r e l s t e i n  c o m m e n t :  
R e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  t h e  t e n d e r - p l u s - m e r g e r  p r o c e d u r e  i s  m e r e l y  a  w a y  o f  b y p a s s i n g  t h e  
t a r g e t  c o m p a n y ' s  p r o x y  m a c h i n e r y ,  w h i c h  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  i n c u m b e n t  
b o a r d ,  a n d  s u b m i t t i n g  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o p o s a l  t o  d i r e c t  r e f e r e n d u m  o f  t h e  
s t o c k h o l d e r s .  T h o s e  w h o  a c c e p t  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a r e  p r o p e r l y  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  
a y e - v o t e r s ,  t h o s e  w h o  d o  n o t ,  a s  n a y - o r  n o n - v o t e r s .  
B r u d n e y  &  C h i r e l s t e i n ,  A  R e s t a t e m e n t  o f  C o r p o r a t e  F r e e z e o u t s ,  8 7  Y A L E  L . J .  1 3 5 4 ,  1 3 6 0  
( 1 9 7 8 ) .  S e e  a l s o  R .  P O S N E R ,  E C O N O M I C  A N A L Y S I S  O F  L A W §  1 2 . 5  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  
1 6 5 .  A  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  b y  a  s i n g l e  d o m i n a n t  
s h a r e h o l d e r  a n d  s a l e  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  s t o c k h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t  i s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  
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The sale of control analogue is, it is submitted, the most appropriate 
standard for judging defensive measures. It does not seek to impose stan-
dards developed from such historically differing contexts as the fiduciary 
and statutory perspectives. More importantly, it treats the tender offer in 
its essential characteristic- an offer to purchase directed to each 
shareholder in his individual capacity. 166 The analogue focuses on alien-
ability, a fundamental characteristic of the ownership of shares, and 
eliminates the incongruity of restraints that management's defensive 
measures have created between the alienability of majority and minority 
shares. 167 A unified approach applies, individual shareholders possessing 
no greater right to transmit control by acting in a collective manner 
adverse to corporate interests than does the single, dominant share-
holder. Nor is there less right, or conversely, greater justification for 
management interference with decisionmaking for the minority rather 
than the majority shareholder. 
Distinctions unquestionably exist between factors influencing the 
transference-of-control-judgment of the dominant shareholder and factors 
affecting fractionalized shareholders acting in a de facto collective manner. 
In the former instance, a controlling shareholder may have fostered rela-
tionships with corporate employees, suppliers, customers, minority share-
holders, and other community interests-relationships the shareholder 
that scattered shareholders are incapable of handling collectively. While this difference is 
significant, it only goes to who raises the questions and not the judgments to be made. 
Target management, for example, might negotiate with the acquiror regarding changes 
in the price or other terms of the offer. Management might also institute litigation based 
upon concerns of corporate waste. Management's role in these circumstances may be 
appropriately regarded as facilitating resolution of the more fundamental issue, deter-
mined by shareholders alone, of accepting or rejecting the offer. 
166. For Williams Act purposes the definition of tender offer goes well beyond the 
essential characteristic noted in the text. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 
817 (S.D.N .Y. 1979). This is to be expected, for distinct issues are being considered. The 
text seeks to consider the essential characteristic of a tender offer for the purpose of 
evaluating management's defensive response. Statutory definition has sought to deter-
mine what combination of characteristics will trigger Williams Act procedures and 
requirements. Characteristics such as premiums, contingencies, and limited time frames, 
examined for Williams Act purposes, do not necessarily distinguish an individual sale of 
control from the collective sale, as such factors may well be present in both circumstances. 
Characteristics determining whether stockholders should come under the Williams Act 
umbrella, designed to protect them from undue pressure, nondisclosure, and unequal 
treatment by the tender offeror, do not necessarily apply in determining whether the 
transaction may permissibly trigger a host of defensive reactions by target management. 
It is, for example, a matter of relative indifference for defensive purposes whether the 
potential acquiror is offering a premium for the purchase of shares. Indeed a common 
reply by target management is that the premium is not adequate. The existence of a 
premium, however, is a primary element in determining whether a tender offer exists for 
Williams Act purposes. 
167. See Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguard and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 
21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613, 678-79 (1970) (discussing the tender offer as a device for 
providing equal opportunity for the sale of shares by both minority and majority 
shareholders). 
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s  s u b m i t t e d ,  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  
s .  I t  d o e s  n o t  s e e k  t o  i m p o s e  s t a n -
d i f f e r i n g  c o n t e x t s  a s  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  
t a n t l y ,  i t  t r e a t s  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i n  
t o '  p u r c h a s e  d i r e c t e d  t o  e a c h  
1 1  
T h e  a n a l o g u e  f o c u s e s  o n  a l i e n -
o f  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  s h a r e s ,  a n d  
1 t s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d e f e n s i v e  
n a b i l i t y  o f  m a j o r i t y  a n d  m i n o r i t y  
n d i v i d u a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  p o s s e s s i n g  
• Y  a c t i n g  i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  m a n n e r  
o e s  
1  
t h e  s i n g l e ,  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e -
l v e r s e l y ,  g r e a t e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
l l l l l a k i n g  f o r  t h e  m i n o r i t y  r a t h e r .  
· b e t w e e n  f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  
d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  a n d  f a c t o r s :  
i n g i n  a  d e  f a c t o  c o l l e c t i v e  m a n n e r .  
l i i ' e h o l d e r  m a y  h a v e  f o s t e r e d  r e l a -
p l i e r s ,  c u s t o m e r s ,  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e - .  
: & - r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h e  shareholder~ 
D i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  W h i l e  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  
o n s  a n d ,  n o t  t h e  j u d g m e n t s  t o  b e  
a t e  w i t h  t h e  a c q u i r o r  r e g a r d i n g  c n a n J t e s  
n e n t  m i g h t  a l s o  i n s t i t u t e  l i t i g a t i o n  
I t ' s  r o l e  i n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  m a y  
1  t f  t h e  m o r e  f u n d a m e n t a l  i s s u e ,  d e t e r - "  
j e c t i n g  t h e  o f f e r .  
1 1 ! .  o f  t~nder o f f e r  g o e s  w e l l  b e y o n d  t h e  
e l l m a n  v .  D i c k i n s o n ,  4 7 5  F .  S u p p .  7 8 5 ,  
d i s t i n c t  i s s u e s  a r e  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d .  T h e  
i c  o f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  
t a t u t o r y  d e f i n i t i o n  h a s  s o u g h t  t o  d e t e r -
t r i g g e r  W i l l i a m s  A c t  p r o c e d u r e s  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s ,  a n d  l i m i t e d  t i m e  
~arily d i s t i n g u i s h  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  s a l e  
a y  w e l l  b e  p r e s e n t  i n  b o t h  
" S  s h o u l d  c o m e  u n d e r  t h e  W i l l i a m s  
e  p r e s s u r e ,  n o n d i s c l o s u r e ,  a n d  u n e q u a l  
l r i l y  a p p l y  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  
e n s i v e  r e a c t i o n s  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
n e e  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  p u r p o s e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  
: p u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s .  I n d e e d  a  c o m m o n  
m  i s  n o t  a d e q u a t e .  T h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  
m i r u n g  w h e t h e r  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  e x i s t s  f o r  
i  q n d  R e s t r a i n t s - A n  I n t e r e s t  A n a l y s i s ,  
t c u s s i n g  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a s  a  d e v i c e  f o r  
h a r e s  b y  b o t h  m i n o r i t y  a n d  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
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m a y  d e s i r e  t o  a s s u r e  a r e  p r o t e c t e d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  c o n t r o l .  
T h e  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  a l s o  p r e s u m a b l y  h a s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  e x p e r t i s e  
t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  w i l l  h a v e  d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t s  u p o n  c o r -
p o r a t e  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  I n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t ,  o f f e r o r s  m a y  b e  a b l e  t o  
e x e r t  g r e a t e r  l e v e r a g e  o v e r  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  i s s u e s  o f  
p r i c e ,  n u m b e r  o f  s h a r e s  t o  b e  p u r c h a s e d ,  c o n d i t i o n a l  a c c e p t a n c e s ,  a n d  
o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  o f f e r .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  
p e r s p e c t i v e  b e t w e e n  c o n t r o l  a n d  n o n c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  d o  n o t  l e a d  t o  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  s h o u l d  n o t  e n j o y  s i m i l a r  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  
r o l e s .  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  k n o w l e d g e  m a y  w e l l  b e  a m e l i o r a t e d  b y  d i s c l o s u r e ,  a n d  
t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  h a s  e n c o u r a g e d  a  g r e a t e r  f l o w  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  C o n c e r n s  e x p r e s s e d  f o r  e m p l o y e e ,  c u s t o m e r ,  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  
i n t e r e s t s
1 6 8  
a r e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  t w o  i n d e p e n d e n t  s o u r c e s :  t a r g e t  m a n a g e -
m e n t ' s  i n j u n c t i v e  e f f o r t s  a n d  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y ' s  e c o n o m i c  c o n -
c e r n s .  T h e  f o r m e r ,  h o w e v e r  s e l f i s h l y  p u r s u e d ,  m a y  r a i s e  i s s u e s  o f  w a s t e ,  
l o o t i n g ,  a n d  i l l e g a l i t y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  c o n c e r n s  r e l e v a n t  t o  a  m a j o r i t y  
·  s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  c o n t r o l .  
1 6 9  
E v e n  m o r e  p r o t e c t i v e  o f  s u c h  
i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  f r e q u e n t l y  o v e r l o o k e d  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  f e a r e d  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t a k e o v e r s ,  a r e  t h e  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  
c o m p a n y  t h a t  m a y  a n d  p r o b a b l y  w i l l  b e  q u i t e  i n i m i c a l  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  
d i s r u p t i o n s  i n  e m p l o y e e  m o r a l e ,  s u p p l i e r  a n d  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  a n d  
t h e  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  u s e  o f  a c q u i r e d  a s s e t s .  C o n c e r n s  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  
s h a r e h o l d e r  w e l f a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  p o s i t i o n  
b e t w e e n  c o n t r o l  a n d  n o n c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a r e  t h u s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
r e s o l v e d  b y  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  d i s c l o s u r e ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  s c r u t i n y ,  
a n d  t h e  c o m m o n a l i t y  o f  t a r g e t - a c q u i r o r  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t s . l 1 °  
1 6 8 .  S e e  n o t e  7 1  s u p r a .  
1 6 9 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e s  1 7 6 - 8 0  i n f r a .  
1 7 0 .  T h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e  m a y  b e  v i e w e d  a s  a  n e u t r a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  s c o p e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n s  u p o n  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  r e l y -
i n g  p r i n c i p a l l y  o n  a  p r e m i s e  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  s u c h  l i m i t a t i o n s  a r e  t h e y  s h o u l d  b e  a n a l o g o u s l y  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t .  A  
j u d g m e n t a l  r e s p o n s e  m a y  b e  t h a t  c u r r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a r e  
t i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e r e f o r e  
a r g u m e n t  b a s e d  s o l e l y  o n  a n a l o g y  t o  c u r r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  f a i l s  t o  a d d r e s s  u n d e r l y i n g  i s s u e s  
o f  v a l u e s  a n d  g o a l s .  T o  s o m e  e x t e n t  t h e  a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  b e  v a l i d ,  f o r  t h i s  A r t i c l e  d o e s  n o t  
p u r p o r t  t o  e x a m i n e  c u r r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  f r o m  s o c i a l  a n d  
~economic p e r s p e c t i v e s .  T h a t  i s  n o t  t o  s a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  r e l i a n c e  u p o n  c u r r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  
i s  w i t h o u t  u n a r t i c u l a t e d  m a j o r  p r e m i s e s  t h a t  a d o p t  p o l i c i e s  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f  s u c h  
l i m i t a t i o n s .  O n e  p r e m i s e  i s  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  d e n y  f r e e  a l i e n a b i l i t y  o f  
s h a r e s  w h e r e  t h e  r e s u l t  m a y  b e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d a m a g i n g  t o  n o n p a r t i c i p a t o r y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
a n d  c o r p o r a t e  c r e d i t o r s .  A n  i n d e p e n d e n t  p r e m i s e  a d o p t s  i n  a  b r o a d  s e n s e  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  
c o m p e t i t i v e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  t h u s  l i m i t i n g  t h e  a l i e n a b i l i t y  o f  s h a r e s  i n  c i r -
c u m s t a n c e s  w h e r e  a n t i t r u s t  c o n c e r n s  h a v e  a p p r o p r i a t e  d o m i n a n c e .  A  t h i r d ,  p e r h a p s  
f u n d a m e n t a l ,  p r e m i s e  r e g a r d s  c u r r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  a s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a  p r e s u m p t i v e  
o f  a l i e n a b i l i t y  o f  s h a r e s ,  i m p o s i n g  u p o n  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  a d v a n c i n g  
: ; a r g u m e n t s  b a s e d  u p o n  c o m p e t i n g  v a l u e s  a n d  c l a i m s .  T h e  a n a l o g u e  i s  t h u s  n o t  w i t h o u t  
l . " i u d i ! D l e n t a l  a s p e c t s ,  a l t h o u g h  s u c h  p r e m i s e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  t a n g e n t i a l  t o  t h e  t h e s e s  o f  t h i s  
• • J 
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B. Limitations upon the Sale of Controlling Interests 
Limitations upon the sale of control shares are narrowly drawn, consis-
tent with judicial concerns regarding restraints upon alienability. Twenty-
five years have passed since Perlman v. Feldmann, 171 yet that apparently 
ground-breaking decision has failed to produce substantial litigation 
challenging sales of control. Contrary to the efforts of some commentators 
to give expansive interpretations to Perlman, 172 the Second Circuit has 
regarded Perlman in the narrow context of its somewhat unusual factual 
situation. That court's characterization of Perlman seven years after the 
decision "was basically that the controlling shareholders in selling control 
to a potential customer had appropriated to their personal benefit a cor-
porate asset: the premium which the company's product could command 
in a time of market shortage."173 Perlman has thus not created a substan-
tial restraint upon the sale of control shares, and may be viable only in 
the relatively infrequent instances of clearly identifiable corporate oppor-
tunities inuring to the principal benefit of selling shareholders.m Such a 
limitation would have rare application in the tender offer context where 
the offered premium extends to all shareholders, each shareholder thus 
given the right to share proportionately in the premium representing 
transference of control. 175 
171. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
172. See generally Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale 
of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1212 (1958). 
173. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962). 
174. In a fairly narrow reading of Perlman, it has been suggested that the case is simply 
an illustration of the "looting" standard arising from such cases as Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 
N.Y.S.2d 622, 652-53 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. 
L. REV. 986, 988-90 (1957). 
175. The Perlman decision has been used to suggest that the controlling shareholder 
should seek to obtain for the minority shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares 
upon the same tenns offered to the controlling shareholder. This obligation has been 
implied by some commentators based upon a broad reading of Perlman. Andrews, The 
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505, 
515 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1958); 
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 31 (1956). But Perlman has 
not evolved in this direction and the position has generally been rejected. Clagett v. 
Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978); Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 
F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Yerke v. Batman, 376 
N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). California courts, however, appear more prone 
·to accept an "equal opportunity" doctrine, particularly where arguably undue advantage 
has inured to the controlling shareholder. In Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969), the court referred to the articles cited in note 172 supra and sug-
gested that the growth in shareholder population and need for continual investment "may 
in the future require legislative action or the adoption by the courts of one or the other 
law writer's recommendations for the investor's protection." Id. at 271, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 
793. Similar concerns in a somewhat different context are evident in the obligations 
imposed upon controlling shareholders in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 
111-12, 460 P.2d 464, 473-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601-02 (1969). However valid or 
desirable "equal opportunity" arguments appear, they have little relevance in the tender 
More relevant to tender 
;au.• ... n•• .. ,.. or imposing liability 
'£\Jm!ltaJnct~swhere a "lootihg" 4 
is reasonably foresee 
dealt with companies owning 
whether the sellers could rec 
porate assets would be w~te 
.. party. 17& Perception of thts 
seller, 111 for there does not aJ 
to investigate the character (l 
case law has generally devc 
former controlling shareholdc 
"if the circumstances surro\1 
suspicion in a prudent man 
group who will mismanage all 
waste ordinarily have narrow 
sistent to apply su~h standaJ:d 
thus including anutrust and I 
in its ability to perceive pot 
disclosure obligations of the 
source of funds, plans' regax:c 
assets, and board changes, as 
target company's corporate s1 
The foregoing restraints 
minimal. Corporate and min2, 
ficiently protected as long asl 
through the sales price the val~ 
offer context where offers are open 1 
l4(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)(19~ 
basis. Williams Act § 14(d)(6), Hi\: 
176 Insuranshares Corp. v. Nm 
1940);. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28f?l.Y.l 
R.Ev. 118 (1941). See generaUy Haze~ 
trolling Shareholders- Common LA 
Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. 
177. In DeBaun v. First W. B~ 
!54 (1975), the court upheld a den 
court found that the seller became c! 
dent person that the purchaser Will 
Rptr. at 360. 
178. In Levy v. American Bcvera 
The law does not require one to 
a business transaction, even of a 
or criminal act if given the opj 
assumed, in the absence of •en: 
265 A.D. 208, 219, 38 N.Y.S.2d 51 
F.2d 57~. 578 (4th Cir. 197~). , 
179. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F .. 
180. Schedule 14 D-1, 17 C.F.R. 
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' l e  o f  C o n t r o l l i n g  I n t e r e s t s  
, l s h a r e s  a r e  n a r r o w l y  d r a w n ,  c o n s i s -
~traints u p o n  a l i e n a b i l i t y .  T w e n t y -
~ F e l d m a n n ,  
1 7 1  
y e t  t h a t  a p p a r e n t l y  
t o  ' p r o d u c e  s u b s t a n t i a l  l i t i g a t i o n  
>  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  s o m e  c o m m e n t a t o r s  
r r r l m a n ,  
1 7 2  
t h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  h a s  
x t  o f  i t s  s o m e w h a t  u n u s u a l  f a c t u a l  
1 1  o f  P e r l m a n  s e v e n  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  
l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  s e l l i n g  c o n t r o l  
: e d  t o  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  b e n e f i t  a  c o r -
IMP~llny's p r o d u c t  c o u l d  c o m m a n d  
a n  h a s  t h u s  n o t  c r e a t e d  a  s u b s t a n -
h a r e s ,  a n d  m a y  b e  v i a b l e  o n l y  i n  
~arly i d e n t i f i a b l e  c o r p o r a t e  o p p o r -
.  o f  s e l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
1 7 4  
S u c h  a  
i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t  w h e r e  
r e h o l d e r s ,  e a c h  s h a r e h o l d e r  t h u s  
i f  i n  t h e  p r e m i u m  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
9  u . s .  9 5 2  ( 1 9 5 5 ) .  
s  R i g h t  t o  E q u a l  O p p o r t u n i t y  i n  t h e  S a l e  
" C o n t r o l "  i n  C o r p o r a t e  L a w ,  5 8  C O L U M .  
.  5 7 2 ,  5 7 6  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 6 2 ) .  
~as b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  c a s e  i s  s i m p l y  
m p  s u c h  c a s e s  a s  G e r d e s  v .  R e y n o l d s ,  2 8  
"~Sale o f  C o n t r o l l i n g  S h a r e s ,  7 0  H A R V .  
)  
l l l g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  
l e r s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  s h a r e s  
s h a r e h o l d e r .  T h i s  o b l i g a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  
l a d  r e a d i n g  o f  P e r l m a n .  A n d r e w s ,  T h e  
S a l e  o f  S h a r e s ,  7 8  H A R V .  L .  R E v .  5 0 5 ,  
! i 8  C O L U M .  L .  R E V .  1 2 1 2 ,  1 2 2 2  ( 1 9 5 8 ) ;  
.  L .  R E v .  1 ,  3 1  ( 1 9 5 6 ) .  B u t  P e r l m a n  h a s  
a s  g e n e r a l l y  b e e n  r e j e c t e d .  C l a g e t t  v .  
) ;  H o n i g r n a n  v .  G r e e n  G i a n t  C o . ,  3 0 9  
J . S .  9 4 1  ( 1 9 6 3 ) ;  Y e r k e  v .  B a t m a n ,  3 7 6  
i a  c o u r t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a p p e a r  m o r e  p r o n e  
t l a r l y  w h e r e  a r g u a b l y  u n d u e  a d v a n t a g e  
o  v .  H a l b e r t ,  2 7 1  C a l .  A p p .  2 d  2 5 2 ,  7 6  
t i d e s  c i t e d  i n  n o t e  1  7 2  s u p r a  a n d  s u g -
o d  n e e d  f o r  c o n t i n u a l  i n v e s t m e n t  " m a y  
1 t i o n  b y  t h e  c o u r t s  o f  o n e  o r  t h e  o t h e r  
l ) t e c t i o n . "  / d .  a t  2 7 1 ,  7 6  C a l .  R p t r .  a t  
o n t e t t  a r e  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s •  
H~F. A h m a n s o n  &  C o . ,  1  C a l .  3 d  9 5 ,  
f 2 ,  6 0 1 · 0 2  ( 1 9 6 9 ) .  H o w e v e r  v a l i d  o r e  
h e y - h a v e  l i t t l e  r e l e v a n c e  i n  t h e  t e n d e r .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 1 5  
M o r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i s  t h e  c o m m o n - l a w  l i m i t a t i o n  p r o -
h i b i t i n g  o r  i m p o s i n g  l i a b i l i t y  u p o n  t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  i n t e r e s t s  i n  c i r -
c u m s t a n c e s  w h e r e  a  " l o o t i n g "  o r  o t h e r  u s u r p a t i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a s s e t s  b y  t h e  
a c q u i r o r  i s  r e a s o n a b l y  f o r e s e e a b l e .  D e c i s i o n s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  h a v e  g e n e r a l l y  
d e a l t  w i t h  c o m p a n i e s  o w n i n g  h i g h l y  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  a n d  h a v e  t u r n e d  u p o n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  s e l l e r s  c o u l d  r e a s o n a b l y  h a v e  p e r c e i v e d  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  c o r -
p o r a t e  a s s e t s  w o u l d  b e  w a s t e d  o r  o t h e r w i s e  e x p l o i t e d  b y  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  
p a r t y .  
1 7 6  
P e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h i s  r i s k  m u s t  a r i s e  f r o m  f a c t s  k n o w n  t o  t h e  
s e l l e r ,  
1 7 7  
f o r  t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a n  a f f i r m a t i v e  d u t y  u p o n  s e l l e r s  
t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  t h e  p u r c h a s e r .  
1 7 8  
A l t h o u g h  
c a s e  l a w  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  d e v e l o p e d  t h r o u g h  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
f o r m e r  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  s e e k  i n j u n c t i v e  r e l i e f  
" i f  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  p r o p o s e d  t r a n s f e r  w o u l d  a l e r t  
s u s p i c i o n  i n  a  p r u d e n t  m a n  t h a t  t h e  p u r c h a s e r s  a r e  a n  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  
g r o u p  w h o  w i l l  m i s m a n a g e  a n d  l o o t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  a s s e t s . "
1 7 9  
L o o t i n g  a n d  
w a s t e  o r d i n a r i l y  h a v e  n a r r o w  c o n n o t a t i o n s ,  b u t  i t  w o u l d  b e  e n t i r e l y  c o n -
s i s t e n t  t o  a p p l y  s u c h  s t a n d a r d s  t o  i n s t a n c e s  o f  a l l e g e d  s t a t u t o r y  i l l e g a l i t y ,  
t h u s  i n c l u d i n g  a n t i t r u s t  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  v i o l a t i o n s .  M a n a g e m e n t  i s  a i d e d  
i n  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  p e r c e i v e  p o t e n t i a l  m i s u s e  o f  t a r g e t  a s s e t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  
d i s c l o s u r e  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  i n c l u d i n g  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  
s o u r c e  o f  f u n d s ,  p l a n s  r e g a r d i n g  p o t e n t i a l  m e r g e r ,  l i q u i d a t i o n ,  s a l e  o f  
a s s e t s ,  a n d  b o a r d  c h a n g e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a n y  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l  e f f e c t s  u p o n  t h e  
t a r g e t  c o m p a n y ' s  c o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  b u s i n e s s .
1 8 0  
T h e  f o r e g o i n g  r e s t r a i n t s  o n  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
m i n i m a l .  C o r p o r a t e  a n d  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s u f -
f i c i e n t l y  p r o t e c t e d  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  s e l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  d o e s  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t h r o u g h  t h e  s a l e s  p r i c e  t h e  v a l u e  o f  a  c o r p o r a t e  a s s e t ,  a n d  h a s  n o  r e a s o n a b l e  
o f f e r  c o n t e x t  w h e r e  o f f e r s  a r e  o p e n  t o  a l l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o n  i d e n t i c a l  t e r m s ,  W i l l i a m s  A c t  §  
1 4 ( d ) ( 7 ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  §  7 8 n ( d ) ( 7 ) ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  a n d  s h a r e s  m a y  b e  r e j e c t e d  o n l y  o n  a  p r o  r a t a  
b a s i s .  W i l l i a m s  A c t §  1 4 ( d ) ( 6 ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  §  7 8 n ( d ) ( 6 )  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
1 7 6 .  l n s u r a n s h a r e s  C o r p .  v .  N o r t h e r n  F i s c a l  C o r p . ,  3 5  F .  S u p p .  2 2 ,  2 7  ( E . D .  P a .  
1 9 4 0 ) ;  G e r d e s  v .  R e y n o l d s ,  2 8  N . Y . S . 2 d  6 2 2 ,  6 2 9  ( S u p .  C t .  1 9 4 1 ) ,  n o t e d  i n  2 6  M I N N .  L .  
R E v .  1 1 8  ( 1 9 4 1 ) .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  H a z e n ,  T r a n s f e r s  o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  a n d  D u t i e s  o f  C o n -
t r o l l i n g  S h a r e h o l d e r s - C o m m o n  L a w ,  T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  I n v e s t m e n t  C o m p a n i e s - a n d  a  
P r o p o s a l  f o r  R e f o r m ,  1 2 5  U .  P A .  L .  R E v .  1 0 2 3  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
1 7 7 .  I n  D e B a u n  v .  F i r s t  W .  B a n k  &  T r u s t  C o . ,  4 6  C a l .  A p p .  3 d  6 8 6 ,  1 2 0  C a l .  R p t r .  
5 5 4  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  u p h e l d  a  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  s e l l e r  o f  c o n t r o l  w h e r e  t h e  
c o u r t  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  s e l l e r  b e c a m e  d i r e c t l y  a w a r e  o f  f a c t s  t h a t  w o u l d  h a v e  a l e r t e d  a  p r u -
d e n t  p e r s o n  t h a t  t h e  p u r c h a s e r  w a s  " l i k e l y  t o  l o o t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n . "  / d .  a t  6 9 7 ,  1 2 0  C a l .  
.  R p t r .  a t  3 6 0 .  
1 7 8 .  I n  L e v y  v .  A m e r i c a n  B e v e r a g e  C o r p . ,  t h e  c o u r t  s t a t e d :  
T h e  l a w  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  o n e  t o  a c t  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  w i t h  w h o m  
a  b u s i n e s s  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  e v e n  o f  a  l a r g e  a m o u n t ,  i s  h a d ,  w i l l  c o m m i t  a  f r a u d u l e n t  
o r  c r i m i n a l  a c t  i f  g i v e n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d o  s o .  Q u i t e  t h e  c o n t r a r y  m a y  b e  
a s s u m e d ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a c t u a l  n o t i c e .  
2 6 5  A . D .  2 0 8 ,  2 1 9 ,  3 8  N . Y . S . 2 d  5 1 7 ,  5 2 7  ( 1 9 4 2 ) .  S e e  a l s o  S w i n n e y  v .  K e e b l e r  C o . ,  4 8 0  
F . 2 d  5 7 3 ,  5 7 8  ( 4 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 3 ) .  
1 7 9 .  M c D a n i e l  v .  P a i n t e r ,  4 1 8  F . 2 d  5 4 5 ,  5 4 7  ( l O t h  C i r .  1 9 6 9 ) .  
1 8 0 .  S c h e d u l e  1 4  D - 1 ,  1 7  C . F . R .  §  2 4 0 . 1 4 d - 1  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
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grounds to suspect that the acquiror will engage in corporate looting or 
other waste. In the absence of legitimate concerns by target management 
about either of these potentialities, considering as well questions of 
magnitude and subsequent availability of judicial relief, fractionalized 
shareholders acting as a collective majority should have no additional 
impediments placed upon their judgments regarding transference of 
shares. Corporate interests and remaining minority shareholders require 
no greater protection in the context of collective, rather than unitary, 
decisionmaking. Employing such a conclusion as the premise of the sale 
of control analogue, it is appropriate to examine specific defensive 
measures in light of the analogue standard. 
C. Applicatz"on of the Sale of Control Analogue to Defensive Measures 
Evaluating specific defensive measures in the perspective of relatively 
circumscribed common-law restraints on the sale of control indicates that 
some defensive tactics are consistent with alienability rights accorded con-
trol shares, while other measures unreasonably impinge upon transfer-
ability and exceed protections developed at common law. In particular, 
the sale of control analogue may be examined with regard to the follow-
ing defensive techniques. 
1. Amendments to Articles of Incorporation 
A controlling shareholder is not likely to be faced with charter or 
by-law restraints that may impede the sale of control. It would be quite 
extraordinary to expect the controlling shareholder to tie his own hands or 
limit his own transferability by charter provisions requiring supermajority 
votes in excess of his own voting strength. What the controlling 
shareholder is unlikely to impose upon himself is nevertheless imposed 
upon a fractionalized minority through supermajority provisions that 
effectively preclude the possibility of merger and therefore create in 
management or recalcitrant shareholders a virtual veto over unwanted 
tender offers. 181 
The justification for supermajority voting restraints imposed by 
charter amendment is their adoption by the shareholders, who 
presumably have knowledge of the effect that such provisions will have in 
discouraging potential tender offerors. 182 This justification, however, 
does not address a more fundamental issue: what protections are appro-
priate to assure that supermajority provisions do not unreasonably 
restrict future conduct desired by a majority of the shareholders? 
181. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. 
182. The SEC requires through proxy regulation a justification by management of 
charter amendments that would impede or discourage tender offer efforts. Exchange Act 
Release 34-15230, Oct. 13, 1978 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 
81, 7 48. The disclosure requirement has not proven a deterrent to management in the 
pursuit of such antitender offer measures. 
TENDER OFFERS 
Although such provisions are gm1 
of shareholders pursuant to statut( 
ment or repeal requires a superm3; 
merger requirement. m The effeo 
locked into the supermajority pre 
be the "dead hand" of prior share] 
but sold their shares long before tl 
didate. 185 The result of superm 
perhaps no longer identifiable, m.' 
ferent circumstances has effectt 
without management approval. I 
utilize corporate machinery to iru 
Although corporate codes u 
sions, it may be questioned wheth1 
provisions to be adopted by any~ 
percentage. 187 The eighty perceJl 
183. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ~~ 
followed by approval by "a majority of tl 
The articles of incorporation may requ 
Imposing a supermajority voti~~ n;quil 
would impose a substantial sohotauon I 
those with diverse, highly fragmented Sh 
184. See note 25 supra and accompal 
185. The "dead hand" argument is 
restrictive charter provisions occurs dw 
La baton v. Universal Leaf Tabacco Co~ 
, 96,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Although s1i 
cumstances is equivalent to a rejection c 
require supermajority approval as the pl 
186. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHC 
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (19~~ 
sions. 
are contrary to the basic principle 
incumbent management to control 
port of its shareholders. In addition 
of the majority into what may be c 
permitting that minority to block sij 
supported by a majority of the shal 
Jd. at 195. In what is surely an aberra1 
Home Corporation recommended to its. 
majority provision adopted a~ ~ de£~ 
ment noted that the supermaJonty proVI 
consistent with the Company's current 
corporate governance .... In addition, 1 
of management . . . . " The proxy state. 
at 390-41,-42. 
187. Whether supermajority provisic 
majority vote has not been directly liti.j 
propriety of these charter an? by:la~ ; 
cern or with respect to compliance With 
18, at 13 (footnote omitted). Indeed, 
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i l l  e n g a g e  i n  c o r p o r a t e  l o o t i n g  o r  
e  c o n c e r n s  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  
c o n s i d e r i n g  a s  w e l l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
f  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e l i e f ,  f r a c t i o n a l i z e d  
\ i < > r i t y  s h o u l d  h a v e  n o  a d d i t i o n a l  
m e n t s  r e g a r d i n g  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  
i n g  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  r e q u i r e  
f  c o l l e c t i v e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  u n i t a r y ,  
t c l u s i o n  a s  t h e  p r e m i s e  o f  t h e  s a l e  
: e  t o  e x a m i n e  s p e c i f i c  d e f e n s i v e  
d a r d .  
r  A~logue t o  D e f e n s i v e  M e a s u r e s  
l l r e s  i n  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  
n  t h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
h  a l i e n a b i l i t y  r i g h t s  a c c o r d e d  c o n -
~asonably i m p i n g e  u p o n  t r a n s f e r -
~ a t  c o m m o n  l a w .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
! D n i n e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w -
~les o f  I n c o r p o r a t i o n  
l i k e l y  t o  b e  f a c e d  w i t h  c h a r t e r  o r  
s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l .  I t  w o u l d  b e  q u i t e  
s h a r e h o l d e r  t o  t i e  h i s  o w n  h a n d s  o r  
p ! o v i s i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  s u p e r m a  j o r i t y  
s t r e n g t h .  W h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  
n  h i m s e l f  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  i m p o s e d  
g h  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  
m e r g e r  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  c r e a t e  i n  
L e r s  a  v i r t u a l  v e t o  o v e r  u n w a n t e d  
i t y  v o t i n g  r e s t r a i n t s  i m p o s e d  b y  
: i o n  b y  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  w h o  
c t  t h a t  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  w i l l  h a v e  i n  
s .
1 1 1  
T h i s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r , .  
i s s u e :  w h a t  p r o t e c t i o n s  a r e  a p p r o - .  
p r o v i s i o n s  d o  n o t  u n r e a s o n a b l y ·  
i l  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ?  
i n g  t e x t .  
u l a t i o n  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  
c o u r a g e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  e f f o r t s .  E x c h a n g e  
I S f c r  B i n d e r ]  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  
> r o v e n  a  d e t e r r e n t  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 1 7  
A l t h o u g h  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  a d o p t e d  b y  o n l y  a  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  
o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  p u r s u a n t  t o  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n ,  
1 8 3  
a n y  a t t e m p t e d  a m e n d -
m e n t  o r  r e p e a l  r e q u i r e s  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  
m e r g e r  r e q u i r e m e n t .
1 8 4  
T h e  e f f e c t i v e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  f u t u r e  m a j o r i t i e s  a r e  
l o c k e d  i n t o  t h e  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n ,  u n a b l e  t o  o v e r c o m e  w h a t  m a y  
b e  t h e  " d e a d  h a n d "  o f  p r i o r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w h o  a p p r o v e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  
b u t  s o l d  t h e i r  s h a r e s  l o n g  b e f o r e  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a  v i a b l e  a c q u i r i n g  c a n -
d i d a t e . 1 8 5  T h e  r e s u l t  o f  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  i s  t h a t  a  s h i f t i n g ,  
p e r h a p s  n o  l o n g e r  i d e n t i f i a b l e ,  m a j o r i t y  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a c t i n g  i n  f a r  d i f -
f e r e n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  h a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e c l u d e d  c u r r e n t  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  
w i t h o u t  m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o v a l .  I n e f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  t h u s  a b l e  t o  
u t i l i z e  c o r p o r a t e  m a c h i n e r y  t o  i n s u l a t e  i t s e l f  f r o m  c h a l l e n g e .  
1 8 6  
A l t h o u g h  c o r p o r a t e  c o d e s  u n i v e r s a l l y  p e r m i t  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i -
s i o n s ,  i t  m a y  b e  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  s t a t u t o r y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  p e r m i t s  s u c h  
p r o v i s i o n s  t o  b e  a d o p t e d  b y  a n y  v o t e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  p r o p o s e d  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  
p e r c e n t a g e .
1 8 7  
T h e  e i g h t y  p e r c e n t  p r o v i s i o n  o f  G u l t o n  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .  
18~. E . g . ,  D E L .  C O D E  A N N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  2 4 2 ( c ) ( 1 )  ( S u p p .  1 9 7 8 )  ( r e q u i r e s  b o a r d  a p p r o v a l  
f o l l o w e d  b y  a p p r o v a l  b y  " a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  s t o c k  e n t i t l e d  t o  v o t e  t h e r e o n . " ) .  
T h e  a r t i c l e s  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  m a y  r e q u i r e  a  g r e a t e r  v o t e  t h a n  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  s t a n d a r d .  
I m p o s i n g  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t  u p o n  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  c h a r t e r  p r o p o s a l  
w o u l d  i m p o s e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s o l i c i t a t i o n  b u r d e n  f o r  n u m e r o u s  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h o s e  w i t h  d i v e r s e ,  h i g h l y  f r a g m e n t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r  g r o u p s .  
1 8 4 .  S e e  n o t e  2 5  s u p r a  a n d  a c c o m p a n y i n g  t e x t .  
1 8 5 .  T h e  " d e a d  h a n d "  a r g u m e n t  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  w h e r e  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  
r e s t r i c t i v e  c h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  o c c u r s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  
L a b a t o n  v .  U n i v e r s a l  L e a f T a b a c c o  C o . ,  [ 1 9 7 9  T r a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  
,  96,94~ ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 7 9 ) .  A l t h o u g h  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  a m e n d m e n t s  i n  s u c h  c i r -
c u m s t a n c e s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  a d o p t i o n  s h o u l d  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
r e q u i r e  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  a p p r o v a l  a s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  c r e a t e  f u t u r e  p r o p h y l a c t i c  e f f e c t s .  
1 8 6 .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  E .  A R A N O W ,  H .  E I N H O R N  &  G .  B E R L S T E I N ,  D E V E L O P M E N T S  I N  T E N D E R  
O F F E R S  F O R  C O R P O R A T E  C O N T R O L  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  i n  w h i c h  i t  i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i -
s i o n s .  
a r e  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  d e m o c r a c y ,  f o r  t h e y  p e r m i t  
i n c u m b e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  c o n t r o l  a  c o r p o r a t i o n  l o n g  a f t e r  i t  h a s  l o s t  t h e  s u p -
p o r t  o f  i t s  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  .  .  .  [ s u c h ]  p r o v i s i o n s  .  .  .  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  w i l l  
o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n t o  w h a t  m a y  b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  t y r a n n y  o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y ,  b y  
p e r m i t t i n g  t h a t  m i n o r i t y  t o  b l o c k  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t h a t  a r e  
s u p p o r t e d  b y  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
I d .  a t  1 9 5 .  I n  w h a t  i s  s u r e l y  a n  a b e r r a t i o n a l  r e v e r s a l  o f  r o l e s ,  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  U . S .  
H o m e  C o r p o r a t i o n  r e c o m m e n d e d  t o  i t s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  1 9 7 9  t h e  r e p e a l  o f  a  7 5 %  s u p e r -
m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n  a d o p t e d  a s  a  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e  i n  1 9 7 5 .  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  p r o x y  s t a t e -
m e n t  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  " r e f l e c t  a  d e f e n s i v e  p o s t u r e  w h i c h  i s  n e i t h e r  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  C o m p a n y ' s  c u r r e n t  p h i l o s o p h y  n o r  i n  t u n e  w i t h  c u r r e n t  c o n c e p t s  o f  
c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  . . . .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  p l a c e  e x c e s s i v e  p o w e r  i n  t h e  h a n d s  
o f  m a n a g e m e n t  . . . .  "  T h e  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t  i s  e x t r a c t e d  i n  A .  F L E I S C H E R .  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  
a t  ~90-41,-42. 
1 8 7 .  W h e t h e r  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  m a y  b e  v a l i d l y  a d o p t e d  b y  l e s s  t h a n  a  s u p e r -
m a j o r i t y  v o t e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  d i r e c t l y  l i t i g a t e d .  F l e i s c h e r  r e f e r s  t o  " s p a r s e  c a s e  l a w  o n  t h e  
p r o p r i e t y  o f  t h e s e  c h a r t e r  a n d  b y - l a w  a m e n d m e n t s ,  e i t h e r  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  f i d u c i a r y  c o n -
c e r n  o r  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  ' t e c h n i c a l '  p r o v i s i o n s . "  A .  F L E I S C H E R ,  s u p r a  n o t e  
1 8 ,  a t  1~ ( f o o t n o t e  o m i t t e d ) .  I n d e e d ,  " s p a r s e "  i s  a n  o v e r s t a t e m e n t  a s  t o  a n y  d i r e c t  
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was adopted by a fifty-four percent shareholder vote .188 
shareholders in Seibert v. Culton Industn'es did not challenge the 
ciency of the vote. 189 Rather, they focused on the Board of 
discretionary authority to reduce the required percentage vote 
eighty percent to a simple majority by Board approval of a pn:>p<>&e(f. 
takeover prior to the offeror's acquisition of a five percent 
interest. 190 Although the court's decision upholding the alternative 
percentage provision may impliedly be read to support the validity of 
underlying shareholder vote, the validity of that vote was not at issue. 
Delaware precedent may not be lacking should such validity be challenged. 
Cases involving the reduction of prior rights of shareholders indicate the 
inability of one group of shareholders or management to unilaterally 
acquire an improved position relative to nonconsenting shareholders. In 
Telvest, Inc. v-. Olson, 191 a defensive effort by target management to issue 
to all common stockholders preferred shares containing supermajority 
terms for the approval of certain merger, sales of assets, or similar transac-
tions was held to violate plaintiff's voting rights despite plaintiffs equal 
treatment with all other shareholders. 192 The acts of the Board of Directors 
were purportedly consistent with its statutory and charter authority to issue 
preferred shares and set the terms thereof. 195 Nevertheless, this action 
resulted in "an alteration of the voting powers of the common stock"194 such 
that plaintiffs twenty percent interest no longer carried the same strength 
to influence merger votes as existed prior to the issuance of the preferred 
shares. 195 
The Telvest decision suggests that a similar "alteration of voting 
powers" argument may apply to the adoption of supermajority provisions 
by less than a supermajority vote. The adoption in Seibert effectively 
aggrandized a fifty-four percent decision into an eighty percent decision 
that could not be altered without an eighty percent approval. Thus, the 
forty-six percent of the Gulton Industries shareholders who opposed or 
abstained from voting in favor of the supermajority provision must now 
convince not five percent, but an additional thirty-four percent of the 
challenge of validity. The issue of what vote is necessary to adopt a supermajority provi-
sion is discussed in Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law 
Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 545 (1979), but the authors inconclusively suggest only 
that "an element of judgment is involved; a 70% supermajority requirement can prob-
ably be adopted by a smaller stockholder vote than a 90% supermajority requirement." 
/d. at 546. 
188. See Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 79-5631, at 2 (Del. Ch., filed June 21, 
1979). 
189. /d. at 3. 
190. /d. at 3-4. 
191. No. 79-5798 (Del. Ch., filed March 8, 1979). 
192. /d. at 7-8, 14. 
193. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1974). 
194. No. 79-5798 (Del. Ch., filed March 8, 1979). 
195. /d. 
to repeal the provision should 
is a far heavier burden than m 
of the antitakeover provision tb 
Additional statutory support £1 
•c:lCJrptJIOn may be garnered ~ro.m tb 
...,,. .. ,Mna the same supermaJOnty VCl 
provision.I9& The legislative 
by an earlier group of sh; 
require supermajority approval I 
tides of any lesser numl 
this legislative policy ~.con~a 
adoption of the proVIsiOn lik 
simple majority,. but ~as 
knowingly tmposmg 
. rs 197 
!K&oauo .... ~ VOtlflg powe • 
Insistence upon a vote in~xces 
without precedent. In Sear 
.. n,nT~\v:~ of a charter amendment-~ 
of··in1terest ramifications was rejecte 
interested shareholders. The votes 
trolled notwithstanding the fact th 
total v~te was in opposition to the. 
based entirely on equitable groun~ 
. the nonrecognition of the votes of I 
196. See note 25 supra. :-; 
197. If a supermajority vote _for adoJ 
. through reincorporation, ~equinng only_ 
already written into the articles of the ~ 
• to challenge, however, as lacking a leg~~ 
of the higher shareholder approval that ,_ 
198. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954). 
interested shareholders, the amendment r 
the 61,351 votes required to achi~ve a stat 
been unduly harsh in not reducmg the 
shares of noninterested sharehold~. A¥ 
grounds was made even clearer m the 
approval by the majority of the ~t~khold 
the principles of equity' is not bmding UJ 
v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330, 35 
199. See 212 F.2d at 397. . 
200. See Cary, Corporate Devtces Us• 
(1970). Cary states: . ' 
I raise the quesuon · · · whether ~ 
super-majority requirement. Certlll 
lead me to say that it is invalid. I do 
ticularly relating to the ~e:W York .a 
more than so-called maJonty requm 
that such a provision can only be c 
/d. at 840. Professor Cary presumably h 
O W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  
n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  v o t e .  
1 8 8  
P l a i n t i f f  
u s t n ' e s  d i d  n o t  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  s u f f i -
I C U S e d  o n  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s '  
e  r e q u i r e d  p e r c e n t a g e  v o t e  f r o m  
~y B o a r d  a p p r o v a l  o f  a  p r o p o s e d  
l l i s i t i o n  o f  a  f i v e  p e r c e n t  s t o c k  
c i s i o n  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
·  r e a d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  
l i t y  o f  t h a t  v o t e  w a s  n o t  a t  i s s u e .  
s h o u l d  s u c h  v a l i d i t y  b e  c h a l l e n g e d .  
r i g h t s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n d i c a t e  t h e  
: s  o r  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  u n i l a t e r a l l y  
t o  r t o n c o n s e n t i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  I n  
f o r t  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  i s s u e  
l .  s h a r e s  c o n t a i n i n g  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  
r : s a l e s  o f  a s s e t s ,  o r  s i m i l a r  t r a n s a c -
l n g  r i g h t s  d e s p i t e  p l a i n t i f f s  e q u a l  
I  T h e  a c t s  o f  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  
! ! o r y  a n d  c h a r t e r  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i s s u e  
~f.m N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h i s  a c t i o n  
) W e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m o n  s t o c k "  
1 9 4  
s u c h  
o  l o n g e r  c a r r i e d  t h e  s a m e  s t r e n g t h  
[ ) r  to~ t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  
t t  a  s i m i l a r  " a l t e r a t i o n  o f  v o t i n g .  
) . p t i o n  o f  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  
t~adoption i n  S e i b e r t  e f f e c t i v e l y  
m - i n t o  a n  e i g h t y  p e r c e n t  d e c i s i o n  
g h t y  p e r c e n t  a p p r o v a l .  T h u s ,  t h e  
o i e s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w h o  o p p o s e d  o r  
u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n  m u s t  n o w  
i t i o n a l  t h i r t y - f o u r  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
a e c e s s a r y  t o  a d o p t  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i -
r c t i n g  T a k e o v e r s :  C h a r t e r  a n d  B y - L a w .  
t  t h e  a u t h o r s  i n c o n c l u s i v e l y  s u g g e s t  o n l y  
%  s u p e n n a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  c a n  p r o b -
b a n  a  9 0 %  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  
7 9 - 5 6 3 1 ,  a t  2  ( D e L  C h . ,  f i l e d  J u n e  2 1 ,  
9 7 9 ) .  
9 7 9 ) .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 1 9  
s h a r e s  t o  r e p e a l  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  s h o u l d  a n  a t t r a c t i v e  m e r g e r  p a r t n e r  a p p e a r .  
T h i s  i s  a  f a r  h e a v i e r  b u r d e n  t h a n  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  t a s k  o f  a c h i e v i n g  a d o p -
t i o n  o f  t h e  a n t i t a k e o v e r  p r o v i s i o n  t h r o u g h  o n l y  a  f i f t y - f o u r  p e r c e n t  v o t e .  
A d d i t i o n a l  s t a t u t o r y  s u p p o r t  f o r  r e q u i r i n g  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t e  o f  
a d o p t i o n  m a y  b e  g a r n e r e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  s o m e  c o r p o r a t e  c o d e s  
r e q u i r i n g  t h e  s a m e  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t e  t o  a l t e r ,  a m e n d ,  o r  r e p e a l  t h e  p a r -
t i c u l a r  p r o v i s i o n .
1 9 6  
T h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o l i c y  t h u s  r e f l e c t e d  i s  t h a t  a  m a t t e r  
c o n s i d e r e d  b y  a n  e a r l i e r  g r o u p  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i m p o r t a n t  
t o  r e q u i r e  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  a p p r o v a l  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s h i f t i n g ,  
s u b s e q u e n t  t i d e s  o f  a n y  l e s s e r  n u m b e r .  I t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  
r e g a r d  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o l i c y  a s  c o n t a i n i n g  a n  i m p l i c i t  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  l i k e w i s e  w a s  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  t e m p o r a r y ,  
s h i f t i n g ,  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y ,  b u t  w a s  i n s t e a d  t h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  c h o i c e  o f  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  k n o w i n g l y  i m p o s i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  u p o n  t h e i r  s t a t u t o r i l y  
g r a n t e d  v o t i n g  p o w e r s .
1 9 7  
I n s i s t e n c e  u p o n  a  v o t e  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h e  m i n i m u m  s t a t u t o r y  s t a n d a r d  i s  
n o t  w i t h o u t  p r e c e d e n t .  I n  S e a g r a v e  C o r p .  v .  M o u n t  , 1
9 8  
s h a r e h o l d e r  
a p p r o v a l  o f  a  c h a r t e r  a m e n d m e n t  h a v i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r o l  a n d  c o n f l i c t -
o f - i n t e r e s t  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  w a s  r e j e c t e d  b y  t h e  c o u r t  d i s r e g a r d i n g  t h e  v o t e s  o f  
i n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  T h e  v o t e s  o f  t h e  n o n i n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  c o n -
t r o l l e d ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n l y  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  s i x  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  v o t e  w a s  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t .  
1 9 9  
T h e  c o u r t ' s  a c t i o n  w a s  
b a s e d  e n t i r e l y  o n  e q u i t a b l e  g r o u n d s ,  a s  n o  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  e x i s t e d  f o r  
t h e  n o n r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  v o t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
2 0 0  
1 9 6 .  S e e  n o t e  2 5  s u p r a .  
1 9 7 .  I f  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  v o t e  f o r  a d o p t i o n  w e r e  t h e  n o r m ,  e v a s i o n  m a y  b e  s o u g h t  
t h r o u g h  r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  r e q u i r i n g  o n l y  a  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  w i t h  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  
a l r e a d y  w r i t t e n  i n t o  t h e  a r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  s u r v i v o r  c o r p o r a t i o n .  S u c h  e f f o r t s  m i g h t  b e  s u b j e c t  
t o  c h a l l e n g e ,  h o w e v e r ,  a s  l a c k i n g  a  l e g i t i m a t e  b u s i n e s s  p u r p o s e  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  a v o i d a n c e  
o f  t h e  h i g h e r  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  t h a t  w o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  b e  r e q u i r e d .  
1 9 8 .  2 1 2  F . 2 d  3 8 9  ( 6 t h  C i r .  1 9 5 4 ) .  D i s r e g a r d i n g  t h e  4 3 , 0 0 0  s h a r e s  v o t e d  b y  t h e  
' i n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  r e c e i v e d  5 3 , 9 7 9  a f f i r m a t i v e  v o t e s ,  f a l l i n g  s h o r t  o f  
t h e  6 1 , 3 5 1  v o t e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  a c h i e v e  a  s t a t u t o r y  m a j o r i t y .  I  d .  a t  3 9 7 .  T h e  c o u r t  m a y  h a v e  
b e e n  u n d u l y  h a r s h  i n  n o t  r e d u c i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  m a j o r i t y  t o  a  f i g u r e  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  
s h a r e s  o f  n o n i n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  A v o i d a n c e  o f  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  s t a n d a r d  o n  e q u i t a b l e  
g r o u n d s  w a s  m a d e  e v e n  c l e a r e r  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  o p i n i o n ,  w h i c h  s t a t e d  t h a t  " t h e  
a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  p l a n  w h i c h  i s  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  e q u i t y ,  i s  n o t  b i n d i n g  u p o n  t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n . "  M o u n t  
v .  S e a g r a v e  C o r p . ,  1 1 2  F .  S u p p .  3 3 0 ,  3 3 4  ( S . D .  O h i o  1 9 5 3 ) .  
1 9 9 .  S e e  2 1 2  F . 2 d  a t  3 9 7 .  
2 0 0 .  S e e  C a r y ,  C o r p o r a t e  D e v i c e s  U s e d  t o  I n s u l a t e  M a n a g e m e n t ,  2 5  B u s .  L A W .  8 3 9  
( 1 9 7 0 ) .  C a r y  s t a t e s :  
I  r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  .  .  .  w h e t h e r  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  .  .  .  m a y  c r e a t e  a  
s u p e r - m a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  C e r t a i n l y  I  h a v e  n o  a c t u a l  c a s e  i n  m i n d  t h a t  w o u l d  
l e a d  m e  t o  s a y  t h a t  i t  i s  i n v a l i d .  I  d o  h a v e  i n  m i n d  s o m e  s t a t u t e s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  p a r -
t i c u l a r l y  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  B u s i n e s s  C o r p o r a t i o n  A c t ,  w h i c h  p e r m i t s  [ s i c ]  
m o r e  t h a n  s o - c a l l e d  m a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s .  T h e y  i n  e f f e c t  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  s u c h  a  p r o v i s i o n  c a n  o n l y  b e  c r e a t e d  b y  a  s u p e r · m a j o r i t y  a s  w e l l .  
a t  8 4 0 .  P r o f e s s o r  C a r y  p r e s u m a b l y  h a d  i n  m i n d §  6 1 6  o f  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  B u s i n e s s  C o r -
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Corporate democracy as a means of reflecting changing consensus, 
as well as the need to facilitate corporate response to altered conditions, 
are objectives frustrated by supermajority charter provisions that prevent 
a majority shareholder interest from acting. Turnover rates among 
shareholders within particular corporations may not be readily available, 
but it is reasonable to surmise that for many corporations an active 
market will have the cumulative, relatively frequent effect of a change in 
identity and a significant shift in percentage of ownership of shares. 201 
The transient nature of stock ownership, coupled with the evanescent 
quality of a majority block of shares, suggest the need for substantial 
safeguards before past judgments are permitted to preclude current deci-
sions favored by a majority of shareholders. Supermajority provisions 
may render shareholders-and even management-powerless to react to 
changed economic conditions, however material their impact. The 
amending process is intended to facilitate timely corporate reaction to 
fluctuating conditions; it is not a process designed for strangulating 
obstinacy or enshrining irrevocable veto rights. If supermajority provi-
sions are to be permitted, minimum safeguards and policy concerns sup-
port the requirement of adoption by no less than an equally supermajority 
vote. 202 
2. Issuance of Shares 
In the absence of an announced or threatened takeover effort, deci-
sions by target management to issue shares to ESOTs, employees, suppliers, 
or other third parties are appropriately evaluated by such standards as con· 
flict of interest, adequacy of consideration, reasonableness in light of 
capital structure, and similar traditional concerns. Where the issuance has 
poration law which, unlike the simple majority provision for other charter amendments, 
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 803 (McKinney Supp. 1980), requires a two-thirds approval for 
charter amendments that increase statutorily prescribed voting majorities. /d. § 616 
(McKinney 1963). An indirect effort to dissuade the adoption of supermajority provisions 
is the position of the Wisconsin Department of Securities that it may not permit the 
registration of shares by any corporation whose charter contains a supermajority provi-
sion. Bartell, WiSconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1468 (1977). This 
administrative judgment does not go to the validity or invalidity of such provisions but 
appears premised upon a notion of fairness to the holders of equity securities. 
201. A 1971 SEC study of institutional investor trading indicated a steady annual rise 
in block trades of 10,000 shares or more, with over 15,000 of such trades occurring in 
1970. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM· 
MISSION, REPORT 1546, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, at 1546, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
202. Policy concerns militating against supermajority provisions suggest an argument 
of per se invalidity rather than, as proposed in this Article, requiring that such provisions 
·gamer supermajority approval. Per se invalidity, however, faces the insuperable burden 
of universal statutory recognition of the right of shareholders to adopt voting require-
ments in excess of statutory minimums. Indeed such may be the preferred course in some 
circumstances, for example close corporations. This Article has therefore adopted a more 
limited, pragmatic approach, one that is believed to be consistent with both statutory and 
policy concerns. 
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s  o f  r e f l e c t i n g  c h a n g i n g  c o n s e n s u s ,  
r a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  a l t e r e d  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
d t y  c h a r t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  p r e v e n t  
n  a c t i n g .  T u r n o v e r  r a t e s  a m o n g  
t t i o n s  m a y  n o t  b e  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  
f o r  m a n y  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a n  a c t i v e  
i v e l y  f r e q u e n t  e f f e c t  o f  a  c h a n g e  i n  .  
c e n t a g e  o f  o w n e r s h i p  o f  s h a r e s .  t o l  
h i p ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  e v a n e s c e n t  
,  s u g g e s t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  s u b s t a n t i a } .  
l e l l i l i t t e d  t o  p r e c l u d e  c u r r e n t  
h o l « j l e r s .  S u p e r m a j o r i t y  
t a n a g e m e n t - p o w e r l e s s  t o  r e a c t  
v e r  m a t e r i a l  t h e i r  i m p a c t .  
i t _ a t e  t i m e l y  c o r p o r a t e  r e a c t i o n  
r o c e s s  d e s i g n e d  f o r  
~to r i g h t s .  I f  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  
f e g u a r d s  a n d  p o l i c y  c o n c e r n s  
~than a n  e q u a l l y  
i f  S h a r e s  
n h r e a t e n e d  t a k e o v e r  e f f o r t ,  
e s t o E S O T s ,  e m p l o y e e s ,  s u p p u e n  . .  
v a l u a t e d  b y  s u c h  s t a n d a r d s  a s  
a t i o n ,  r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  i n  l i g h t  
C 4 m c e r n s .  W h e r e  t h e  i s s u a n c e  
p r o v i s i o n  f o r  o t h e r  c h a r t e r  a m e n d m e n t t  
1 9 8 0 ) ,  r e q u i r e s  a  t w o - t h i r d s  a p p r o v a l  
p r e s c r i b e d  v o t i n g  m a j o r i t i e s .  I d .  §  
t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  p r o v i s ; , .  . . .  
• f  S e c u r i t i e s  t h a t  i t  m a y  n o t  p e r m i t  
,  c h a r t e r  c o n t a i n s  a  s u p e r m a j o r i t y  
~ B u s .  L A W .  1 4 6 5 ,  1 4 6 8  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
i d i t y  o r  i n v a l i d i t y  o f  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  
~e h o l d e r s  o f  e q u i t y  s e c u r i t i e s .  
> r  t r a d i n g  i n d i c a t e d  a  s t e a d y  a n n u a l  
o v e r  1 5 , 0 0 0  o f  s u c h  t r a d e s  o c c u r r i n g  
O F  T H E  S E C U R I T I E S  A N D  E X C H A N G E  
t  1 5 4 6 ,  9 2 n d  C o n g . ,  1 s t  S e s s .  ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
n a j o r i t y  p r o v i s i o n s  s u g g e s t  a n  a r g u m e d i  
i s  A r t i c l e ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  s u c h  n r n . n . ; , . . . ,  
,  h o w e v e r ,  f a c e s  t h e  i n s u p e r a  
f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  a d o p t  v o t i n g  
t c h  m a y  b e  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  c o u r s e  i n  
l t i s o A r t i c l e  h a s  t h e r e f o r e  a d o p t e d  a  
t o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  b o t h  s t a t u t o r y  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 2 1  
n o t  e f f e c t e d  a  m a t e r i a l  s h i f t  i n  c o n t r o l ,  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a c t i o n  m a y  b e  
a c c o r d e d  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r e s u m p t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  a n y  p r e s u m p t i o n  f a v o r i n g  
m a n a g e m e n t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e l i e f ,  i f  a p p r o -
p r i a t e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  r i g h t  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  c h a n g e  m a n a g e -
m e n t  i f  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  i t s  u s e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  p o w e r .  
A  d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  c o n c e r n s  a r i s e s  w h e n  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s  a f f e c t s  
c o n t r o l  o r  i s  c o n c u r r e n t  w i t h  a n  a n n o u n c e d  o r  t h r e a t e n e d  t a k e o v e r  
e f f o r t .  
2 0 8  
T h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e  m a y  p r o v i d e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
g u i d a n c e .  A  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  f a c e d  w i t h  a  p r e m i u m  o f f e r  f o r  t h e  
p u r c h a s e  o f  h i s  s h a r e s  w o u l d  b e  u n l i k e l y  t o  c a u s e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  i s s u e  
s h a r e s  t h a t  m i g h t  c r e a t e  a  v e t o  b l o c k  o v e r  a n y  e v e n t u a l  m e r g e r  o r  o t h e r  
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .  E v e n  i f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  o f f e r  i s  n o t  f a v o r e d ,  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t ,  n e g a t i v e  b l o c k  d i m i n i s h e s  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  f u t u r e ,  p o t e n -
t i a l l y  m o r e  f a v o r a b l e  o f f e r s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  p e r m i t  i n d i v i d u a l ,  n o n c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  e n j o y  
r i g h t s  o f  t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  a  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r ,  a  c o r p o r a t e  
i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s  d u r i n g  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  t i m e  f r a m e ,  o r  a n y  i s s u a n c e  o t h e r -
w i s e  m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c t i n g  c o n t r o l ,  s h o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  o f  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  S u c h  a p p r o v a l  w o u l d  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  
2 0 3 .  T h e  s h i f t  i n  e v a l u a t i v e  c o n t e x t  b e t w e e n  c o n t r o l  a n d  n o n c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n s  i s  
i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s . ,  I n c .  v .  B . F .  G o o d r i c h  C o . ,  3 0 1  F .  S u p p .  7 0 6  ( N . D .  I l l .  
1 9 6 9 ) .  I n  1 9 6 5 ,  G o o d r i c h  a n d  G u l f  C h e m i c a l s ,  I n c . ,  e n g a g e d  i n  a  j o i n t  v e n t u r e ,  c o n -
s i d e r e d  h a v i n g  o n e  p a r t y  b u y  o u t  t h e  o t h e r ' s  i n t e r e s t  b u t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f a i l e d  f o r  l a c k  o f  
a g r e e m e n t  o n  p r i c e .  I d .  a t  7 0 8 .  S u c h  p r o s p e c t  a p p a r e n t l y  w a s  n o t  r a i s e d  a g a i n  u n t i l  
J a n u a r y  1 9 6 9  w h e n  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s t r i e s  a n n o u n c e d  i t s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  m a k e  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
f o r  G o o d r i c h  s h a r e s .  I d .  N e g o t i a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  G o o d r i c h  a n d  G u l f  i m m e d i a t e l y  r e c o m -
m e n c e d ,  a n d  a f t e r  o n l y  o n e  d a y  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  G o o d r i c h  a g r e e d  t o  b u y  o u t  G u l f s  i n t e r e s t  
b y  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  G o o d r i c h  c o m m o n  s t o c k  f o r  G u l f s  s h a r e .  I d .  T h e  
c o u r t  n o t e d  t h a t  " a l t h o u g h  t h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  b o t h  G o o d r i c h  a n d  G u l f  c l a i m  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
m u t u a l  a g r e e m e n t  t o  d e f e a t  p l a i n t i f f s  t a k e o v e r  b i d ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  r e m a r k a b l e  e m p a t h y  
b e t w e e n  t h e  c o m p a n i e s . "  I d .  a t  7 1 2 .  D e s p i t e  t h e s e  " r e m a r k a b l e "  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e  c o u r t  
a p p l i e d  t r a d i t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  s t a n d a r d s  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  i s s u a n c e  o f  
s h a r e s ,  t o t a l l y  i g n o r i n g  t h e  d y n a m i c s  o f  t h e  b a t t l e  f o r  c o n t r o l  a n d  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s u c h  i s s u -
a n c e  u p o n  t h e  e n t r e n c h m e n t  o f  G o o d r i c h  m a n a g e m e n t .  I d . ;  s e e  n o t e  8 7  s u p r a .  B u s i n e s s  
j u d g m e n t  p r e s u m p t i o n s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  v a l i d l y  i n v o k e d  h a d  t h e  1 9 6 5  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e e n  
c o n c l u d e d  a n d  c h a l l e n g e d ,  b u t  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a  1 9 6 9  t e n d e r  o f f e r  b a t t l e  s u c h  p r e s u m p -
t i o n s  w e r e  u n d u l y  c h a r i t a b l e  t o  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t .  F a i r l y  u n u s u a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w e r e  
p r e s e n t  i n  C r o u s e - H i n d s  C o .  v .  I n t e r n o r t h  I n c . ,  N o .  8 0 - 7 8 6 5  ( 2 d  C i r .  N o v .  1 4 ,  1 9 8 0 ) ,  i n  
w h i c h  C r o u s e - H i n d s  f o u n d  i t s e l f  t h e  t a r g e t  o f  a n  u n w a n t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  i t s  
a n n o u n c e d  p r o p o s e d  m e r g e r  w i t h  B e l d e n  C o r p .  S e e  n o t e  1 3 3  s u p r a .  T h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  
. d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  j u d g m e n t  p r e s u m p t i o n  p r o t e c t e d  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  
t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  g o  f o r w a r d  w i t h  t h e  m e r g e r ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  m e r g e r ' s  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  u p o n  t h e  
p r o p o s e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  T h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  i n  i t s  n a r r o w  c o n t e x t ,  f o r  t h e  m e r e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s h o u l d  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  a s  t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  
m e a s u r e s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  p r i o r  a p p r o v e d  p l a n s .  U s i n g  a  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e ,  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  m e r g e  w a s  p u r s u a n t  t o  a u t h o r i t y  a c k n o w l e d g e d  b y  C r o u s e -
H i n d s  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  A s  l o n g  a s  m a n a g e m e n t  w a s  a c t i n g  i n  g o o d  f a i t h  a n d  w i t h o u t  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  a n  i m m i n e n t  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  b u s i n e s s  r e g u l a r i t y  s h o u l d  n o t  
b e  a v o i d e d  s i m p l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a r e  n o w  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
o p p o r t u n i t y .  
.J 
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the reasons and consequences of the issuance of shares, including the 
potential inhibiting of pending or imminent tender offers. 2°4 While 
shareholder votes may be strongly influenced by management's control of 
the proxy machinery, shareholder consciousness will be considerably 
elevated by full disclosure in a tender offer context. A decision in such 
circumstances to issue additional shares to third parties who may be 
antagonistic to the tender offer is equivalent to a collective rejection of, 
or at least a judgment to impede, the offer. The sale of control analogue 
thus premises shareholder approval of the issuance of shares upon two 
factors: the recognition that an issuance of shares may effectively under· 
cut or preclude a tender offer from proceeding, and a model that regards 
individual shareholders as possessing the right to make a collective judg-
ment equivalent to the right enjoyed by a single control shareholder or 
group of dominant shareholders.2°5 
Focusing upon shareholder approval and disclosure aspects would 
relieve courts from the mysteries of determining "primary" purposes or 
the bona fides of stated management concerns. The advantage of an 
alternative approach is illustrated by Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen. 206 
Although the plaintiff shareholder owned fifty-two percent of the out-
standing shares, it did not control the Board of Directors at the time the 
Board chose to issue a substantial block of shares that would have reduced 
plaintiff's holding to thirty-four percent and shifted control to the cor-
porate president. 207 Relying upon a "primary purpose" approach,2°8 the 
court concluded that the purported basis for issuance of the shares, an 
204. In instances where a tender offer has not yet been made for purposes of the 
Williams Act, the inchoate nature of the offer should not excuse a lack of full disclosure 
of all the information relevant to such potential offer. Nondisclosure of such information 
may well violate rule 14(a)-9 of the proxy regulations. At state court levels, it may be 
hoped that the notions of nondisclosure have.advanced beyond the limited view expressed . 
in America~ Hard.ware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (Sup. 
Ct. 1957), m wh1ch the court concluded that a potential tender offer was "wholly 
unrelated" to the proposed issuance of shares for which stockholder approval was sought, · 
thereby denying plaintiffs request for an injunction based upon the inadequacy of the 
proxy statement to disclose the potential tender offer. /d. at 64, 136 A.2d at 693. · 
205. Shareholder approval of the issuance or repurchase of shares in a defensive con-
text would not preclude minority shareholder objections based upon traditional grounds 
such as insufficiency of consideration received for shares issued or excessive consideration 
for shares repurchased. Nothing short of unanimous shareholder consent would preclude 
such actions. See Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 74, 90 A.2d 652, 
656 (1952). 
206. 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976). 
207. /d. at 206. 
208. The court reasoned: 
It is basic, of course, that directors or officers who cause unissued or treasury 
shares to be issued to themselves or others solely for the purpose of obtaining or 
maintaining control of the corporation breach their fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders. 
Id. at 207. 
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extinguishment of a debt < 
undermined by serious ques 
debt, 2°9 These deficiencies 
rather than the bona fides <l 
The unfortunate implicati 
established, the shift in co 
shareholder objection. lfdil 
ment considerations when~ 
the extinguishment of a lt1 
upon control or the availabi 
Mandating shareholder app1 
tender offer contexts, avo 
"primary," "sole," "bona ficl 
Shareholder approval ,t 
tender offers is the accepted 
on Take-Overs and Meqe 
Code, regarded as "good sfal 
vision that, during the pend« 
may be taken by the Boar( 
"could effectively result in a 
shareholders of the offeree 
decide on its merits."l15 T 
209. /d. 
210. /d. at 207-08. ~ 
211. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380, 
212. The duality of the fiducil 
Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen,~ 
it was in the best interests of all stO< 
the ice show business of the defend 
terminate Mr. Scallen." Id. at 207 
shareholders would be harmed by a 
ment appropriate within the fiPucil 
fiduciary concern with corporate WI 
limitation upon measures taken to J 
concepts is not resolved except by ; 
21S. The City Code, which does 
commercial behavior in the securitl 
Working Party, a representative boc 
the governors of the Bank of Englan 
of tender offers and mergers. THE C 
1976). 
214. /d. at 4. 
215. /d. General Principle No.4, 
At no time after a bona fide of 
offeree company or after the bo 
that a bona fide offer might be i 
of the offeree company in relat 
approval in general meeting of I 
could effectively result in any 
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i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
m m i n e n t  t e n d e r  o f f e r s .  
2 0
•  W h i l e  
1 e n c e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o n t r o l  o f  
m s c i o u s n e s s  w i l l  b e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
o f f e r  c o n t e x t .  A  d e c i s i o n  i n  s u c h  
r e s  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  w h o  m a y  b e  
i v a l e n t  t o  a  c o l l e c t i v e  r e j e c t i o n  o f ,  
1 f f e r .  T h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e  
~ t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s  u p o n  t w o  
: e  o f  s h a r e s  m a y  e f f e c t i v e l y  u n d e r -
c e e d i n g ,  a n d  a  m o d e l  t h a t  r e g a r d s  
l e  r i g h t  t o  m a k e  a  c o l l e c t i v e  j u d g -
, y  f i .  s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r  o r  
~~ a n d  d i s c l o s u r e  a s p e c t s  w o u l d  
t e r m i n i n g  " p r i m a r y "  p u r p o s e s  o r  
- c o n c e r n s .  T h e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  a n  
i c a g o  S t a d i u m  C o r p .  v .  S c a l l e n .  z o e  
! l e d  f i f t y - t w o  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  o u t -
~ard o f  D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  
o f  s h a r e s  t h a t  w o u l d  h a v e  r e d u c e d  
1 t  a n d  s h i f t e d  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  c o r -
i m a r y  p u r p o s e "  a p p r o a c h ,  
2 0 8  
t h e  
s i s  f o r  i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e  s h a r e s ,  a n  
B O t  y e t  b e e n  m a d e  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  
1 o u l d  n o t  e x c u s e  a  l a c k  o f  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  
: d f e r .  N o n d i s c l o s u r e  o f  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  
l a t i o n s .  A t  s t a t e  c o u r t  l e v e l s ,  i t  m a y  b e  
a n c e d  b e y o n d  t h e  l i m i t e d  v i e w  e x p r e s s e d  
t p . ,  3 7  D e l .  C h .  5 9 ,  1 3 6  A . 2 d  6 9 0  ( S u p .  
.  a  p o t e n t i a l  t e n d e r  o f f e r  w a s  " w h o l l y  
w h i c h  s t o c k h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  w a s  s o u g h t ,  
t i o n  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  i n a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  
o f f e r .  l d .  a t  6 4 ,  1 3 6  A . 2 d  a t  6 9 3 .  
r e p u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s  i n  a  d e f e n s i v e  c o n -
j e c t i o n s  b a s e d  u p o n  t r a d i t i o n a l  g r o u n d s  
·  s h a r e s  i s s u e d  o r  e x c e s s i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o u s  s h a r e h o l d e r  c o n s e n t  w o u l d  p r e c l u d e  
I n c . ,  3 3  D e l .  C h .  6 9 ,  7 4 ,  9 0  A . 2 d  6 5 2 ,  
~ w h o  c a u s e  u n i s s u e d  o r  t r e a s u r y  
l e l y  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  o b t a i n i n g  o r  
e a c h 1  t h e i r  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  t o  t h e  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  5 2 3  
e x t i n g u i s h m e n t  o f  a  d e b t  o w e d  t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  b y  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  w a s  
u n d e r m i n e d  b y  s e r i o u s  q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  a n d  a m o u n t  o f  s u c h  
d e b t .  
2 0 9  
T h e s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  l e d  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  o f  c o n t r o l ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  b o n a  f i d e s  o f  t h e  d e b t ,  m o t i v a t e d  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s .  
2 1 0  
T h e  u n f o r t u n a t e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t ,  h a d  t h e  d e b t  b e e n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  s h i f t  i n  c o n t r o l  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  a c c o m p l i s h e d  d e s p i t e  
s h a r e h o l d e r  o b j e c t i o n .  I f  d i r e c t o r s '  a c t i o n s  a r e  u p h e l d  u n d e r  b u s i n e s s  j u d g -
m e n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w h e n e v e r  t h e r e  i s  " a n y  r a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  p u r p o s e , "
2 1 1  
t h e  e x t i n g u i s h m e n t  o f  a  l e g i t i m a t e  d e b t  m a y  w e l l  s u f f i c e ,  d e s p i t e  e f f e c t s  
u p o n  c o n t r o l  o r  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  m e a s u r e s .  
M a n d a t i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  i n  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  i m m i n e n t  
t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t s ,  a v o i d s  t h e  h a i r - s p l i t t i n g  p r o b l e m s  c r e a t e d  b y  
" p r i m a r y , "  " s o l e , "  " b o n a  f i d e s , "  a n d  s i m i l a r  a m b i g u o u s  s t a n d a r d s .
2 1 2  
S h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a c t i o n s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  
t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i s  t h e  a c c e p t e d  n o r m  i n  E n g l a n d ,  p u r s u a n t  t o  t h e  C i t y  C o d e  
o n  T a k e - O v e r s  a n d  M e r g e r s .
2 1 5  
A m o n g  t h e  G e n e r a l  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  
C o d e ,  r e g a r d e d  a s  " g o o d  s t a n d a r d s  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  b e h a v i o r ,  "
2 1
•  i s  t h e  p r o -
v i s i o n  t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  a n  a c t u a l  o r  i m m i n e n t  o f f e r ,  n o  a c t i o n  
m a y  b e  t a k e n  b y  t h e  B o a r d  w i t h o u t  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t h a t  
" c o u l d  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e s u l t  i n  a n y  b o n a  f i d e  o f f e r  b e i n g  f r u s t r a t e d  o r  i n  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  o f f e r e e  c o m p a n y  b e i n g  d e n i e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
d e c i d e  o n  i t s  m e r i t s . "
2 1 5  
T h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o n  B o a r d  a c t i v i t y  i s  f u r t h e r  
2 0 9 .  I d .  
2 1 0 .  l d .  a t  2 0 7 - 0 8 .  
2 1 1 .  K a p l a n  v .  G o l d s a m t ,  3 8 0  A . 2 d  5 5 6 ,  5 6 8  ( D e l .  C h .  1 9 7 7 ) .  
2 1 2 .  T h e  d u a l i t y  o f  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e p t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  b y  t h e  B o a r d ' s  a r g u m e n t  i n  
C h i c a g o  S t a d i u m  C o r p .  v .  S c a l l e n ,  5 3 0  F . 2 d  2 0 4  ( 8 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 6 ) ,  t h a t  " t h e  B o a r d  f e l t  t h a t  
i t  w a s  i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  s t o c k h o l d e r s  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  M r .  S c a l l e n ' s  i n v o l v e m e n t  w i t h  
t h e  i c e  s h o w  b u s i n e s s  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f s  w o u l d  
t e r m i n a t e  M r .  S c a l l e n . "  I d .  a t  2 0 7  n . 3 .  I s  t h i s  n o t  a  j u d g m e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  w o u l d  b e  h a r m e d  b y  a  s u d d e n  c h a n g e  i n  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  i s  n o t  s u c h  j u d g -
m e n t  a p p r o p r i a t e  w i t h i n  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  m o d e l ?  I f  s o ,  a s  m a n y  w o u l d  a r g u e ,  t h e n  d o e s  t h e  
f i d u c i a r y  c o n c e r n  w i t h  c o r p o r a t e  w e l f a r e  p e r m i t  a c t i o n  o t h e r w i s e  b a r r e d  b y  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  
l i m i t a t i o n  u p o n  m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  c o n t r o l ?  T h e  c o n f l i c t  c r e a t e d  b y  f i d u c i a r y  
c o n c e p t s  i s  n o t  r e s o l v e d  e x c e p t  b y  a r b i t r a r y  p r e s u m p t i o n s  o f  p r i o r i t y .  
2 1 3 .  T h e  C i t y  C o d e ,  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  t h e  f o r c e  o f  l a w ,  b u t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  g o v e r n  
c o m m e r c i a l  b e h a v i o r  i n  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t ,  i s  i s s u e d  u n d e r  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  C i t y  
W o r k i n g  P a r t y ,  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  b o d y  o f  b a n k i n g  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  i n t e r e s t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  
t h e  g o v e r n o r s  o f  t h e  B a n k  o f  E n g l a n d  t o  c o n s i d e r  g o o d  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e  a n d  t h e  c o n d u c t  
o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a n d  m e r g e r s .  T H E  C I T Y  C O D E  O N  T  A K E - 0 V E R S  A N D  M E R G E R S  ( R e v .  A p r .  
1 9 7 6 ) .  
2 1 4 .  I d .  a t  4 .  
2 1 5 .  l d .  G e n e r a l  P r i n c i p l e  N o .  4 ,  a t  1 2  s t a t e s :  
A t  n o  t i m e  a f t e r  a  b o n a  f i d e  o f f e r  h a s  b e e n  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  a n  
o f f e r e e  c o m p a n y  o r  a f t e r  t h e  b o a r d  o f  a n  o f f e r e e  c o m p a n y  h a s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  a  b o n a  f i d e  o f f e r  m i g h t  b e  i m m i n e n t  s h a l l  a n y  a c t i o n  b e  t a k e n  b y  t h e  b o a r d  
o f  t h e  o f f e r e e  c o m p a n y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  
a p p r o v a l  i n  g e n e r a l  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  o f f e r e e  c o m p a n y ,  w h i c h  
c o u l d  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e s u l t  i n  a n y  b o n a  f i d e  o f f e r  b e i n g  f r u s t r a t e d  o r  i n  t h e  
}  
D  
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specified in rule 38 of the Code, in which shareholder approval is expressly 
required for the issuance of any shares, the issuance or grant of options or 
convertible rights, the sale of a material amount of assets, and any other 
contract not in the ordinary course of business. 216 
Although the scope of the English model may not appeal in all of its 
aspects to authorities on this side of the Atlantic, its basic philosophy is 
consistent with the sale of control analogue and the avoidance of 
discriminatory treatment between control and noncontrolling share-
holders. To those who argue that shareholders will uniformly reject 
regardl~ss of merit corporate transactions that impinge upon the tender 
offer, it should be noted that both the English and proposed models pro-
vide for shareholder consideration of the merits of the issuance of shares, 
not a shareholder vote on acceptance or rejection of the tender offer. 217 
Moreover, it would be inappropriate to place upon noncontrolling 
shareholders presumptions and burdens that exceed limitations placed 
upon sales of control by dominant shareholders. The latter are free, sub-
ject to the noted limitations, 218 to sell their shares pursuant to their own 
financial interests. Noncontrolling shareholders, therefore, should not be 
denied the opportunity to approve or reject defensive measures simply 
because they too may be motivated by personal financial interests. 219 
shareholders of the offeree company being denied an opportunity to decide on 
its merits. 
216. Id. at 30-31. 
217. The arguments in Lipton, supra note 93, at 123-24, against a shareholder 
referendum on tender offers presumed that the sole issue before shareholders is the accep-
tance or rejection of the offer. The English and proposed models both regard the tender 
offer as a matter of disclosure. Primary emphasis in such votes will be upon the merits of 
the proposed transaction, a somewhat different context, although admittedly one that 
would undoubtfully be influenced by the effect that the transaction would have on the 
impending offer. 
218. See notes 171-80 supra and accompanying text. 
219. Required shareholder approval of an increase in authorized shares indirectly 
places the question of issuance before the shareholders. Often, however, corporations are 
organized with or develop a surplus of authorized but unissued shares for indeterminate, 
future purposes, and shareholder approval in calmer times is given without attention to 
the ultimate use of such shares to thwart takeover bids or aggrandize management con-
trol. There is little logical basis for permitting management of Corporation X with an 
excess of authorized, unissued shares unilaterally to use such shares for defensive purposes 
without shareholder approval, while management of Corporation Y, enjoying no such 
excess, must obtain shareholder approval in the context of full disclosure of purpose and 
effect. The former simply rewards management foresight, at the considerable expense of 
abusing the good faith of shareholder approval. The district court in Treadway Cos. 
v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH), 
97,603 (2d Cir. 1980), was notably disturbed by the repeated efforts of target manage-
ment to issue shares in a manner "so as to avoid shareholder scrutiny." Id. at 686. The 
issuance created a market shift in control, yet the court of appeals inexplicably failed to 
recognize that management's conduct substantially distorted any original purpose for the· 
authorization of such shares and, indeed, would not have been possible but for the for-
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b  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  i s  e x p r e s s l y  
t h e  i s s u a n c e  o r  g r a n t  o f  o p t i o n s  o r  
t l  a m o u n t  o f  a s s e t s ,  a n d  a n y  o t h e r  
> u s i n e s s .  
2 1 6  
m o d e l  m a y  n o t  a p p e a l  i n  a l l  o f  i t s  
1 e  A t l a n t i c ,  i t s  b a s i c  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  
a n a l o g u e  a n d  t h e  a v o i d a n c e  o f  
n t r o l  a n d  n o n c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e -
l a r e h o l d e r s  w i l l  u n i f o r m l y  r e j e c t  
m s  t h a t  i m p i n g e  u p o n  t h e  t e n d e r  
U i g l i s h  a n d  p r o p o s e d  m o d e l s  p r o -
. e  ~erits o f  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a r e s ,  
t r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  z n  
~ t o  p l a c e  u p o n  n o n c o n t r o l l i n g  
a s .  ~hat e x c e e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  p l a c e d  
~holders. T h e  l a t t e r  a r e  f r e e ,  s u b -
b e i r  s h a r e s  p u r s u a n t  t o  t h e i r  o w n  
~holders, t h e r e f o r e ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  
r e j e c t  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  s i m p l y  
p e r s o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  ! 1
9  
d e n i e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d e c i d e  o n  
~ 9 3 ,  a t  1 2 3 - 2 4 ,  a g a i n s t  a  s h a r e h o l d e r  
~le i s s u e  b e f o r e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i s  t h e  a c c e p -
p r o p o s e d  m o d e l s  b o t h  r e g a r d  t h e  t e n d e r  
1  i n  s u c h  v o t e s  w i l l  b e  u p o n  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  
:  c o n t e x t ,  a l t h o u g h  a d m i t t e d l y  o n e  t h a t  
t h a t  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  w o u l d  h a v e  o n  t h e  
1 1 g  t e x t .  
n c r e a s e  i n  a u t h o r i z e d  s h a r e s  i n d i r e c t l y  
D l d e r s .  O f t e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  
I I  b u t  u n i s s u e d  s h a r e s  f o r  i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  
t i m e r  t i m e s  i s  g i v e n  w i t h o u t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
e r  b i d s  o r  a g g r a n d i z e  m a n a g e m e n t  c o n -
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  C o r p o r a t i o n  X  w i t h  a n  
t o  u s e  s u c h  s h a r e s  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  p u r p o s e s  
n t  o f  C o r p o r a t i o n  Y ,  e n j o y i n g  n o  s u c h  
c o n t e x t  o f  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  p u r p o s e  a n d  
F o r e s i g h t ,  a t  t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x p e n s e  o f  
I .  T h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  i n  T r e a d w a y  C o s .  
1 8 0 ) ,  r e v ' d ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  ( C C H )  ,  
·  t h e  r e p e a t e d  e f f o r t s  o f  t a t g e t  m a n a g e -
!  s h a r e h o l d e r  s c r u t i n y . "  I d .  a t  6 8 6 .  T h e  
e  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a l s  i n e x p l i c a b l y  f a i l e d  t o  
~y d i s t o r t e d  a n y  o r i g i n a l  p u r p o s e  f o r  t h e · ·  
n o t  h a v e  b e e n  p o s s i b l e  b u t  f o r  t h e  f o r -
i l l .  ~ee n o t e  1 1 2  s u p r a .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 2 5  
3 .  R e p u r c h a s e  o f  S h a r e s  
D e c i s i o n m a k i n g  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  r e p u r c h a s e  o f  s h a r e s  i s  o r d i -
n a r i l y  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  a s  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  c o n f e r  n o  
e x p r e s s  p o w e r s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  r e l a t i v e  t o  s u c h  d e c i s i o n s .  u o  R e p u r c h a s e  
p r o g r a m s  m a y  b e  b a s e d  u p o n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  p u r p o s e s ,  s u c h  a s  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  e x c e s s  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n ,  o b t a i n i n g  s h a r e s  f o r  s t o c k  o p t i o n  o r  
o t h e r  u s e ,  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  m o t i v a t i o n s  w h e n  d i r e c t o r s  r e g a r d  t h e  c o r -
p o r a t e  s t o c k  a s  u n d e r v a l u e d .  R e g a r d l e s s  o f  p u r p o s e ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e p u r -
c h a s e s  m a y  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a g g r a n d i z i n g  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s  h e l d  
b y  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  i n s i d e r s  t o  a  d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n  o r  a n  e f f e c t i v e  v e t o  
p o w e r . m  A  c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r ,  r e c o g n i z i n g  s u c h  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  i s  n o t  
l i k e l y  t o  p e r m i t  t h e  b o a r d  t o  u n d e r t a k e  a  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m  t h a t  w o u l d  
s e r i o u s l y  i m p e d e  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  t r a n s f e r  h i s  s h a r e s  b y  c r e a t i n g  a n  a n t a g -
o n i s t i c  m i n o r i t y  b l o c k  c a p a b l e  o f  v e t o i n g  m e r g e r  o r  o t h e r  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  
p l a n s .  z u  N o n c o n t r o l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  s h o u l d  b e  n o  l e s s  p r o t e c t e d .  T h u s ,  
u n d e r  a  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e ,  a n y  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m  t h a t  c a r r i e s  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p e r c e n t a g e  
h o l d i n g ,  o r  c r e a t e s  a  v e t o  p o w e r  w i t h i n  m a n a g e m e n t ,  s h o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  
t o  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  f o l l o w i n g  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  c o n t r o l  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  
I t  m a y  b e  a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w i l l  u n i f o r m l y  a p p r o v e  r e p u r -
c h a s e  p r o g r a m s  i n  n o n t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e x t s .  A p p r o v a l ,  h o w e v e r ,  w i l l  b e  
m u c h  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  w h e r e  t h e  p r o g r a m  m a y  s e r i o u s l y  i m p a i r  
a n n o u n c e d  o r  i m m i n e n t  t e n d e r  o f f e r s .  u s  
T h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  d e f e n s i v e  
m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  d u r i n g  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  c o n t e s t  a r e  n o t  g r o u n d s  f o r  d e n y i n g  
a  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  r o l e  t o  n o n c o n t r o l l i n g  h o l d e r s ,  f o r  i t  m a y  b e  n o  l e s s  
p r o b a b l e  t h a t  a  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r  w o u l d  p r e c l u d e  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
r e s t r a i n t s  i n  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  W h e r e  r e a s o n a b l e  c o n c e r n  o v e r  t h e  
2 2 0 .  D E L  C O D E  A N N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  1 6 0  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  M O D E L  B U S I N E S S  C O R P O R A T I O N  A C T  §  6  
( 1 9 7 5 ) .  
2 2 1 .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  n o t e  4 0  s u p r a  ( d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h e  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m  o f  M a r r i o t t  C o r -
p o r a t i o n ) .  
2 2 2 .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  s u p p o s e  t h e r e  i s  a  d o m i n a n t  5 0 %  s h a r e h o l d e r  a n d  a  3 0 %  m i n o r i t y  
b l o c k ,  a l o n g  w i t h  a  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  r e q u i r i n g  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  a p p r o v a l  o f  a  
m e r g e r .  A  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m  o f  l l %  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  s h a r e s ,  a s s u m i n g  a l l  s h a r e s  
a r e  t e n d e r e d  b y  n e u t r a l  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y  b l o c k  o w n i n g  i n  
e x c e s s  o f  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  s h a r e s ,  t h u s  b e i n g  c a p a b l e  o f  v e t o i n g  a n y  m e r g e r  
p r o p o s a l .  T h e  d o m i n a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r ,  t h r o u g h  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  b o a r d ,  w o u l d  a s s u r e  t h a t  t h e  
r i s k  o f  s u c h  a  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m  i s  a v o i d e d .  
2 2 3 .  T h e  r e c o m m e n d e d  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  a l l  r e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m s  c o n t r a s t s  
w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  o f  i s s u a n c e s  o f  s h a r e s  o n l y  o c c u r r i n g  
d u r i n g  a n  a c t u a l  o r  p e n d i n g  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  n o t e  2 0 5  s u p r a .  T h e  
d i s p a r i t y  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s u c h  v a r y i n g  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  R e p u r c h a s e  p r o g r a m s  
m a y  c r e a t e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  v e t o  b l o c k  w i t h i n  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  w i l l  I J . O t  b e  o v e r c o m e  b y  a n y  
s u b s e q u e n t  c o r p o r a t e  a c t i o n  w i t h o u t  m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o v a l .  T h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  
s h a r e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a y  r a i s e  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  b u t  m a y  n o t  s o  d e f i n i t i v e l y  
c r e a t e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  f o r e c l o s u r e .  T h i r d  p a r t y  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  s h a r e s ,  h o w e v e r  s u p p o r t i v e  t h e y  
m a y  b e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  m a y  i n  t i m e  s e l l  t h e i r  s h a r e s  t o  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  o r  s u c c u m b  t o  
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future corporate welfare exists, management's concerns should be tested 
in an independent forum, analogous to derivative actions that may be 
brought against controlling shareholders. For example, the repurchase of 
shares by management from the potential acquiror in Kors v. Careym 
may have been necessary to protect the goodwill and customer relations 
of the target corporation. It is possible that, if given the opportunity, 
shareholders would have disapproved the repurchase on the premise that 
the repurchase denied an opportunity for a premium sale of their shares. 
Inferences and assumptions about shareholder judgment, however, are 
inadequate bases to preclude shareholder involvement in favor of 
unilateral management action. If potential misuse, waste, or other 
serious concern reasonably exists-as it may have in Kors v. Carey-with 
regard to potential control of corporate assets by the acquiror, the proper 
response is not to deny shareholder involvement in decisionmaking, but 
rather to emphasize the right of management to seek an injunction 
against the acquisition of control. Litigation would focus attention upon 
the alleged potentialities of misuse in a context directly analogous to 
common-law limitations on the sale of control. Management, acting on 
behalf of the corporation, would seek to enjoin a collective sale of control 
on the grounds that the sale of shares cannot be made in circumstances 
indicating a significant danger of misuse or waste of corporate assets by 
the acquiring company. 
The proposed approach substantially equates the transferability 
rights of controlling and noncontrolling shareholders, permitting the lat-
ter the same opportunity to influence decisions affecting their abilities to 
sell as enjoyed by dominant shareholders. Concerns for corporate well-
being would be met not by unilateral management actions to issue or 
repurchase shares, but rather through litigation to enjoin the acquisition 
based upon standards discussed in the following section. 225 
224. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 53, 158 A.2d 136, 139 (1960). 
225. In Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), the court denied the tender 
offeror's motion for preliminary injunction against a competing repurchase offer institu· 
ted defensively by target corporation. /d. at 490. There was no explicit finding about cor· 
porate purpose other than a concem that the tender offer price was too low. A r~purchase 
program unilaterally adopted by target management in opposition to an announced offer 
may create for shareholders two offers rather than one. However, it does not follow that 
shareholders are therefore not adversely affected by target's competing offer. Where the 
target corporation, by acquiring a fairly limited number of shares, increases the percen· 
tage holding of shares of management to the point of an effective veto power, see text 
accompanying notes 39-41 supra, a target offer limited in scope may have the effect of 
eliminating, not enlarging, the transferability opportunities of shareholders. Although 
blocking of shareholder opportunity was apparently not involved in Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 
where the repurchase offer was for 350,000 shares, approximately 40% of the outstanding 
shares, competing tender offers by target corporation should not be regarded as favorable 
to shareholders in all circumstances. The text's recommendation of shareholder approval 
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227. 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1976); see All 
470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
228. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1976); see B. F. 
1349, 1351 (3d Cir. 1970). , 
229. 12 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220 (1980); 
Corp .• 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (S.D.l 
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) W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  ( 1 9 8 1 )  
m t e n t ' s  c o n c e r n s  s h o u l d  b e  t e s t e d  
: o  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n s  t h a t  m a y  b e  
: s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  r e p u r c h a s e  o f  
t t i a l  a c q u i r o r  i n  K o r s  v .  C a r e y u •  
~ g t \ O d w i l l  a n d  c u s t o m e r  r e l a t i o n s  
e  t h a t ,  i f  g i v e n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  
t e  r e p u r c h a s e  o n  t h e  p r e m i s e  t h a t  
t ) r  a  p r e m i u m  s a l e  o f  t h e i r  s h a r e s .  
: - e h o l d e r  j u d g m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r e  
t o l d e r  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  f a v o r  o f  
t e n t i a l  m i s u s e ,  w a s t e ,  o r  o t h e r  
m a r  h a v e  i n  K o r s  v .  C a r e y - w i t h  
a s s e t s  b y  t h e  a c q u i r o r ,  t h e  p r o p e r  
l ) } v e m e n t  i n  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ,  b u t  
t a g e m e n t  t o  s e e k  a n  i n  j u n c t i o n  
t r i o n  w o u l d  f o c u s  a t t e n t i o n  u p o n  
: a  c o n t e x t  d i r e c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  
o o n t r o l .  M a n a g e m e n t ,  a c t i n g  o n  
: S J l j o i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  
a n n o t  b e  m a d e  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
e  o r  w a s t e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a s s e t s  b y  
a l l y  ~equates t h e  t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  l a t -
c i s i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s  t o  
r 5 .  C o n c e r n s  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  w e l l -
n a n a g e m e n t  a c t i o n s  t o  i s s u e  o r  
: i g a t i o n  t o  e n j o i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n .  2 2 S  
1 9 6 0 ) .  
1  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  d e n i e d  t h e  t e n d e r  
I t  a  c o m p e t i n g  r e p u r c h a s e  o f f e r  i n s t i t u -
f h e r e  w a s  n o  e x p l i c i t  f i n d i n g  a b o u t  c o r -
l e r  o f f e r  p r i c e  w a s  t o o  l o w .  A  r e p u r c h a s e  
e n t  i l l ,  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a n  a n n o u n c e d  o f f e r  
n o n e .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h a t  
b y  t a r g e t ' s  c o m p e t i n g  o f f e r .  W h e r e  t h e  
l u m b e r  o f  s h a r e s ,  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p e r c e n -
i n t  o f  a n  e f f e c t i v e  v e t o  p o w e r ,  s e e  t e x t  
i m i t e d  i n  s c o p e  m a y  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
) ] ) O r t u n i t i e s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  A l t h o u g h  
: l y  n o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  M i t e  C o r p .  v .  D i x o n ,  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  4 0 %  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  
i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  f a v o r a b l e  
: o m m e n d a t i o n  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l  
a t  m a y  c r e a t e  t h e  a d v e r s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 2 7  
4 .  L i t i g a t i o n  
T h e  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e  d o e s  n o t  d e n y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a c t -
i n g  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  i n i t i a t e  i n j u n c t i o n  p r o -
c e e d i n g s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p e n d i n g  o r  p r o p o s e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  S u c h  a c t i o n s ,  
b r o u g h t  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  n o n t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y ,  a r e  a n a l o g o u s  t o  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i o n s  b r o u g h t  b y  
m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  e n j o i n  a  d o m i n a n t  
s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l .  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  a u t h o r i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  e x t e n d s  
b e y o n d  r a i s i n g  i s s u e s  s i m i l a r  t o  s u c h  c o m m o n - l a w  a n d  e q u i t a b l e  
r e s t r a i n t s  u p o n  t h e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  c o n t r o l .  I t  a l s o  e n c o m p a s s e s  a  p r o t e c -
t i v e  r o l e  f o r  t e n d e r i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  u n a b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  f r a g m e n t a -
t i o n  t o  l i t i g a t e  i n  a ·  c o l l e c t i v e  m a n n e r ,  t o  a s s u r e  a d h e r e n c e ,  w h e r e  
m a t e r i a l ,  t o  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  s a f e g u a r d s  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  z u  s t a t e  a n t i -
t a k e o v e r  s t a t u t e s ,  a n d  o t h e r  s t a t u t e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  I n v e s t m e n t  C o m p a n y  
A c t ,  Z Z
7  
t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  C o m m e r c e  A c t ,  
2 2 8  
a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
u s e  o f  l o a n s  t o  f i n a n c e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s .  
2 2 9  
A n t i t r u s t  l i t i g a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  o w i n g  t o  i t s  
p r e v a l e n c e ,  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  b u r d e n s o m e  d e l a y s ,  a n d  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
t a r g e t  t o  m a n u f a c t u r e  c l a i m s  t h r o u g h  d e f e n s i v e  a c q u i s i t i o n s .  M a r s h a l l  
F i e l d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s o u g h t  t o  b o o t s t r a p  i t s  a n t i t r u s t  c l a i m s  a g a i n s t  a  p r o -
p o s e d  C a r t e r  H a w l e y  H a l e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  b y  a  h u r r i e d  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t o r e s .  
2 3 0  
M o r e o v e r ,  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  d i r e c t o r s  f a i l e d  t o  d i r e c t  
a d e q u a t e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  w h e t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  a n t i t r u s t  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  
r e s o l v a b l e  b y  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o m p a n y .  
2 3 1  
T h e s e  f a c t o r s ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  f u n d s  c r e a t e d  b y  a n t i t r u s t  l i t i g a -
t i o n ,  s u g g e s t  t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  s t a n d a r d s  s h o u l d  a p p l y  p r i o r  t o  t h e  
i s s u a n c e  o f  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r :  
2 2 6 .  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  s e e  n o t e  1  s u p r a ,  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t i m e l y  f i l i n g  o f  s c h e d u l e s  1 3 d  a n d  
1 4 d ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n  §  1 4 ( e )  o f  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  a l l  m a t e r i a l  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  o f f e r ,  w e r e  d e s i g n e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  P i p e r  v .  C h r i s - C r a f t  I n d u s . ,  I n c . ,  4 3 0  U . S .  1 ,  3 5  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  S h a r e h o l d e r s  a n x -
i o u s  t o  a c c e p t  a  p r e m i u m  o f f e r  a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  i n i t i a t e  l i t i g a t i o n .  M a n a g e m e n t  t h e r e f o r e  
i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h r u s t  i n t o  t h e  r o l e  o f  e n f o r c i n g  W i l l i a m s  A c t  r c ; q u i r e m e n t s .  S i m i l a r  c o n -
c e r n s  i n v o l v e  p o t e n t i a l  v i o l a t i o n s  u n d e r  r u l e  1 0 b - 5 ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  o b l i g a t i o n s  
u n d e r §  1 4 e  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  r e n d e r e d  s u p e r f l u o u s  r u l e  1 0 b - 5  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  R .  J E N N I N G S  
&  H .  M A R S H ,  S E C U R I T I E S  R E G U L A T I O N  7 3 7  ( 4 t h  e d .  1 9 7 7 ) .  
2 2 7 .  1 5  U . S . C .  §  8 0  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  s e e  A r m o u r  &  C o .  v .  G e n e r a l  H o s t  C o r p  . .  2 9 6  F .  S u p p .  
4 7 0 ,  4 7 6  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 6 9 ) .  
2 2 8 .  4 9  U . S . C .  §  5  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  s e e  B .  F .  G o o d r i c h  C o .  v .  N o r t h w e s t  I n d u s . ,  I n c . ,  4 2 4  F . 2 d  
1 3 4 9 ,  1 3 5 1  ( 3 d  C i r .  1 9 7 0 ) .  
2 2 9 .  1 2  C . F . R .  § §  2 0 7 ,  2 2 0  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ;  s e e  M e t r o  G o l d w y n  M a y e r ,  I n c .  v .  T r a n s a m e r i c a  
C o r p . ,  3 0 3  F .  S u p p .  1 3 5 4 ,  1 3 5 6  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 6 9 ) .  
2 3 0 .  D u r i n g  t h e  p e n d e n c y  o f  i t s  a n t i t r u s t  c l a i m  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  e n t e r e d  i n t o  a g r e e m e n t s  
t o  a c q u i r e  f i v e  L i b e r t y  H o u s e  s t o r e s  i n  T a c o m a ,  W a s h i n g t o n  a n d  P o r t l a n d ,  O r e g o n ,  a n d  
a  s h o p p i n g  c o m p l e x  i n  H o u s t o n ,  T e x a s .  P a n t e r  v .  M a r s h a l l  F i e l d  &  C o . ,  4 8 6  F .  S u p p .  
1 1 6 8 ,  1 1 8 3  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 8 0 ) .  
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(a) Antitrust problems created by defensive acquisitions, that is, 
acquisitions initiated and made with knowledge of pending tender offers, 
should not be regarded as being raised in good faith unless such acquisi-
tions are pursuant to shareholder approval following full disclosure of 
the potential tender offer and antitrust implications. Otherwise, target 
management may achieve an effective block on the transferability of 
shares to the potential acquiror, utilizing antitrust laws in a manner that 
controlling shareholders, if given the opportunity, may consider objec-
tionable. 
(b) Judicial attention should be directed not simply to alleged anti-
trust problems, but also to whether any reasonable efforts were made to 
seek resolution of such problems. If antitrust concerns represent the most 
serious challenge to what may be an otherwise favorable merger, the 
directors' good faith in litigating such issues may be questioned where 
remedial possibilities are ignored or deliberately avoided. 282 
(c) A preliminary injunction against the tender offer may not be the 
most appropriate response even where potential antitrust problems are 
evident. Judge Friendly's oft-quoted statement in support of preliminary 
relief233 is not a signal for reflex injunctions against tender offers, but 
rather was designed to encourage district court judges to frame orders at 
an early stage that permit flexibility and accommodation of competing 
interests. The "variety of tools" available to courts include permitting the 
tender offer to proceed with sufficient safeguards so that potential 
divestiture or other remedy may be readily imposed if appropriate. Thus, 
temporary limitations upon the absorption or disposal of major assets, 
changes in employee and customer practices, and other protective 
measures maintain a relative status quo and facilitate a nondisruptive 
transition if remedial action is eventually required. 254 
232. Judicial cognizance of the use and effects of antitrust claims for defensive pur-
poses is well reflected by the circuit court's statement in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. 
Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974): 
[D)rawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained 
sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to 
obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the 
offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it per-
sists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail 
even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust 
violation has been shown. Such cases require a balancing of public and private 
interests of various sorts. 
Id. at 854. Accord, Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc., FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) 197,806, at 90,048-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
233. Judge Friendly observed: 
[D)istrict judges would do well to ponder whether, if a violation has been suffi. 
ciently proved on an application for a temporary injunction, the opportunity for 
doing equity is not considerably better then than it will be later on. The court 
will have a variety of tools useable at that stage. 
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 
1969). 
234. See United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y. 
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W A  L A W  R E V I E W  4 7 5  ( 1 9 8 1 ]  
d e f e n s i v e  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  
1 w l e d g e  o f  p e n d i n g  t e n d e r  o f f e r s ,  
n  g o o d  f a i t h  u n l e s s  s u c h  a c q u i s i -
o v a l  f o l l o w i n g  f u l l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .  O t h e r w i s e ,  t a r g e t  
b l o c k  o n  t h e  t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  o f  
r  a n t i t r u s t  l a w s  i n  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  
> p o r t u n i t y ,  m a y  c o n s i d e r  o b j e c -
~ted n o t  s i m p l y  t o  a l l e g e d  a n t i -
r e a s o n a b l e  e f f o r t s  w e r e  m a d e  t o  
rus~ c o n c e r n s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  m o s t  
1 t h e r w i s e  f a v o r a b l e  m e r g e r ,  t h e  
I S S u e s  m a y  b e  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e r e  
l b e r a t e l y  a v o i d e d .  2
3
~ 
.  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  m a y  n o t  b e  t h e  
> o t e n t i a l  a n t i t r u s t  p r o b l e m s  a r e  
m t e n t  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  
l i o n s  a g a i n s t  t e n d e r  o f f e r s ,  b u t  
:  c o u r t  j u d g e s  t o  f r a m e  o r d e r s  a t  
i  a c c o m m o d a t i o n  o f  c o m p e t i n g  
t o  c o u r t s  i n c l u d e  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  
t  s a f e g u a r d s  s o  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  
l y  i m p o s e d  i f  a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h u s ,  
i 9 n  o r  d i s p o s a l  o f  m a j o r  a s s e t s ,  
r a c t i c e s ,  a n d  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i v e  
1  a n d  f a c i l i t a t e  a  n o n d i s r u p t i v e  
y  r e q u i r e d .  
2 8 4  
s  o f  a n t i t r u s t  c l a i m s  f o r  d e f e n s i v e  p u r ·  
e n t  i n  M i s s o u r i  P o r t l a n d  C e m e n t  C o .  v .  
t ,  4 1 9  u . s .  8 8 3  ( 1 9 7 4 ) :  
i t  w o u l d  d o u b t l e s s  h a v e  r e m a i n e d  
t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  t y p i c a l l y  h o p e s  t o  
f r u s t r a t e  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  
l S i v e  g a m b i t  o f  a  t r i a l  o r ,  i f  i t  p e r -
~ c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  w i l l  f a i l  
l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  n o  a n t i t r u s t  
a  b a l a n c i n g  o f  p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  
r .  H i - S h e a r  I n d u s . ,  I n c . ,  F E D .  S E C .  L .  
• 8 0 ) .  
~ther, i f  a  v i o l a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  s u f f i -
a r y  i n j u n c t i o n ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
t h a n  i t  w i l l  b e  l a t e r  o n .  T h e  c o u r t  
a g e .  
I s  C o r p . ,  4 0 9  F . 2 d  9 3 7 ,  9 4 7  ( 2 d  C i r .  
1  C o r p . ,  4 6 6  F .  S u p p .  1 9 6  ( N . D . N . Y .  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  
5 2 9  
( d )  I n  c a s h  t e n d e r  o f f e r  s i t u a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  
s u b s t a n t i a l  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s ,  t h e  c o s t s  o f  d i v e s t i t u r e  a n d  d a m a g e s  
o c c a s i o n e d  b y  a n t i t r u s t  p r o b l e m s  w i l l  b e  b o r n e  h e a v i e s t  b y  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  
c o m p a n y .  A l t h o u g h  d i v e s t i t u r e  m a y  c r e a t e  a d v e r s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t o  
t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t e  i n t e r e s t s  s u c h  a s  g o o d w i l l ,  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s ,  a n d  
e m p l o y e e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  a n d  p r e a c q u i s i t i o n  s t a t u s  q u o  m a y  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
c o m p l e t e l y  a c h i e v e ,  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  m a y  b e  r e m o t e  a n d  o f  u n c e r t a i n  
e x t e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  s u p p l i e r s  a n d  e m p l o y e e s  o f  t h e  a c q u i r e d  c o m p a n y  m a y  
h a v e  a d e q u a t e  i n s u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  d i v e s t i t u r e  b y  n o r m a l  c o n -
t r a c t u a l  p r o c e s s e s  o r  l e v e r a g e .  
T h e  f o r e g o i n g  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  a  c a u t i o u s  j u d i c i a l  r e s p o n s e  t o  t a r g e t  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c l a i m s  o f  a n t i t r u s t  v i o l a t i o n s ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  m a y  h a v e  
a n a l o g o u s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  o t h e r  c l a i m e d  v i o l a t i o n s  w h e r e  a d e q u a t e  
j u d i c i a l  r e l i e f  m a y  b e  f a s h i o n e d  s h o r t  o f  e n j o i n i n g  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  m  
R e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h i s  s t r i n g  i n  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  b o w  w o u l d  n o t  
c r e a t e  s u b s t a n t i a l ,  a d v e r s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o r  c o r p o r a t e  
i n t e r e s t s .  L e g i t i m a t e ,  n o n a n t i t r u s t  c o n c e r n s  o f  m i s u s e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a s s e t s  
o r  o f  o t h e r  a d v e r s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  c o n t r o l  t r a n s f e r e n c e  m a y  b e  a n s w e r ·  
a b l e  t h r o u g h  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  a n d  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  
2 5 6  
5 .  O t h e r  D e f e n s i v e  M e a s u r e s  
T h e  p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  h a s  f o c u s e d  u p o n  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  
e m p l o y e d  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  r a i s e ,  u n d e r  a  s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  
a n a l o g u e ,  s u b s t a n t i a l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l e g i t i m a c y .  A l t h o u g h  c e r t a i n  d e f e n s i v e  
m e a s u r e s  n o t  d i s c u s s e d  m a y  a l s o  b e  o f  d o u b t f u l  v a l i d i t y ,  s u c h  a s  a c c e l e r a  ·  
t i o n  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  l o a n  a g r e e m e n t s
2 5 7  
a n d  t h e  w i t h h o l d i n g  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r  
l i s t s ,  
2 5 8  
o t h e r  m e a s u r e s  g e n e r a l l y  d o  n o t  c r e a t e  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  u n d e r  a  
1 9 7 9 ) ,  w h e r e ,  a f t e r  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n  b a r r i n g  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  h a d  b e e n  d e n i e d ,  C a r -
r i e r  C o r p .  v .  U n i t e d  T e c h n o l o g i e s  C o r p . ,  1 9 7 8 - 2  T r a d e  C a s . ,  ,  6 2 , 3 9 3 ,  a t  7 6 , 3 7 8 ,  a f . f d ,  
1 9 7 8 - 2  T r a d e  C a s . ,  ,  6 2 , 4 0 5  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 7 8 ) ,  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  i s s u e d  a  H o l d  S e p a r a t e  
O r d e r  r e q u i r i n g  U n i t e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  C a r r i e r  " a s  a  s e p a r a t e  c o r p o r a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  C a r r i e r  
w i l l  b e  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  d i v e s t e d  p u r s u a n t  t o  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t  d e c r e e  . . .  "  4 6 6  F .  S u p p .  a t  
2 0 3 .  A c c o r d ,  A n a c o n d a  C o .  v .  C r a n e  C o . ,  4 l l  F .  S u p p .  1 2 1 0 ,  1 2 1 3  ( S . D . N . Y .  1 9 7 5 ) .  
2 3 5 .  O n e  e x a m p l e  i s  t h e  a l l e g e d  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  f e d e r a l  s h i p p i n g  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
l a w s  i n  G e n e r a l  H o s t  C o r p .  v .  T r i u m p h  A m e r i c a n ,  I n c . ,  3 5 9  F .  S u p p .  7 4 9  ( S . D . N . Y .  
1 9 7 3 ) ,  i n v o l v i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  m i n o r  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y .  I d .  a t  7 5 0 .  A l t h o u g h  
o t h e r  g r o u n d s  i n  t h e  c o m p l a i n t  l e d  t o  a  c u m u l a t i v e  e f f e c t  t h a t  c a u s e d  t h e  c o u r t  t o  i s s u e  a  
p r e l i m i n a r y  i n j u n c t i o n ,  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  u n f o r t u n a t e  h a d  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  m i n o r  a n d  
a p p a r e n t l y  r e s o l v a b l e  s h i p p i n g  a n d  F C C  i s s u e s  b e e n  a  d e t e r m i n a t i v e  f a c t o r  i n  p r e c l u d i n g  
t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  
2 3 6 .  T a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  r e g a r d  l i t i g a t i o n ,  i n  c o m m o n  w i t h  o t h e r  d e f e n s i v e  
m e a s u r e s ,  a s  a  t a c t i c  t o  f o r c e  a  h i g h e r  p r i c e  f r o m  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r o r  i f  t h e  o f f e r  c a n n o t  b e  
d e f e a t e d .  A n t i t r u s t  l i t i g a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  m e t h o d  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h i s  r e s u l t ,  f o r  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  b u l l e t  m a y  n o t  b e  r e a d i l y  s h o v e d  b a c k  i n t o  t h e  b a r r e l  e v e n  
t h o u g h  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  d r o p p e d .  S e e  
W a c h t e l l ,  s u p r a  n o t e  5 0 ,  a t  1 4 3 7 .  
2 3 7 .  S e e  n o t e  4 6  s u p r a .  
2 ! 1 8 .  S e e  M e s a  P e t r o l e u m  C o .  v .  A z t e c  O i l  &  G a s  C o . ,  4 0 6  F .  S u p p .  9 1 0 ,  9 1 4  ( N . D .  
:  




! I  
,,,~ 
530 66 IOWA LAW REVIEW 475 [1981] 
sale of control analogue. For example, a defensive merger with a "white 
knight" may be accomplished only pursuant to shareholder approval. 239 
Assuming full disclosure of the adverse effect of such a merger upon a 
pending tender offer, approval of the merger is equivalent to majority 
shareholder rejection of the tender offer. Broad-scale publicity cam-
paigns do not inhibit target shareholder options, are consistent with full 
disclosure goals, and may be adequately policed by the disclosure stan-
dards of the Williams Act. 240 Reduction in liquidity through increased 
cash dividends, premature debt repayments, and other uses of liquid 
assets may have relatively little impact as a brake upon a tender offer. 
Such measures may actually improve the capitalization structure of the 
target company, and in any event, they are governed by standards of 
waste and mismanagement that would give directors considerable pause 
prior to authorizing extraordinary cash outlays. w Other defensive 
techniques have not been evaluated primarily because any effort to 
catalogue and comment upon the whole of defensive strategies is doomed 
to rather quick obsolescence by the ingenuities of corporate management 
and counsel. It may be anticipated, however, that analysis of new 
measures as developed will be aided by the sale of control analogue, thus 
avoiding the obfuscation of inherently ambiguous or conflicting stan-
dards generally in vogue. 
6. Defensive Measures as a Means of Improving the 
Offering Price to Shareholders 
A more benign attitude is often taken towards management if their 
pursuit of aggressive defensive measures is viewed as a method of forcing a 
higher bid from the potential acquiror. Indeed, shareholders may often 
wind up with higher or competing offers as a result of management's 
belligerance. 242 When management believes the offering price to be too 
Tex. 1976); Commonwealth Oil v. Tesaro, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) 195,081, at 97,815-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
239. Although shareholder approval may not be required for the target corporation 
that is the survivor and issues no more than 20% of its shares to its acquired partner, this 
form of merger is far less effective a defensive measure than the more common merger of 
target corporation into its defensive partner. See, e.g., Broum Group to Acquire Outdoor 
Sports in "White Knight" Move Against Rivals, Wall St. J., May 8, 1979, at 12, col. 3. 
240. Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mass.), vacated on other 
grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975). 
241. Personal liability is imposed upon directors who consent to the payment of any 
cash dividends in excess of statutory limitations. DEL. CORP. CODE§ 174 (1974). Directors 
may also be personally liable for waste of corporate assets determined through derivative 
actions. See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962). 
242. Competing offers may develop through negotiated offers by "white knights" or 
from unexpected sources aroused to action during the period of delay created by defen-
sive techniques. Even in the absence of competing offers the bids may be raised to meet 
objections of inadequacy or to place increased pressure on management. See Kummer&: 
Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FINANCE 505, 514 
(1978) ("Comparatively speaking, premiums for the resisted tenders ... are significantly 
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~. a  d e f e n s i v e  m e r g e r  w i t h  a  " w h i t e  
u s u a n t  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r  a p p r o v a l .  U
9  
: s e  e f f e c t  o f  s u c h  a  m e r g e r  u p o n  a  
e  m e r g e r  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  m a j o r i t y  
o f f e r .  B r o a d - s c a l e  p u b l i c i t y  c a m -
l e r  o p t i o n s ,  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  f u l l  
t e l y  p o l i c e d  b y  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  s t a n -
: i o n  i n  l i q u i d i t y  t h r o u g h  i n c r e a s e d  
a y m e n t s ,  a n d  o t h e r  u s e s  o f  l i q u i d  
~t a s  a  b r a k e  u p o n  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  
t h e  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
h e y ,  a r e  g o v e r n e d  b y  s t a n d a r d s  o f  
i l  g i v e  d i r e c t o r s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a u s e  
c a s h  o u t l a y s .  
2 4 1  
O t h e r  d e f e n s i v e  
.  ·  p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  a n y  e f f o r t  t o  
! l e  o f  d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  i s  d o o m e d  
~uities o f  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  
l ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  o f  n e w  
~e s a l e  o f  c o n t r o l  a n a l o g u e ,  t h u s  
l y  a m b i g u o u s  o r  c o n f l i c t i n g  s t a n -
M e a n s  o f  I m p r o v i n g  t h e  
S h a r e h o l d e r s  
i t : k e n  t o w a r d s  m a n a g e m e n t  i f  t h e i r  
s i s  v i e w e d  a s  a  m e t h o d  o f  f o r c i n g  a  
r .  I n d e e d ,  s h a r e h o l d e r s  m a y  o f t e n  
f f e r s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
~lieves t h e  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e  t o  b e  t o o  
r 4 - 1 9 7 5  T r a n s f e r  B i n d e r ]  F E D .  S E C .  L .  R E P .  
, _  
o t  b e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  t a r g e t  c o r p o r a t i o n  
~of i t s  s h a r e s  t o  i t s  a c q u i r e d  p a r t n e r ,  t h i s  
1 1 e a s u i e  t h a n  t h e  m o r e  c o m m o n  m e r g e r  o f  
~. e . g . ,  B r o w n  G r o u p  t o  A c q u i r e  O u t d o o r  
W a l l  S t .  J . ,  M a y  8 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  a t  1 2 ,  c o l .  3 .  
p p .  6 6 0 ,  6 6 2  ( D .  M a s s . ) ,  v a c a t e d  o n  o t h e r  
c t o r s  w h o  c o n s e n t  t o  t h e  p a y m e n t  o f  a n y  
.  D E L .  C O R P .  C O D E §  1 7 4  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  D i r e c t o r s  
n t e  a s s e t s  d e t e r m i n e d  t h r o u g h  d e r i v a t i v e  
4 0 5 ,  4 0 9  ( D e l .  1 9 6 2 ) .  
a  n e g o t i a t e d  o f f e r s  b y  " w h i t e  k n i g h t s "  o r  
i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  d e l a y  c r e a t e d  b y  d e f e n ·  
i n g  o f f e r s  t h e  b i d s  m a y  b e  r a i s e d  t o  m e e t - ,  
n e s s u r e  o n  m a n a g e m e n t .  S e e  K u m m e r  a t - · j  
T e n d e r  O f f e r s ,  3 3  J .  F I N A N C E  5 0 5 ,  5 1 4  
·  t h e  r e s i s t e d  t e n d e r s  .  .  .  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n d y  
T E N D E R  O F F E R S  5 3 1  
l o w ,  a  s t r e n u o u s  p u b l i c i t y  c a m p a i g n  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  p e r h a p s  
o b l i g a t o r y .  
2 4 3  
M o r e  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t e  t o  j u d g i n g  w h e n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
p r i c e  i s  a  b o n a  f i d e  c o n c e r n  a n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h i c h  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  
m a y  b e  j u s t i f i e d  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  a u g m e n t i n g  t h e  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e .  A g g r e s s i v e  
d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  u n d e r t a k e n  u n i l a t e r a l l y  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  a n  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  p r i c e  i n a d e q u a c y .  A  m a r k e t  p r i c e  
v i e w e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  a s  u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  l o w  m a y  w e l l  b e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
p e r c e i v e d  j u d g m e n t s  a s  t o  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  M o r e o v e r ,  a  b i d  
t h a t  i s  i n  f a c t  i n a d e q u a t e  m a y  g e n e r a t e  c o m p e t i n g  b i d s  o f  h i g h e r  v a l u e s ,  
a n d  t h e  a d v a n c e  n o t i c e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  n u m e r o u s  s t a t e  s t a t u t e s
2
H  p r o v i d e  a  
t i m e  f r a m e  f o r  c o m p e t i n g  b i d s  t o  b e  f o r m u l a t e d .  I n  a n  e r a  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  
m e r g e r  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o m p e t i n g  b i d s  m a y  b e l i e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
a s s e r t i o n s  t h a t  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a v o i d  i n a d e q u a t e  
o f f e r s .
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M o r e v o e r ,  l i t i g a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  i n v o k i n g  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  
a r e  h i g h  r i s k  m e t h o d s  o f  a d d u c i n g  a  h i g h e r  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e ,  f o r  l e g a l  
a r g u m e n t s  o n c e  r a i s e d  m a y  n o t  b e  c o n v e n i e n t l y  i g n o r e d  w h e n  a  h i g h e r  b i d  
h a s  b e e n  o b t a i n e d .  
C O N C L U S I O N  
D e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  m e a s u r e s  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e -
m e n t  t h r o u g h  f i d u c i a r y ,  s t a t u t o r y ,  o r  e c o n o m i c  p e r s p e c t i v e s  i s  i m p e d e d  
b y  a m b i g u i t i e s  a n d  c o n f l i c t s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h o s e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s .  
E f f o r t s  t o  r e s o l v e  c o m p e t i n g  c l a i m s  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  m a c r o c o s m i c  t h e o r i e s  
h a v e  i n e v i t a b l y  c r e a t e d  c o n f l i c t i n g  a r g u m e n t s .  J u d i c i a l  r e s p o n s e  h a s  n o t  
c r e a t e d  c l a r i t y  b e c a u s e  o p i n i o n s  t e n d  t o  c o n f u s e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  a m o n g  s t a n -
d a r d s  a n d  o f t e n  f a i l  t o  a d d r e s s  a d e q u a t e l y  t h e  f u l l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p a r -
t i c u l a r  c o n c e p t s  c i t e d  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  
A n  e f f o r t  t o  a v o i d  i d e o l o g i c a l  a m b i g u i t i e s  t h a t  d e f y  c o n s e n s u s  o r  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  p a s s i v e  t e n d e r s . " ) .  F o r  d i s c u s s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t s  
o f  c o m p e t i n g  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i n i t i a t e d  b y  t a r g e t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  s e e  n o t e  2 2 5  s u p r a .  
2 4 3 .  I f  p r i c e  i n a d e q u a c y  i s  b a s e d  u p o n  n o n d i s c l o s e d  m a t e r i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  u n k n o w n  t o  
t h e  o f f e r o r  a n d  t a r g e t  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  r u l e  1 0 b - 5  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  m i g h t  r e q u i r e  d i s c l o s u r e  s o  
,  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  m a y  m a k e  i n f o r m e d  j u d g m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s t o c k .  T h e  
g o a l  o f  i n f o r m e d  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  b y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  h a s  b e e n  c i t e d  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  r e c o m ·  
m e n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t  b e  a m e n d e d  t o  r e q u i r e  m a n a g e m e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  f o r  a l l  t e n d e r  o f f e r s .  L y n c h  &  S t e i n b e r g ,  s u p r a  n o t e  7 4 ,  a t  9 3 8 .  M a n a g e m e n t  
i s  c u r r e n t l y  u n d e r  n o  d u t y  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t e n d e r  o f f e r s ,  B r o f f e  v .  H o r t o n ,  1 7 2  F . 2 d  4 8 9 ,  
4 9 4  ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9 4 9 ) ,  s u b j e c t  t o  d i s c l o s u r e  c o n c e r n s  n o t e d  a b o v e .  
2 4 4 .  D e l a w a r e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  r e q u i r e s  a  m i n i m u m  2 0  d a y s  a d v a n c e  n o t i c e  t o  t h e  c o r -
p o r a t i o n .  D E L .  C O D E  A N N .  t i t .  8 ,  §  2 0 3 ( a ) ( l )  ( S u p p .  1 9 7 8 )  .  
2 4 5 .  S e e  A .  F L E I S C H E R ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  1 0 0 - 0 1 ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t ,  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  p r o -
o f  a n  " a u c t i o n "  b y  r e a s o n  o f  t h e  d e l a y s  o c c a s i o n e d  b y  s t a t e  s t a t u t e s ,  " t h e  c o n t e n -
t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r  o p p o s i n g  a n  i n i t i a l  o f f e r  i n  o r d e r  t o  
a  b e t t e r  p r i c e  f o r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d . "  N o  i n d i c a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  a s  t o  w h a t  
" o p p o s i n g "  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  b u t  p r e s u m a b l y  t h e  a r g u m e n t  d o e s  n o t  s u g -
o r  c o u n t e n a n c e  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e c l u d e  h o s t i l e  o f f e r s  f r o m  p r o c e e d i n g  
i f  h i g h e r  b i d s  a r e  a c h i e v e d .  
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reasonable accommodation, and to view defensive measures in more 
direct and realistic terms, is reflected by the sale of control analogue. 
The analogue views the tender offer as an effort to achieve a collective 
sale of control through the common response of tendering shareholders. 
There is no persuasive justification for imposing greater impediments 
upon the collective sale of control than are imposed upon a dominant 
shareholder's private transference of control shares. Judicial limitations 
that have developed to restrain the actions of dominant shareholders are 
appropriate guidelines to evaluate restraints upon transferability 
imposed by defensive measures. In this context certain measures lack reas-
onable justification while others may be appropriate only if consistent 
with express or implied shareholder consent. Whatever the result of 
evaluation, the sale of control analogue is better suited than currently 
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